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Abstract

Moral rights, prohibited marks, and geographical indications (GI) appear in
Canadian intellectual property (IP) statutes and international IP instruments – but do not
mirror the characteristics of the classic IP triad (patents, copyrights, and trademarks). The
classic triad are alienable (tradeable, licensable, able to be transferred away by their
owners). Moral rights, prohibited marks, and GI are inalienable (not able to be transferred
to others by the persons entitled to them) and thus distinguishable from classic IP. This
research demonstrates another characteristic setting moral rights, prohibited marks, and
GI apart from classic IP: a common preoccupation with reputation or esteem.
The Copyright Act’s moral rights exist in performances and literary, dramatic,
musical and artistic works, linking works and performances to their creators’ identities
(rights of paternity) and giving creators non-transferable rights to maintain their works’
and performances’ integrity. Listed in the Trademarks Act, prohibited marks are not to
be used as trademarks, being reserved for designated persons, institutions, and
governments to use.
Found in the Trademarks Act, GI are not trademarks but symbols linked to quality
and reputation which indicate place of origin on certain types of products.
Protecting people’s reputations is the tort of defamation’s historic role, however,
studying reputation in defamation is hampered by the continuing role of juries in
Canadian civil and criminal defamation proceedings. Because Canadian jury
deliberations are secret, even judges presiding over jury trials do not learn how juries use
evidence when making findings involving reputation. The preponderance of Canadian
i

defamation decisions arise from jury trials and discuss reputation only in generalities and
abstract terms. In the judge-alone trials studied, no more specific reputation findings
were found than in jury trials. Theoretical work on reputation in defamation (including
that of Robert C. Post), then, was found not transferable to moral rights, prohibited marks
or GI. Analyzing reputation in defamation, therefore, is not helpful to understanding
reputation across moral rights, prohibited marks, and GI. Nonetheless, examination of
moral rights, prohibited marks. and GI themselves demonstrates reputation in the sense of
esteem and uniquely distinguishes the set of moral rights, prohibited marks, and GI from
classic IP.

Keywords: Reputation, Intellectual Property, Moral Rights, Prohibited Marks, Official
Marks, Geographical Indications, Defamation, Paris Convention, Reputation.
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Summary for Lay Audience

Copyright, trademark, and patent are classic intellectual property: tradeable,
licensable, and transferable. As well as including copyright, Canada’s Copyright Act
includes moral rights, giving authors and performers rights to be named on works and
performances, to insist on the integrity of works and performances, and to decide if works
or performances can be used with products, services, causes or institutions. In addition to
trademarks, Canada’s Trademarks Act protects both prohibited marks (like the Red Cross
or any country's flag) that Parliament designates as unavailable for trademark use, and
geographical indications (names and symbols stemming from their place of origin
protecting the quality and reputation of products). These three types of protection
appeared much later than copyright, trademark, or patent. Not one of them is tradeable,
licensable, or transferable, clearly distinguishing them from classic intellectual property,
but do they form a unique set of their own? If they do, is their common characteristic
‘reputation’? This research determined that reputation is involved in all three: in moral
rights, in the concept of integrity; in prohibited marks, in the history of the marks’
protection; in geographical indications, as one of the set of characteristics that can create
a geographical indication.
Reputation in law is most consistently linked with the concept of reputation
identified in the common law of defamation: can this ‘reputation’ be connected with that
found in moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical indications? Exploring
reputation in Canadian jurisprudence, this research shows the preponderance of jury trials
in defamation, and the secrecy to which Canadian juries are bound, means reputation’s
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meaning in Canadian defamation jurisprudence is largely undiscoverable. In the more
rare non-jury actions, judges did not link discussion on reputation to specific evidence.
Asking whether legal theory scholarship about reputation in defamation could be linked
to moral rights, prohibited marks or geographical indications led to the finding it could
not. Nonetheless, exploring moral rights, prohibited marks, and geographical indications
each in its own historical, international, and Canadian jurisprudential context led to the
finding that reputation as ‘esteem’ links all three, creating a common set distinguished
from classic intellectual property.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

A - Introduction
(a) Context
Canadian intellectual property enactments include at least two different types of
protection: firstly, classic intellectual property devices (patents, copyright, and
trademarks),1 which are known to be monopolies that bring economic benefits to their
owners and are characterized as tradeable, licensable, and transferable (and are therefore
alienable rights); secondly, devices such as moral rights (associated with copyright),
prohibited marks, and geographical indications (associated with trademarks), that are not
tradeable, not licensable, and not transferable (and are therefore inalienable rights). There
are other devices legislated in intellectual property statutes in Canada that are also not
tradeable, licensable, or transferable: data exclusivity2 associated with patent came with

1

The classic intellectual property triad is comprised of patent, copyright, and trademark. (This thesis does
not concern patents.) In the Introduction to The Future of Intellectual Property, Daniel J Gervais points out
that "[t]he term primary IP rights can be used to refer to rights in copyright, trademark, design and patent
law … [while] … [a]ding new rights to those primary rights instead of changing them produces secondary
rights." (Daniel J Gervais, ed, The Future of Intellectual Property [ATRIP Intellectual Property Series]
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2021) at 1 [emphasis in original]. This thesis will not follow the
classification of intellectual property rights into primary and secondary rights. Instead, it will refer to
copyright, patent, and trademark as classic rights, while moral rights, prohibited marks, and geographical
indications will be discussed as newer additions.
2

Data exclusivity (known as 'data protection' in Europe) is a concept that arose in the late twentieth century
in connection with the regulatory systems that nation states have put in place to ensure that dangerous drugs
are not distributed within their borders. In order to get the permission of Health Canada to distribute a drug,
whether in or out of patent, those seeking to distribute the drug must provide to Health Canada evidence of
the safety of the drug. This evidence includes evidence gained through clinical trials of the drug on patients.
Data exclusivity protection is linked to that health and safety data. Although data exclusivity protection
often comes to the drug manufacturer who holds the patent on a new drug (typically referred to as the
"brand" company) - because it is that manufacturer that often does the extensive testing that Health Canada
requires to be allowed to be the first to distribute the drug in Canada - data exclusivity protection is
completely independent of patent: data exclusivity protection is given to the drug manufacturer who first
collects the data through clinical trials, demonstrating the safety of the drug, and submits the data to Health
Canada. The monopoly created by data exclusivity is on the data, not on the drug.

2
the international intellectual property trade law requirement; technological protection
measures (TPM) and Rights Management Information (RMI) are found in the Copyright
Act3 (Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42, ss 41.21 and 41.22, respectively). This thesis
argues that it is the aspect of reputation that appears in the law of moral rights,4
prohibited marks, and geographical indications that links these three devices uniquely
together.5
Each of moral rights, prohibited marks (also known as official marks), and
geographical indications has, to varying degrees, been analyzed in the scholarly
literature,6 but no study has examined all three together. One rational for grouping these
three devices together in this thesis is based on the observation that each of these devices
appears to be an exception to the classic form of intellectual property with which it has
been associated: moral rights appear with, but is distinct from, copyright and both
prohibited marks and geographical indications appear with, but are distinct from,
trademark.

3

Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42.

‘Moral’ in the expression ‘moral rights’ in the protection of the literary and artistic works of authors is
different from the meaning of ‘moral’ in the sense of morality or ethics. For discussion of the earliest
origin of droits moraux (moral rights), see Susan P Liemer, “On the Origins of Le Droit Moral: How NonEconomic Rights Came to Be Protected in French IP Law,” (2011) 19:65 J Intell Prop L 65.
4

5

Of the three classic intellectual property devices, trademark does involve reputation, but reputation is
involved in trademark law from the perspective of being an element in deciding whether a trademark has a
public presence in association with goods or services – not in the sense of being of the essence in creating
the protection, as it is in the cases of the moral rights, geographical indications, and prohibited marks.
6

As will be demonstrated in the chapters below, there has been some scholarly literature exploring the
concept of reputation in association with moral rights (see Chapter 4). There is no previous literature about
the concept of reputation in association with prohibited marks (see Chapter 5). Finally, although
‘reputation’ is statutorily embedded within the definition of ‘geographical indication’ in Canada’s
Trademarks Act, as is described in Chapter 6, this area of law is newer to Canada than moral rights or
prohibited marks and is perhaps the least studied.

3
The idea of closely focussing on provisions that appear to be other than the classic
triad of patent, copyright, and trademark and yet have come to be considered in the
context of intellectual property (either in statutes or in international instruments) has been
the source of work done by Margaret Ann Wilkinson.
Wilkinson first contrasted copyright with personal data protection.7 In arguing
that personal data protection interests should be prioritized over intellectual property
interests, she noted that “the economic interests in copyright [in the Copyright Act] must
be balanced both with moral rights interests and with users’ rights [both also found in the
Copyright Act], pointing out that intellectual property does not stand above or apart from,
but must be balanced with, other interests.8 Later, noting that protection of confidential
information was clearly treated as intellectual property in the international context when
it was included in the TRIPS Agreement9 in 1994, Wilkinson analyzed its functioning
and concluded that it does not possess the classic characteristics of intellectual property
(tradeable, licensable and transferable) and is better considered amongst legal regimes
such as those governing secrecy, personal data protection and access to information.10
7

See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, "Battleground between New and Old Orders: Control Conflicts between
Copyright and Personal Data Protection" in Ysolde Gendreau, ed, An Emerging Intellectual Property
Paradigm: Perspectives from Canada (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008) (227-266), comparing
classic copyright with the emerging protection of what is known as personal data protection.
8

Ibid at 265, noting that Justice Bastarache, in writing for the majority of the Supreme Court in Harvard
College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 SCR 45, 2002 SCC 76, a patent case, was certainly
prepared to apply the Charter in the context of intellectual property in an appropriate case (at paras 177182).
9

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 15 April 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 UNTS 299; 33 ILM 1197 (entered
into force 1 January 1995) [TRIPS Agreement]
10

Margaret Ann Wilkinson, "The Confidentiality of Seclusion: Studying Information Flows to Test
Intellectual Property Paradigms" (Ch 3) in Courtney Doagoo, ed Intellectual Property for the 21st Century:
Interdisciplinary Approach (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014) (72-94). Wilkinson concludes
Nothing in the legal protection of personal data or privacy or confidentiality encourages the spread
of ideas in ways consistent with the basic tenets of IP: analytically, the essence of all three
(privacy, PDP, and confidentiality) is to exclude others completely from access. Intellectual

4
These latter regimes can be analyzed most effectively from the point of view of
information flow rather than an intellectual property perspective.11 She has examined and
compared confidential information, privacy law, and personal data protection.12
More recently, Wilkinson examined data exclusivity,13 which is required to be
protected under the provisions of TRIPS, noting that “[t]he existence of patent is not
necessary to the existence of data exclusivity”14 She observed, that, in a similar way in
the copyright context neither technological protection measures (TPM) nor Rights
Management Information (RMI)15 are dependent upon the existence of copyright in
works or other subject-matter. Nor do any of the three (data exclusivity, TPM or RMI)

property, on the other hand, encourages public dissemination of ideas. The tensions between the
exploitation of confidential information in a business context, providing appropriate PDP for
individuals in the context of those same businesses, and balancing privacy with demands for
access are becoming real social economic and political issues. [footnote omitted]. Recognizing
that these concepts – and the IP devices – are all facets of information flow and focussing on
analysis of situations from that perspective … will help the law respond to the emerging demands
of a changing society, one increasingly challenged by new claims asserted in respect of
information and flows of information and yet increasingly dependent upon information and
information flow. (at 91-92).
11

Ibid at 74. Questions of the flow of information in society, Wilkinson notes, depend upon the reality that
“[u]sers seek information and evaluate it to fit their needs based both on availability (access) and on the
perceived authority of the source of the information.” [emphasis in original]
12

Ibid. Neither the emerging Canadian tort of privacy (in 2012) nor the legislated federal, provincial and
territorial personal data protection statutes in Canada are typically seen as intellectual property. Wilkinson
concluded that protection of confidential information functions more like the privacy tort and personal data
protection legislation than like intellectual property and, therefore, should not be grouped with intellectual
property.
13

Wilkinson has found that data exclusivity falls outside of the Patent Act and is regulated through "the
federal Food and Drugs Act, and pursuant to it, the Data Protection Regulation of the Regulations
Respecting Food and Drug." See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, "Is Protection of Data through Data
Exclusivity, Technological Protection Measures or Right Management Information Actually Intellectual
Property?" (Ch 9) in Daniel J Gervais, ed The Future of Intellectual Property [ATRIP Intellectual Property
Series] (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2021) at 185. See also Margaret Ann Wilkinson, "Health Personal
Data and Data Exclusivity: Do the Subjects of, and Intellectual Property in, Data Complete?" in Mistrale
Goudreau and Margaret Ann Wilkinson, eds New Paradigms in the Protection of Investments, Data and
Signs (Montreal: Édition Yvon Blais, 2019) (263-285).
14

Margaret Ann Wilkinson, "Is Protection of Data through Data Exclusivity, Technological Protection
Measures or Right Management Information Actually Intellectual Property?", supra note 13 at 190.
15

Ibid.

5
share the characteristics of classic intellectual property rights of being tradeable,
licensable, and transferrable.16
When the classic intellectual property triad of patents, copyrights and trademarks
moved into trade agreements (while remaining still in the public international law sphere
as well), they appear to have become empowered. Yet while some associated devices also
moved into the trade agreement context (confidential information17, for instance), moral
rights did not, though they have existed in public international law for about a century.
The concept of geographical indications, on the other hand (as this thesis will describe),
entered Canada’s domestic law because of international trade obligations, not because of
public international law commitments Canada has made. Prohibited marks, as will also
be described below, have their origins in public international law even older than that of
the provisions establishing the moral rights – and are recognized in TRIPS. Presence or
absence in either of public international law or international trade law is not a
characteristic that can link the three devices studied in this thesis.
This thesis argues that what conceptually links the three devices of moral rights,
prohibited marks, and geographical indications as a unique set is the concept of
reputation embedded in each of them. In addition, it will be demonstrated that it is
reputation that distinguishes this unique triad of devices (moral rights, prohibited marks
and geographic indications) from the classic triad of intellectual property rights
(copyright, patent and trademark).

16
17

Ibid.

Recall that Margaret Ann Wilkinson argues that although the TRIPS Agreement includes protection of
confidential information amongst intellectual property protections, it does not possess the classic
characteristics of intellectual property and is better considered amongst legal regimes governing secrecy,
personal data protection and access to information. See Wilkinson, supra note 10.

6
Although moral rights are associated with copyright as both are connected with
works and performances, the moral rights are distinct from copyright18 and it was the
unique presence of reputation in moral rights19 (and not in copyright) that caught the eye
of this researcher.20 Looking for similar devices, this researcher was drawn to the
prohibited marks section in Canada’s Trademarks Act, a listing of symbols that cannot be
used as trademarks21 embedded in the trademark statute. These symbols include, for
example, symbols of royal family members, state and international institutions, and
universities. Although not explicitly articulated, reputation appears to have been
historically part of their social provenance – but has not been explored in legal
scholarship.
This thesis embraced the opportunity to explore the concept of reputation in
prohibited marks and to compare it with the concept of reputation as it is embedded in
moral rights protection.
A recent addition to the Canadian Trademarks Act,22 geographical indications
appear in international trade agreements together with trademark protection.23 As Tesh

18

It has been said that "while the two systems of copyright and moral rights have been demonstrated to be
distinct, they remain integrated by their focus upon works and their respective authors."(Margaret Ann
Wilkinson, "The Public Interest in Moral Rights Protection" (2006) Mich St L R 193 at 217).
19

As will be discussed further in the moral rights section below, s 28.2(1) of the Copyright Act, supra note
3, speaks of “the prejudice of … [the work’s or performance’s] author’s or performer’s honour or
reputation” [emphasis added].
20

It has been noticed that "the purpose of moral rights is to protect the reputation of the author" (Margaret
Ann Wilkinson & Natasha Gerolami, “The Author as Agent of Information Policy: The Relationship
Between Economic and Moral Rights in Copyright” (2009) 26:2 Gov Inf Q 321 at 327.) However, it has
not been known that scholars elaborated on how the concept of reputation connects to the specific category
of moral rights of integrity, nor has it been explored what aspect of reputation is associated with it.
21

Teresa Scassa, Canadian Trademark Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2015) at 197.

22

Trademarks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13. See Table 1 below.

23

In the TRIPS Agreement (supra footnote 9) geographical indications have a separate section.

7
Dagne has pointed out "[t]he interaction between GIs and trademarks is described in
various terms that indicate a conflicting relationship: 'tempestuous,' 'complex' and
'cobweb like.' … The two regimes have similarities in their functions, however."24 Dev
Gangjee notes
while GIs are located within intellectual property doctrine as distinctive
signs capable of generating a commercially valuable intangible
reputation, this is in a very different sense from trademark law. They are
tethered to place, open to all who satisfy the conditions for production
there and therefore do not easily fit within the category of private
property.25 [emphasis added]
The term "reputation" in the definition of geographical indications26 indicates that
‘reputation’ is a core requirement for geographical indication registration (detailed in
Chapter 6), whereas reputation is not an initial requirement for registered trademark
protection.
Geographical indications and their connection with classic trademarks was the
focus of earlier research conducted by Melissa Loucks.27 She concluded that
[a]s trademarks and geographical indications are unique devices that are
not interchangeable and it is possible for legislation to simultaneously
protect both, … trademarks and geographical indications are not in
conflict and can instead be viewed as harmonious tools.28

24

Tesh W Dagne, "The Narrowing Transatlantic Divide: Geographical Indications in Canada's Trade
Agreements" (2016) 10 European Review of Intellectual Property Law 598 at 604.
25

Dev Gangjee, "Quibbling Siblings: Conflicts between Trademarks and Geographical Indications" (2007)
82:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 1253 at 1257.
26

See Trade-marks Act, SC 1994, c 2, s 2.

27

Melissa A Loucks, Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Conflict or Coexistence? (LLM Thesis,
University of Western Ontario, Faculty of Law, 2012). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 850,
online: Scholarship@Western <https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/850>.
28

Ibid at 123.

8
As noted earlier, the prohibited marks and geographical indications are associated
with the Canada’s Trademarks Act 29 whereas the moral rights are found in the Copyright
Act30 in Canada.31 Because there is no definition of reputation in the Copyright Act32or
the Trademarks Act33, this thesis looks to the common law tort of defamation, which, as
will be demonstrated, is known to protect reputation, for exploration of the concept of
reputation. Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated, exploration of reputation in the context
of defamation has proven anything but straightforward. For instance, Andrew T Kenyon
has said that "it is not reputation but aspects of reputation that are protected by
defamation law. That is all defamation law has ever protected."34 [emphasis in original]
This thesis therefore looks at scholarly theorizing about reputation in defamation
(detailed in Chapter 2) and at evidence of reputation present in the primary legal

29

Currently prohibited marks are in Section 9 of the Trademarks Act, supra note 22; Geographical
indications are in ss 2, 11.1 – 11.24 of the Trademarks Act.
30

Copyright Act, supra note 3, ss 2, 14.1(1), 17.1(1), 28.2(1).

31

American author Xiyin Tang demonstrates, however, that moral rights have been considered in
connection with trademark principles in the American context. See Xiyin Tang, “The Artist as Brand:
Toward a Trademark Conception of Moral Rights” (2012) 122:1 Yale L J 218. This connection made in
American legal circles may be further evidence that a commonality between moral rights, prohibited marks
and geographical indications exists.
32

Copyright Act, supra note 3.

33

Trademarks Act, supra note 22. Passing off was a common law tort some time before trademarks were
enacted in statute in Canada. Passing off remains, to this day, an action protecting the owners of
unregistered trademarks who have acquired sufficient goodwill or reputation in marks and whose marks
have become distinctive in the marketplace. As noted by Catherine W Ng, in “The Law of Passing Off –
Goodwill Beyond Goods” (2016) 47:7 IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition
Law 817 at 825, “the term “pass off” first appeared in the headnote to the 1842 English case of Perry v
Truefitt” (citing to Perry v Truefitt (1842) 5 Beav 66, 49 ER 749 (Ch)). Canada’s first trademark legislation
was the Trade Mark and Design Act, 31 Vict, c 55, enacted in 1868. The concept of ‘reputation’ as used in
trademark-related discourse, whether statutory or in the context of passing off, is inextricably linked
directly with products and services. That sense of ‘reputation’ in trademark is illustrated in the language of
Justice Austin, for the Ontario Court of Appeal, in the passing off case of Ray Plastics Ltd v Dustbane
Products Ltd., 74 OAC 131, 57 CPR(3d) 474: “that the product had a reputation, that the get-up had a
secondary meaning.” This language is clearly distinct from the concept of ‘reputation’ as ‘esteem’ that is
the focus of this thesis.
Andrew T Kenyon, “Defamation, Privacy and Aspects of Reputation” (2018) 56:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 59 at
60 [emphasis in original].
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instruments of Canadian defamation law: statutes and cases (Chapter 3). Both scholarly
theorizing (Chapter 2) and doctrinal analysis (Chapter 3) of defamation law are then used
to explore the role of reputation in moral rights (Chapter 4), prohibited marks (Chapter 5)
and geographical indications (Chapter 6).
Figure 1, below, “Testing the Role of Reputation in Defamation and Intellectual
Property”, illustrates the principal elements of this thesis and the approach this research
takes.

Figure 1: Testing the Role of Reputation in Defamation and Intellectual Property
Reputation - known to be protected in
Common law
tort of:

Defamation: libel and slander
Reputation - testing for role in –

Intellectual
property law:

Copyright Act
Moral rights

Trademarks Act
Prohibited marks

Geographical
indications

David Vaver has pointed out that "[t]he regulation of patents protecting industrial
inventions, the oldest form of IP [intellectual property], goes back to a Venetian decree of
1474 (or to the English Statute of Monopolies of 1624)."35 He says copyright was
introduced later, "as a response to the protectionist bent of the early eighteenth century
London book trade.”36 The English Statute of Anne37 granted, for the first time, copyright

35

David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2011) at 1-2. The latter is often cited as Statute of Monopolies, 1623 (21) JAC 1, c 3.
36

Ibid at 2.

37

Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c 19 (1710).
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as a limited, alienable, monopoly for authors. The development of a related system in
civil law began not long after, in 1793 (known as "droit d'auteur").38 At this time no
theory of the moral rights was associated with copyright law. Margaret Ann Wilkinson
has explained that the early emergence of the economic rights in copyright39 was "suited
to the advancement of national economies."40
Although a form of trade marks was used in ancient times to identify goods,
modern trademark law is "a product of the Industrial Revolution, when judges started
protecting business names and symbols."41 Trademarks first appeared as a common law
construct enforced through passing off and other tort actions,42 but while the common law
actions continued, they "led to [statutory] systems of national trade-mark registration in
the second half of the nineteenth century."43 No concepts of either prohibited marks or
geographical indications were articulated in these early beginnings of trademark law.
Copyright and trademark are different intellectual property regimes, although the
two can co-exist in connection with a common physical symbology .44 Writing about this
phenomenon,45 Roger Hughes cites the Stork case46 in which, based on the same set of
38

See Wilkinson, supra note 18, at195.

39

As discussed further below, the moral rights are a much later addition.

40

Wilkinson, supra note 18, at 197.

41

Vaver, supra note 35 at 2.

42

Scassa, supra note 21, at 10.

43

Vaver, supra note 35, at 2.

44

See Craig S Mende & Belinda Isaac, "When Copyright and Trademark Rights Overlap" (Ch 7) in Neil
Wilkof & Shamnad Basheer, eds Overlapping Intellectual Property Rights (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012)
45

Hon Roger T Hughes, "Overlap and Redundancy (Redundancy) in Intellectual Property" (2018) 31:1 IPJ
19.
46

Stork Market Inc v 1736735 Ontario Inc. (Hello Pink Lawn Cards Inc), 2017 FC 779 (CanLII) [Stork
case].
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facts, "[t]he plaintiff succeeded in trademark infringement but lost in copyright
infringement."47 Hughes pointed out that the same set of facts can give rise to different
causes of action in intellectual property. Hughes concluded that overlap and redundancy
in intellectual property not only exists but "[i]t is unnecessary to eliminate overlap and
redundancy." 48
Although moral rights appear in the Copyright Act and prohibited marks and
geographical indications in the Trademarks Act moral rights are separate from copyright
and prohibited marks and geographical indications are separate from trademark. This
thesis will demonstrate that evidence of reputation can be involved with devices that
themselves are associated with different areas of intellectual property.

(b) Scope
(i) About intellectual property
The first known appearance of the term "intellectual property" was in an
eighteenth-century British periodical.49 At the end of the nineteenth century, the term
“intellectual property” appeared in the French name of the first international office
uniting the international bureaus administering patent and copyright: “Bureaux

47

Hon Roger T Hughes, supra note 45, at 22.

48

Ibid at 22. The overlapping in intellectual property rights was addressed in Neil Wilkof & Shamnad
Basheer, eds, Overlapping Intellectual Property Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). For this
thesis of particular interest are the following chapters: Craig S Mende & Belinda Isaac, "When Copyright
and Trademark Rights Overlap" (Ch 7); Mira T Sundara Rajan, "Moral Rights or Economic Rights" (Ch
10); David Llewelyn, "Protection of 'Famous' Marks under Trademark Law and Passing Off" (Ch 11); Dev
S Gangjee, "Overlaps between Trademarks and Geographical Indications" (Ch 13).
The use of the term “intellectual property” occurred in an article entitled “Conclusion of the Account of
Dr. Smith’s New and General Systems of Physic, from the last Review, p.194” in Monthly Review; or,
Literary Journal: by Several Hands, Volume XLI (London, UK: printed for R. Griffiths: And Sold by T.
Becket and P.A. De Hondt, in the Strand. M,DCC,LXIX [1769]).
49
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internationaux réunis pour la protection de la propriété intellectuelle” (known under its
French acronym BIRPI) in the second half of the twentieth century.50 The term
"intellectual property" received broad international acceptance only after it emerged in
the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization51 in 1967
[known as the WIPO Convention] as a term embracing a list of rights "resulting from
intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields."52 Article 2(viii)
of the WIPO Convention reads in full as follows:
‘intellectual property’ shall include the rights relating to:
- literary, artistic and scientific works,
- performances of performing artists, phonograms, and broadcasts,
- inventions in all fields of human endeavor,
- scientific discoveries,
- industrial designs,
- trademarks, service marks, and commercial names and designations,
- protection against unfair competition,
and all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial,
scientific, literary or artistic fields.53

Multilateral treaties created in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century began
to bring international standardization to intellectual property. First, in 1883, the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 54 began to standardize patent and

50

See Darinka Tomic, "Finding the Role and Definition of Intellectual Property" (Ch 3) in The Right to
Food and the Right to Intellectual Property in the United Nations (including International Human Rights)
and International Trade: Finding the Definition (MSL Thesis, The University of Western Ontario, Faculty
of Law, 2017). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 4672, online: Scholarship@Western
<https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4672>.
51

WIPO, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (Signed in Stockholm on
July 14, 1967, and as amended on September 28, 1979.
52

Ibid art 2(viii).

53

Ibid.

54

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 20 March 1883, as revised at Brussels on
December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on
June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and as amended on
September 28, 1979, 828 UNTS 305 [Paris Convention].
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trademark internationally, then three years later, the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works55 began the same process of standardization for copyright.
Intellectual property received enhanced attention across the globe after its historic
'crossover' into international trade through the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).56 Intellectual property law continues to develop
internationally both through public international law and in international trade law.

(ii) Moral rights
Conceptions of moral rights
spread into many copyright environments from France and Germany,
which, early in the nineteenth century, recognized rights such as the right
of divulgation or disclosure (the author’s right to control if and when the
work will be published), the right of paternity or attribution (the author’s
right to be identified with the work …), and the right of withdrawal or
repentance (the author’s right to withdraw a work from public
circulation).57
Moral rights originated from the French civil law tradition (droits moraux),
referring to individual, personal, and thus inalienable rights, of an author of literary or
artistic works. Certain moral rights were added to the public international Berne
Convention in the 1928 Rome Revision of that treaty.58 The article reads as follows:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the
work, as well as the right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other

55

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, as revised in
Paris, 24 July 1971, 1161 UNTS 30, Can TS 1998, No 1 (Index) (as amended on 28 September 1979,
entered into force 19 November 1984) [Berne Convention].
56

Supra note 9.

57

Wilkinson, supra note 18 at 195.

58

Berne Convention, supra note 55 (Article 6bis added at Rome in 1928.)
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modification of the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation. [emphasis added]59
Canada instantiated moral rights in its Copyright Act in 1931.60 The added
subsection read as follows:
Independently of the author's copyright, and even after the assignment,
either wholly or partially, of the said copyright, the author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work, as well as the right to restrain any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of the said work which would
be prejudicial to his honour or reputation. [emphasis added]61
Margaret Ann Wilkinson has put the creation of moral rights in the following
context:
However, the emerging dominance of the corporate business structure
over the older sole proprietorships and partnerships led to ownership of
the original (economic) rights in copyright lying overwhelmingly with
corporate interests. This, in turn, led many nations to recognise a need
for new rights related to, but apart from, the economic rights in
copyright: hence the rise of those rights eventually grouped as “the
moral rights.”62 [emphasis added]
In addition, and in support of this initial observation, this thesis argues that moral
rights are an exception to copyright though associated with it. K E Gover has said that
“[m]oral rights are a collection of rights designed to recognize and protect the non-

59

Ibid, art 6bis (1) [emphasis added].

60

An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, SC (21-22 Geo V), c 8 (assented to 11 June 1931), s 5 [Canada
Copyright Act 1931].
61

Ibid s 5(5) [emphasis added].

Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “What is the Role of New Technologies in Tensions in Intellectual Property?”
(Ch 1) in Tana Pistorius, ed, Intellectual Property Perspectives on the Regulation of Technologies
[Intellectual Property Series] (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2018), (8-34) at 16-17 [footnote and
illustration omitted, emphasis added]. Wilkinson also pointed out "from a theoretical perspective, it can
hardly be argued that non-transferable, individual rights (as moral rights are conceived to be) have a place
in trade and therefore in a trade regime or trade agreements." (at 16).
62
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economic rights of artists in their works” [emphasis added].63 Wilkinson also noticed
that
it cannot be a coincidence that the conception of these “moral rights”
emerged just as corporate law evolved. As a result of the evolution of
corporate law, the transfer of the earlier-conceived copyright rights (which
were always conceived of as being transferable) could occur, by the end of
the nineteenth century, not just between individuals (as had been the case
up until the corporate law changes beginning in the mid-nineteenth
century, since, before then, all businesses had comprised individuals) but
also from individual creators and authors to separate corporate “persons”
(and these latter, themselves, could never be original authors or
creators).64
(iii) Prohibited marks
Prohibited marks appeared in public international law in the twentieth century, at
the 1925 Hague Revision of the Paris Convention, as a measure to
refuse or to invalidate the registration, and to prohibit by appropriate
measures the use, without authorization by the competent authorities,
either as trademarks or as elements of trademarks, of armorial bearings,
flags and other State emblems of the contracting countries, official signs
and hallmarks indicating control and warranty adopted by them and all
imitations thereof from a heraldic point of view.65
In Canada, prohibited marks [then termed "forbidden marks"] were first added to
the 1932 Unfair Competition Act.66 Significant revisions to the 1932 Unfair Competition
Act followed in 1953, through the enactment of An Act Relating to Trade Marks and

63

KE Gover, Art and Authority: Moral Rights and Meaning in Contemporary Visual Art (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018) at 11 [emphasis added]. It should also be noted that the sense of “moral” in the
copyright context is a very different use of “moral” from that found in ethics. (See Rowland Lorimer,
“Intellectual Property, Moral Rights, and Trading Regimes: A Publishing Perspective” (1966) 21:2
Canadian Journal of Communication 267). These and other characteristics of moral rights differentiating
them from classic copyright are detailed in the substantive chapter of this thesis dealing with moral rights
(Chapter 4).
64

Wilkinson, supra note 62, at 16.

65

Paris Convention, supra note 54, art 6ter.

66

Unfair Competition Act, 1932, 22-23 Geo V, c 38, s 14.
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Unfair Competition (known as the Trade Marks Act).67 This enactment, which termed
the former “forbidden marks” as “prohibited marks”, added seven new marks to the list
of "prohibited marks" (as will be discussed further in Chapter 5).
Between 1953 and 1990 the prohibited marks section of Canada’s trademark
legislation remained unchanged. However, after 1990 several further revisions of the
trademark statute occurred.68 The prohibited marks in the current version of
Canada's Trademarks Act 69 is a list of marks described in twenty-one subparagraphs of
subsection 9(1) (see again Chapter 5). These marks, including the flags of countries,70
words and emblems of international significance71 and crests associated with royalty,72
symbols of universities,73 and any "matters that may falsely suggest a connection with
any living individual"74 cannot be used as trademarks in Canada.75

67

Trade-Marks Act, 1952-53, c 49, s 1.

68

The amendments to prohibited marks Section 9 of the Trademarks Act since the 1985 Revised Statutes of
Canada consolidations have occurred in 1990, c 14, s 8; 1993, c 15, s 58; 1993, c 44, ss 226, 236(1)(c), (d);
1994, c 47, s 19; 2007, c 26, s 6; and 2014, c 32, ss 11, 53. The amendments in SC 2018, c 27, s 215 (not
yet in force) and s 216 (also not yet in force), will, when brought into force, add s 9(3) and s 9(4) (through s
215), and also (through s 216) add s 11.01 to the Exception section.
69

Supra note 22, s 9.

70

Ibid s 9(1)(i).

71

See, for instance, ibid s 9(1)(g) [symbol of the Red Crescent].

72

Ibid s 9(1)(a), s 9(1)(b).

73

Ibid s 9(1)(n)(ii).

74

Ibid s 9(1)(k).

75

In addition to Trademarks Act, prohibited marks in Canada are also protected through the Olympic and
Paralympic Marks Act, SC 2007, c 25. Titled in full "An Act respecting the protection of marks related to
the Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games and protection against certain misleading business
associations and making a related amendment to the Trade-marks [Trademarks] Act" this 2007 statute will
not be further discussed in this thesis because the focus of this thesis is on individual's rights and the
Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act focuses on corporate rights of the type protected as regular trademarks
under the Trademarks Act. Distinctions differing prohibited marks from trademarks are further detailed in
the substantive chapter of this thesis dealing with prohibited marks (Chapter 5).
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(iv) Geographical indications
A precursor to the concept of geographical indications, "indications of source,"
first appeared in the original 1883 Paris Convention.76 Where goods were qualified to
able to be labelled with "indications of source" (as created by countries pursuant to the
concept of “indications of source” then permitted under the Paris Convention), producers
from any other geographic location were prohibited from associating their goods "as an
indication of source [with] the name of a specified locality, when such indication is
joined to a trade name of a fictitious character or used with fraudulent intention".77 This
prohibition in the original 1883 Paris Convention is among the earliest, if not the earliest,
prohibition on using as a mark particular geographical names. A later term for
“indication of source”, "appellation of origin", entered the European-based 1958 public
international Lisbon Agreement.78 In modern usage, the terms "indication of source" and
"appellation of origin" have become roughly interchangeable with the term "geographical
indications".79
When in 1994 three nation states came together in the first comprehensive modern
international trade agreement, the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement between
the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico and the Government of the
United States (NAFTA)80, it included a section about geographical indications. Slightly

76

Paris Convention, supra note 54, art 10.

77

Ibid.

78

Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International Registration, (31
October 1958, amended 28 September 1979, entered into force 4 November 1983, last revised 1. January
1994) [Lisbon Agreement]. Canada is not signatory to the Lisbon Agreement.
79
80

These terms are further explored in Chapter 6.

North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico
and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can TS No 7, 32 ILM 289, 605 (entered into
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later, the virtually global multilateral, TRIPS Agreement81 introduced the first definition
of the term “geographical indications” in any international agreement.82
The obligations stemming from the TRIPS Agreement imposed legal obligations
for member states to protect geographical indications for wines and spirits.83 Canada
amended its Trademarks Act accordingly.84 Teresa Scassa has noted that geographical
indications “have an uneasy relationship with … trademark law, and there is currently no
international consensus on the scope that should be given to the protection of such
indications.”85 Teshager Dagne, writing in 2014, notes that "[d]espite their inclusion as
category of IP in the TRIPS Agreement, some express doubts about GIs as a form of
IP."86 He goes on to say,87 that while
trademarks 'operate as a kind of shortcut to get consumers to where they
want to go.' … the rights acquired under trademark law are not proprietary
in nature per se. A sign or term under trademark law earns proprietary
value to the owner if the sign or term has developed a reputation for a
product through continuous use in relation to a product.88

force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA]. On July 1, 2020, the new Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement
(CUSMA) entered into force.
81

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9.

82

Ibid art 22.

83

Ibid art 23.

84

World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act, SC 1996, c 47.

85

Scassa, supra note 21, at 230. The characteristics of geographical indications that make them different
from trademarks are detailed in the substantive chapter discussing reputation and geographical indications
(Chapter 6).
86

Teshager W Dagne, "The Identity of Geographical Indications and Their Relation to Traditional
Knowledge in Intellectual Property Law" (2014) 5:2 WIPO Journal 137 at 144 [footnote omitted].
87

Citing to Mattel v 3894207 Canada Inc [2006] 1 SER 772.

88

Dagne, "The Identity of Geographical Indications …” supra, note 86 at 146.
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Dagne continues, saying "GIs protection for products … entails the recognition of
proprietary interests of its own (even without a reputation developed through use)."89 In
2016 Dagne wrote "in essence GIs and trademarks are different legal regimes."90

B - Comparisons Between Moral Rights, Prohibited Marks, and Geographical
Indications
As set out below in Table 1: " First Appearance in any International Agreement
and in Canadian Legislation of Moral Rights, Prohibited Marks, and Geographical
Indications", moral rights protection was added to Canada's Copyright Act in 1931
following the inclusion of moral rights in the 1928 Rome revision of the Berne
Convention. Prohibited marks entered Canada's Unfair Competition Act in 1932 after
Article 6ter was added to the 1925 Hague Revision of the Paris Convention.
Geographical indications for wines and spirits entered Canadian law through amendments
to the Trademarks Act in 1994, reflecting Canada joining the TRIPS Agreement earlier
that year.
Table 1 also demonstrates that all three of moral rights, prohibited marks, and
geographical indications are twentieth century devices - much later additions to the
Canadian laws of copyright and trademark than are the original devices of copyright and
trademark with which these rights are now associated.

89
90

Ibid.

Tesh W Dagne, "The Narrowing Transatlantic Divide: Geographical Indications in Canada's Trade
Agreements" (2016) 10 European Review of Intellectual Property Law 598 at 604.
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Table 1: First Appearance in Any International Agreement and in Canadian
Legislation of Moral Rights, Prohibited Marks, and Geographical Indications

Moral Rights

International Agreement

First appearance in Canada

1928 Rome Revision of the Berne Convention

1931 Copyright Amendment
Act, 21-22 Geo V, c 8
s 5(5)
- "the author shall have the right
to claim authorship of the work,
as well as the right to restrain
any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of the said
work"

Article 6bis
(1) Independently o the authors copyright, and
even after the transfer of the said copyright, the
author shall have the right to claim authorship of
the work, as well as the right to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of
the said work which would be prejudicial to his
honour or reputation.
(2) The determination of the conditions under
which these rights shall be exercised is reserved
for the national legislation of the countries of the
Union. The means of redress for safeguarding
these rights shall be regulated by the legislation
of the country where protection is claimed.

Prohibited
Marks

Article 11bis
(1) Authors of literary and artistic works shall
enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the
communication of their works to the public by
radiocommunication.
(2) The national legislations of the countries of
the Union may regulate the conditions under
which the right mentioned in the preceding
paragraph shall be exercised, but the effect of
those conditions will be strictly limited to the
countries which have put them in force. Such
conditions shall not in any case prejudice the
moral right (droit moral) of the author, nor the
right which belongs to the author to obtain an
equitable remuneration which shall be fixed,
failing the agreement, by the competent
authority.
1925 Hague Revision Conference of the Paris
Convention
(Article 6ter)
- "to prohibit ... the use … either as trademarks
or as elements of trademarks, of armorial
bearings, flags and other State emblems, …
official signs and hallmarks" …

In Schedule A [to the 1931
Copyright Amendment Act] full
text of The Rome Copyright
Convention, 1928

1932 Unfair Competition Act,
22-23 Geo V, c 38
s 14.1
-" No person shall be entitled to
adopt for use in connection with
his business, as a trademark or
otherwise, any symbol consisting
of, or so nearly resembling as to
be likely mistaken for,"…
[list of eleven subsections
describing symbols that cannot
be used as trademarks follows]
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Geographical
Indications

1994 TRIPS Agreement

World Trade Organization
Agreement Implementation Act,
SC 1994, c 47

(Article 23)

s 190(2)(a) took effect 1 January
1996
Amended Trade-marks Act, SC
1994, c 2, ss 2, 11.11

-"Each Member shall provide the legal means
for interested parties to prevent use of a
geographical indication identifying wines for
wines not originating in the place indicated by
the geographical indication in question or
identifying spirits for spirits not originating"…

Following the 1994 TRIPS Agreement, David Vaver said, "[l]obbied by the
industries that live off IP [intellectual property], the United States and Europe later
embarked on a program of concluding bilateral free trade agreements that invariably
increase IP obligations ("TRIPS-plus" treaties)."91 Of the three devices this thesis focuses
upon, geographical indications have been particularly affected by the bilateral and
multilateral international trade agreements that Canada has signed since the TRIPS
Agreement.92 For example, the 2014 Canada - Korea Free Trade Agreement (Canada Korea FTA)93 and the 2017 Canada - European Union Comprehensive Economic Trade
Agreement (CETA),94 each required Canada to amend the geographical indications
section in its Trademarks Act.95

91

Vaver, supra note 35, at 5.

92

The TRIPS Agreement (supra note 9) has a separate section on geographical indications. Other bilateral
or multilateral trade agreements to which Canada is a party (discussed later in this thesis) also deal with
geographical indications separately from trademarks.
93

Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement, 22 September 2014 (entered into force 1 January 2015), art 16.10
[Canada-Korea FTA].
94

Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 30 October 2016
(entered into force 21 September 2017), arts 20.16-20.23 [CETA].
Currently “Geographical Indications” are enacted in ss 11.1 – 11.24 of the Trademarks Act, supra, note
22.
95

22
Canada has created twenty-four categories of food and agricultural products with
which geographical indications can be associated.96 The trade agreement between Canada
and the European Union specifically requires that Canada protect hundreds of European
products in Canada:97 these products each fall into one or other of the twenty-four
categories just mentioned. Reciprocating provisions have been required by Canada of its
international partners in these agreements concerning geographical indications: see, for
instance, Korea’s agreement to protect "Canadian Whiskey" and "Canadian Rye Whisky"
in Korea.98
These two trade agreements, the Canada-Korea FTA and CETA,99 are examples
of "TRIPS-plus" treaties because these trade agreements expand their members’
obligations beyond the requirements for the protection of geographical indications these
countries have already agreed to in the TRIPS Agreement.100
Canada has been and is a party to other regional trade agreements that include
intellectual property. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement between
Canada, Mexico, and the United States (NAFTA)101 came into effect a year before
The definition of “geographical indication” in s 2 of the Trademarks Act, supra note 22, states that a “
‘geographical indication’ means an indication that identifies a wine or spirit, or an agricultural product or
food of a category set out in the schedule…” The Schedule (cited to SC 2017, c 6, s 77 (Sched 2) is titled
“Categories of Agricultural Products or Food” and contains 24 categories.
96

97

International trade agreements to which Canada is also signatory include the multilateral Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) entered into force 30 December 2018,
and Canada - United States - Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) entered into force 1 July 2020. These free trade
agreements include sections on intellectual property, but none are considered to impose new requirements
for Canadian intellectual property law beyond those already required by CETA (supra note 94). Each will
be further discussed infra.
98

In signing the Canada-Korea FTA (supra note 93). Details are provided in Chapter 6.

99

Supra note 94.

100
101

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art 23.

North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico
and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can TS No 7, 32 ILM 289, 605 (entered into
force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA].
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TRIPS and, like TRIPS, included provisions relating to intellectual property. In 2020
NAFTA was replaced by the Canada - United States - Mexico Agreement (CUSMA),102
which, compared with NAFTA, contains an expanded and updated section on intellectual
property. Another multilateral trade agreement affecting Canada that has a separate
section on intellectual property is the 2018 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).103
These international trade agreements are discussed further in this thesis only to the
extent that they affect Canadian legislation involving one or more of moral rights,
prohibited marks or geographical indications.
This thesis argues that the aspect of reputation appearing in the law of moral
rights, prohibited marks and geographical indications groups these three devices uniquely
together.
C - The Concept of Reputation
(a) Introduction
In the field of ethics, scholar David Oderberg has said that reputation "is simply
the general consensus of judgment about a person's character."104 Oderberg speaks about

102

Canada - United States - Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) entered into force 1 July 2020. Canada-United
States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng. This treaty has four official
names: Tratado entre Mexico, Estados Unidos y Canada [T-MEC] (used primarily in Mexico), United
States, Mexico, Canada Agreement [USMCA] (used primarily in the United States), Accord Canada –
Etats-Unis—Mexique [ACEUM] (used in Canada, in French), and Canada-United States-Mexico
Agreement [CUSMA] (used in Canada, in English). This trade agreement is the successor to the North
American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] which had been in effect between these three countries since
January 1, 1994.
103

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) entered into force
30 December 2018.
David S Oderberg, “The Morality of Reputation and the Judgment of Others” (2013) 1:2 Journal of
Practical Ethics 3 at 6.
104
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reputation normatively (considering reputation can be good, and also bad, but also true or
false, in all combinations) and states "that having a good, true reputation is the most
prized possession."105 Reputation, in the sense being considered by Oderberg, led to the
declaration of “reputation” as a human right in 1948, in Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR]. Article 12 reads as follows:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.106[emphasis added]
Not only does the UDHR declare the reputation of individuals a human right but it also
indicates that it is a right to be protected at law. However, the UDHR is not specific
about what form legal protection of individuals’ reputations should take.107
The later UN 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
includes reputation in these provisions:
Article 17

1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.108 [emphasis added]
and
Article 19
…
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information
105
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and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be
such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 109
...
[emphasis added]

While in Article 17 (above), the ICCPR declares individuals should be free from attacks
on their reputations, the ICCPR, in Article 19 (3)(a), set out immediately above, declares
that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression may restrict individuals’ abilities to
protect reputation.
The ICCPR, like the UDHR, does not define or mention defamation (either libel
or slander). Canadian defamation case law does not cite to either of the above UN
documents (the UDHR or ICCPR) except in two instances.110 In the first instance, in
2009 in Crookes v Newton (a defamation case which will be further analyzed in Chapter
3 of this thesis), the Court of Appeal for British Columbia delivered judgment on appeal
from the order of Justice Kelleher in the Supreme Court of British Columbia.111 Justice
Prowse in the Court of Appeal delivered dissenting reasons in which she cited the
Australian High Court decision in Dow Jones and Company Inc. v Gutnick [2002] HCA
56, 210 CLR 575. Justice Prowse noted:
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[i]n his reasons for judgment, Gaudron J. [in Dow Jones and Company
Inc. v Gutnick] rejected the notion that effective remedies for Internet
defamation were not possible. At paras 115-116 of the decision, he
[Justice Gaudron] stated: … [116] The [ICCPR] also provides that "[n]o
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation". And that "[e]veryone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attack".112
In the second instance, in 1993 in R v Stevens,113 a Canadian criminal libel case (also
discussed below in Chapter 3), Justice Giesbrecht of the Manitoba Provincial Court said:
The importance of reputation is recognized in international human rights
agreements. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(I.C.C.P.R.), which was adopted by the United Nations in 1966 and in
force in Canada since 1976, in its preamble recognizes the "inherent
dignity" and the "equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family" as the "foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world".
The I.C.C.PR. deals with reputation in the following two articles:
ARTICLE 17
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy ... nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of law against such
interference or attacks.

Article 19 guarantees freedom of expression but provides that this right
carries with it "special duties and responsibilities" and is subject to certain
restrictions as provided by law and as are necessary "for respect of the
rights or reputations of others”.114
As noted there is some connection between the international human rights concept
of reputation and Canada's defamation law involving reputation (law which involves
tortuous conduct between persons, including individuals). One would not expect a

112

Crookes v Newton, 2009 BCCA 392 at para 26.

113

R v Stevens, [1993] 82 CCC(3d) 181.

114

Ibid at 124.

27
connection concerning reputation as found in international human rights law and
reputation as maybe found in intellectual property devices (in this study, the law of moral
rights, prohibited marks and geographical indications).

(b) Reputation distinguished from the concepts of goodwill and privacy
(i) Reputation and goodwill
In a 2011 article, Andrea Slane noticed that comparison between reputation,
associated with the moral rights in the Copyright Act, and goodwill associated with
trademarks had not received adequate attention, in her view, in Canadian courts.115 In her
article, she explains that she uses the term "goodwill" as a synonym for "reputation" in
her discussions about trademark: “[w]hile the term ‘reputation’ is used in both [copyright
and trademark], I will use the term ‘goodwill’ to refer to the reputational interests
protected by trademark in order to maintain clarity”.116 She continues
[g]oodwill in trademark law, is, in contrast [to reputation in moral rights]
a specifically commercial concept: it refers to a positive association with a
source of goods or services that brings customers back to these goods or
services, rather than to a competitor. As the SCC found in Mattel, there is
nothing subjective or personal about goodwill [in trademark] – it is a
factual finding that must be established by a plaintiff, and it is
measured entirely by the degree to which consumers associate a mark with
a source. [footnote omitted; emphasis added].117

Robert Bone also distinguishes the concept of reputation as goodwill in trademark
from the concept of personal reputation. He notes that the change of the economy from
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personal to corporate changed the concept of "goodwill" in trademark law and writes that,
in modern usage, "[g]oodwill generated by large corporations removed at great distance
from the ultimate consumer [is] a very different thing than the paradigmatic form of
goodwill as personal reputation."118 The goodwill (or reputation) dealt with in connection
with trademark falls outside the scope of this research.

(ii) Reputation and privacy
In recent scholarship, the expansion of the language of reputation towards
connecting with privacy (law) has been noticeable, especially since the right to respect
private and family life (Article 8) entered the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) (drawing the attention of scholars 119).
Interestingly, the Law Commission of Ontario (LCO) in 2020 recommended
substantive reform of Ontario’s defamation law, based on the "seven principles guiding
defamation law":120
1. Defamation Law Must Re-Balance Protection of Reputation and
Freedom of Expression in the Internet Age
2. Defamation Law Needs to Be Updated; Some Statutory Reforms are
Necessary
3. Defamation Law is Evolving; New Reforms Must Complement These
Developments
4. Access to Justice and Dispute Resolution Must Be Improved
5. Defamation Law Must Specifically Address Online Personal Attacks
6. There Must Be New Obligations for Intermediary Platforms
7. Defamation Law and Privacy Law Have Distinct Objectives and Should
Remain Separate
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The report concluded that "[t]he LCO recommends against significant reform to most of
the substantive elements of the tort of defamation."121 It also recommended "[o]n balance,
the LCO believes that the unique substantive elements of defamation law, such as the
presumptions of damage and falsity, remain relevant today."122 The report noted that
"[t]he distinction between truth and falsity, along with an increased focus on opinion,
remains crucial to the tort of defamation."123
The LCO clearly points to the need for reputation in defamation law being kept
separate from privacy law.124 Andrew Kenyon had already said that "defamation and
privacy law are largely separate, even though both connect with reputational
concerns."125Attention to privacy protection has also been associated with the reputations
of celebrities, as in the work of David Rolph.126 Privacy law protects an individual's right
not to be exposed to the public.127 Privacy is a different construct, not one associated with
reputation in the sense with which this thesis is concerned.
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(c) - Reputation in Canada’s defamation law
(i) Framework
When false statements damage an person's reputation, Canadian law has long
provided remedies for defamation. Defamation actions often revolve around the use of
"words", for instance in a published article in the newspaper. However, the form of a
defaming act need not be words: it can be any 'permanent form' that is also visible (libel)
or temporary and audible (slander).128 For example, a person can be defamed by a
pictorial communication such as a caricature.129
Canada has included criminal libel in the Criminal Code.130 Robert Martin
explained that "[c]ivil libel is the mechanism whereby individuals may seek to protect
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their reputations"131 whereas "[t]he broad purpose of criminal libel is to preserve public
order. Criminal libel punishes certain forms of expression largely because they are seen
as creating threats to public order."132
Martin wrote that the criminal defamatory libel offence "sounds very similar to
civil libel, but there are some distinctions."133 Martin noted "that the distinction between
civil libel and criminal libel [is] that civil libel [is] a private matter between
individuals."134 On the other hand, "a [criminal] defamatory libel prosecution is a public
matter between the state and the accused."135 In civil defamation actions damages are
awarded, while if a criminal prosecution for defamatory libel succeeds, the punishment
can be a jail sentence.
In 2020, Dylan Williams, himself writing about defamatory libel, noted “in
Canada, there is little discussion around criminal defamation … [t]he offences attract
occasional criticism from legal practitioners but almost no academic study.”136 In 2018
Lisa Taylor and David Pritchard focussed on criminal libel in Canada in an article in
which they concluded “the advent of the Internet and social media has changed the
environment for reputational harm”.137
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Civil defamation actions (whether for libel or slander) are private matters between
private parties. Plaintiffs can be either individuals or corporations and, as well,
defendants can be corporations or individuals.138 Civil actions for defamation can be
brought for either libel or slander. In modern legal civil actions both libel and slander are
included by the term defamation, which is considered, as a civil matter, to be part of the
branch of common law known as torts.139
For both libel and slander as a civil action, to be defamatory an expression must
be in some sort of published form perceived by the public as defamatory. Raymond E
Brown has said
[t]he defamatory publication may be published orally or in writing or in
some other permanent or transitory form. Where the distinction is
maintained, the written or more permanent form is considered to be libel,
is actionable per se, and damages are presumed. Where the defamatory
statement is made orally or in a more transitory form, its publication is
considered a slander. … Where, as in most Canadian provinces, the
distinction is abolished [by statute], slander is treated the same as libel.140
Although civil libel and slander remain common law actions in all the common
law Canadian provinces and in the territories, the common law respecting defamation has
been modified by statute in all these jurisdictions.
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(ii) In Québec civil law
Québec is a civil law jurisdiction rooted in the French civil law tradition. In that
province defamation currently falls under the Civil Code enacted in 1991,141 enacted in
art.1457. 142 In its 2002 judgment in Prud'homme v Prud'homme, the Supreme Court of
Canada discusses the civil law rules of liability for defamation:143
The basis for an action in defamation in Quebec is found in art. 1457
C.C.Q., [] which lays down the general rules that apply to question of civil
liability. Thus, in an action in defamation, the plaintiff must establish, on a
balance of probabilities, the existence of injury, or a wrongful act, and of a
casual connection, as in the case of any other action in civil, delictual or
quasi-delictual liability.144
The Supreme Court continued, pointing out that "Quebec civil law does not provide for a
specific form of action for interference with reputation"145 and explaining "[w]hether
remarks are defamatory is determined by applying an objective standard … whether an
ordinary person would believe that the remarks made, when viewed as a whole, brought
discredit on the reputation of another person."146 The Court continued, noting "a person
who has made remarks that are deemed to be defamatory will not necessarily be civilly
liable for them. The plaintiff must further demonstrate that the person who made the
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remarks committed a wrongful act."147 In this respect, the Court says
Accordingly, in Quebec civil law, communicating false information is not
necessarily a wrongful act. On the other hand, conveying true information
may sometimes be a wrongful act. This is an important difference
between civil law and the common law, in which the falsity of the things
said is an element of the tort of defamation. [emphasis added]148
In light of the difference between civil and common law in the treatment of defamation,
highlighted above, the analysis in this thesis will be necessarily restricted to the common
law tort of defamation.

D – Research Questions and Approach
(a) Approach
In this thesis, doctrinal and theoretical approaches have been blended with
historical analysis in analyzing the statutory devices of moral rights, prohibited marks
and geographical indications. The legislative history of each device, for instance, has
been shown to be very revealing. As well, though it has been said that "doctrinal
methodology is in a period of change and transition",149 and that its focus on critical
analysis and synthesis of law may be "too constricting,"150 in this thesis, there was no
other way of approaching the necessary empirical analysis of defamation law than
through a doctrinal analysis. This has also been the case in describing the primary
constructs of this thesis – moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical indications. As
has been noted, "[d]octrinal research is not simply a case of finding the correct legislation
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and the relevant cases […]. It is a process of selecting and weighing materials, taking
into account hierarchy and authority, as well as understanding social context and
interpretation."151
A dynamic methodological approach ideally suited to the research questions in
this thesis has been created through describing the primary constructs of this thesis
(moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical indications), explaining the origin of the
protection of reputation in the common law defamation action (but also analyzing the
impact on reputation, if any, of the Canadian statutory framework which has come to
modify the common law of defamation across Canada), analyzing Canadian defamation
jurisprudence, and exploring the ideational theorizing of Robert C. Post about
defamation.
Lyndsay Campbell, writing about the early history of libel law (1820-1840),
compared the development of libel law in Massachusetts with that in Nova Scotia. She
also used a blend of approaches, situating the law of defamation in these two jurisdictions
in this period in the context of the larger history of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia at the
time. Her work in the primary sources of defamation law in nineteenth century
Massachusetts and Nova Scotia reveals ways in which these two developing societies
sometimes shared paths and, in other ways, diverged in social and political development.
Campbell “turn[ed] to use of courts themselves through a consideration of civil cases, in
which individuals, through their strategic decisions, demonstrated their understandings of
the invitation offered by courts as fora for disputes about reputation and expression.”152
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This thesis uses the law of defamation as an analytic tool to assist in investigating
three under-studied areas of law related to intellectual property: moral rights, prohibited
marks and geographical indications. Specifically, this thesis explores whether the
concept of ‘reputation’ present in Canada’s defamation law could be helpful in
understanding the roles of moral rights, prohibited marks or geographical indications in
Canadian law.

(b) Research questions
(i) Overall question
Does the concept of ‘reputation’ form a unique link bringing the concepts of
moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical indications uniquely together?
(ii) Specific questions
1. Is the concept of reputation involved in each of the moral rights, prohibited marks
and geographical indications?
2. Can the concept of reputation in defamation law contribute to an understanding of
the concept of reputation involved in moral rights, prohibited marks and
geographical indications?
3. Does the concept of reputation distinguish the moral rights, prohibited marks and
geographical indications from the classic triad in intellectual property (copyright,
patent and trademark)?
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CHAPTER 2 - THEORIZING ABOUT REPUTATION
A - Defining Reputation
(a) Literary meaning of "reputation"
In writing about "reputation" legal scholars have tended to quote from
Shakespeare's Othello (Othello, The Moor of Venice, Act III Scene 3) in which
Shakespeare's character Iago says that their "[g]ood name in man and woman ... [i]s the
immediate jewel of their souls".153 However, as Raymond Brown pointed out, there are
an "[a]lmost forgotten and rarely quoted … words"154 in an earlier Act from this
Shakespearian play in which, to Cassio's lament that, having lost his reputation, he has
"lost the immortal part of [himself]," Iago responds by saying "[r]eputation is an idle and
most false imposition; oft got without merit, and lost without deserving" (Othello, The
Moor of Venice, Act II Scene 3).155 It seems that these two different views are put in the
mouth of the same character because, as Dario Milo noted, these views "emphasize the
difference between reputation and character."156 In this regard, Milo pointed out that
"there are aspects of the law relating to mitigation of damages for harm to reputation that
reinforce the proposition that the concept of reputation is different from that of character,
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and is recipient-oriented."157 Nevertheless, even though more than four hundred years
have passed since Shakespeare wrote Othello, the difficulty defining and explaining the
meaning of "reputation," especially in legal terms, remains to this day. According to the
Oxford English Dictionary, "reputation" means
(a) The condition, quality, or fact of being highly regarded or esteemed;
credit, fame, distinction; respectability, good report.
(b) The honour, credit, good name, or fame of a particular person or thing.
158

A specialized law dictionary such as Black's Law Dictionary defines "reputation" more
precisely as
1. (1839) The esteem in which someone is held or the goodwill extended
to or confidence reposed in that person by others, whether with respect to
personal character, private or domestic life, professional and business
qualifications, social dealings, conduct, status, or financial standing.
Evidence of reputation may be introduced as proof of character whenever
character evidence is admissible. … Also termed personal reputation.
2. The esteem in which a company is held by the public. 159
The definition of the term "reputation" in the law dictionary expands the meaning
of the term beyond the artistic and linguistic. The law dictionary embraces the "personal
character" of reputation and broadens its perspective to include "the goodwill extended to
or confidence reposed in that person by others." The first definition of reputation in the
Black's Law Dictionary (citation 1 above) dates to 1839. At that time modern
corporations had not been created in corporate law in Canada. The term "goodwill" could
only be linked to an individual's reputation and not a corporate reputation because
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modern corporations had not yet been created in Canadian law.160 In Black's Law
Dictionary, the second definition of reputation above "[t]he esteem in which a company
is held by the public"161 indicates that reputation [also expressed here as "esteem"]
manifests itself (only) through the lenses of others, i.e. "the public."
In the most recent edition of Canadian Law of Torts, the authors say that "[a]
judicial person, that is, a non-profit organization or a business corporation, may also sue
for defamation if the defamatory statement affects the reputation of the organization
concerned."162 However, the authors further note that "[n]evertheless, it is generally
accepted that governments and public institutions cannot sue in defamation, because
allowing them to sue would be inconsistent with the constitutional right to freedom of
expression, and would have a chilling effect on citizens' ability to criticize the
government."163

(b) Theories about "reputation"
Australian author Matthew Collins comments in 2014 that "[s]urprisingly little
judicial ink has been spilled on the relationship between defamatory meaning and
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reputation," while, as he puts it in a note, "[t]he question has, however, been the subject
of academic attention."164
Robert Post, in an article in 1986, wrote that "[r]eputation … is a mysterious
thing"165 that still draws scholars' attention.166
Among scholars drawn by Post's article was Lawrence McNamara, who said,
“[w]ithout a clear sense of what reputation is, it would be difficult to make a judgment
about the manner and extent of its protection under the law."167 Nonetheless, Dario Milo,
who also discussed Post's article (at approximately the same time as McNamara) said that
"[i]t is difficult to provide a satisfactory definition of reputation."168
Post considered reputation in defamation law in its social context and historical
perspective.169 He postulated "three distinct concepts of reputation that the common law
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of defamation has at various times in its history attempted to protect."170 In this context,
Post discussed reputation as property, reputation as honour, and reputation as dignity.
Post said at the beginning of his article, for all three of his concepts of reputation, "they
are as types analytically distinct, although in actuality there may be, and indeed must be,
some overlap."171
(i) Post's “reputation as property”
Post's starting point about reputation as property is that reputation can be
understood in connection with goodwill.172 Post states that "[t]here are aspects of modern
defamation law that can be understood only by reference to the concept of reputation as
property, as, for example, the fact that corporations and other inanimate entities can sue
for defamation."173 As Post notes, "[i]n many cases, particularly where the plaintiff is a
corporation, it is difficult to distinguish between defamation and injurious falsehood,
since it is not possible to separate defamation of the plaintiff from disparagement of
plaintiff's property or business."174 175
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Post begins his observations about reputation as property by saying that this
concept "can be understood as a form of intangible property akin to goodwill."176 He
continues by saying "[t]he concept of reputation as property explains why defamation law
proscribes aspersions on an individual's character even in the contexts that are not
narrowly oriented toward business relationships;"177 – his explanation is that character
can be viewed as "the fruit of personal exertion."178
Post writes that
The concept of reputation as property presupposes that individuals are
connected to each other through the institution of the market. The market
provides the mechanism by which the value of property is determined. The
purpose of the law of defamation is to protect individuals within the
market by ensuring that their reputation is not wrongfully deprived of its
proper market value.179
Although in his article Post does not separate reputation (as property) from the
individual who has it, he discusses both concepts (reputation as property and the
individual who has it) in the context of the market. For Post, "[u]nderlying the concept of
reputation as property is an implicit image of a form of society that … [he terms] ‘a
market society.”180 In theory,181 Post explains, an individual always retains the capacity
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to "produce" new reputation. Law protects only "those aspects of an individual's
reputation that the market can measure."182 This means that the market value of a person's
reputation will vary. It also means that "every person enjoys an equal right to enter the
market to attempt to achieve what reputation he can."183 As Post observes, "[t]he concept
of reputation as property is … deeply imbedded in our understanding of defamation
law."184 (Note that Post also sees "reputation as honour" and "reputation as dignity" as
part of defamation law, as will be explained further).
Writing in the late 20th century, Robert Post considers reputation as a product of
human labour. He says, it exists "[t]he concept of reputation as property presupposes that
individuals are connected to each other through the institution of the market."185
Post also says that "the concept of reputation as property is deeply inconsistent
with important doctrines of common law defamation."186 He explains that this is so
because reputation as property "cannot explain so fundamental a doctrine as that a
communication must be deemed defamatory before it can support an action."187 This is
because "[t]he common law of defamation will not offer redress for untrue
communications that are not defamatory, even if they cause damage to an individual's
credit or business opportunities."188
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Concluding his section on reputation as property Post says that "[i]mportant and
fundamental aspects of defamation law are thus inexplicable from the perspective of
reputation as property. To understand them, we must turn to the analysis of other
concepts of reputation."189
(ii) Post's “reputation as honour”
Post ties the concept of reputation as honour to the traditional view of
reputation,190 particularly ''influential in preindustrial England during the formative years
of defamation law."191 Post defines honour as "a form of reputation in which an
individual personally identifies with the normative characteristics of a particular social
role and in return personally receives from others the regard and estimation that society
accords to that role."192 Post explains that "reputation as honour" is different from
"reputation as property" because the former is not earned or created through the effort of
labour but is created from what society attributes to the individual’s position (for
example, the position of king). As Post says, "a king does not work to attain the honor of
his kingship, but rather benefits from the honor which society attributes to his
position."193 Reputation as honour "cannot be bought and sold like goodwill, but is
instead attached to specific social roles."194
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In his work, Post borrows the term "deference society" from historian Michael
Thompson's book describing society in eighteenth-century England.195 Post explains that
"[a]n insult to the king involves not only injury to the king's personal interest, but also
damage to the social status with which society has invested the role of kingship."196 Post
elaborates, saying that "[t]he preservation of honor in a deference society, … entails more
than the protection of merely individual interests."197 He further says that "[t]the concept
of reputation as honor is consonant with aspects of defamation law that are difficult to
understand from the perspective of reputation as property."198
About the distinction between reputation in terms of involving the honour of an
individual and reputation involving an institution that an individual represents, Post says
that "[i]f in a deference society an attack upon the person of the king was equivalent to an
attack on the institution of monarchy, we [in modern society] are now more likely to
distinguish between an attack on the president and an attack on the institution of the
presidency."199 That is, the reputation of an individual will likely be differently
interpreted today from reputation of an institution that an individual represents whereas,
in the past, we lived in “deference” societies where the reputation of the individual and
that of the institution the individual represented were more often conflated and thus
differently protected at law.
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(iii) Post's “reputation as dignity”
Another of Post’s concepts of reputation is tied to the concept of dignity. Post
notes that "it is not immediately clear how reputation, which is social and public, and
which resides in the ‘common or general estimate of a person,’ can possibly affect the
‘essential dignity’ or a person's ‘private personality’."200 However, Post makes the
connection by adopting Erving Goffman’s sociological approach201 (expressed in
Goffman’s 1967 collection of essays):202
[w]hile it may be true that the individual has a unique self all his own,
evidence of this possession is thoroughly a product of joint ceremonial
labor, the part expressed through the individual’s demeanor being no more
significant than the part conveyed by others through their deferential
behaviour toward him.203
Although Post holds that Goffman's approach could possibly create a theoretical
grounding for a connection between the law of defamation and the concept of reputation
as dignity, Post finds this possible theoretical connection problematic.
Post believes instead that defamation law protects reputation as dignity because
"[w]hen rules of deference and demeanor are embodied in speech, and hence are subject
to the law of defamation, … [and he then calls them] ‘rules of civility."204 For Post, "[t]he
dignity that defamation law protects is thus the respect (and self-respect) that arises from
full membership in society."205
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Post says that “[d]ignity is not like property, for dignity is not the result of
individual achievement and its value cannot be measured in the marketplace” and that
“[i]t is inaccurate, therefore, to speak of defamation law as ‘compensating’ for the loss of
dignity.”206 Post says, "[s]ometimes defamation law incorporates the perspective of
[reputation as property] 'a considerable and respectable class in the community';
sometimes the perspective of [reputation as honour] 'right-thinking persons'; and
sometimes the perspective of [reputation as dignity] 'society … taken as it is."207 Post
continues saying that "honor is concerned with attributes of personal identity that stem
from the characteristics of particular social roles, whereas dignity is concerned with the
aspects of personal identity that stem from membership in the general community."208
However, Post elaborates (considering that at one time the meaning of the terms "dignity"
and "honour" were close, referring to the time of the English Renaissance and citing to
the usage of the term "dignity" recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary) by saying that
the question of reputation "is not the protection of individual dignity, but rather which
communities the law will assist in the maintenance of their cultural identity."209
Post’s study is theoretical but rooted in historical observations positioned within a
broader social context. Post identified three possible approaches to the concept of
reputation in defamation law. He did not prioritize any of them over the others. Instead,
describing characteristics which, in his view, separate each of the three approaches from
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the other two he did not seek to establish a "right" nor "the" approach to the concept of
reputation.
(iv) Reaction to Post
McNamara considers reputation a critical interest to be protected by defamation
law210 (although his main focus in his book is on the question of what test should be used
to determine what is defamatory).211 McNamara disagreed with Post over the concept of
reputation as property, saying that "[i]t does not explain why esteem, confidence, and
goodwill are vested in a person… [and that] the idea that reputation is a form of property
does not tell us anything about the processes of moral judgment that are [according to
McNamara] central to the formation of reputation."212
McNamara rejects Post's "proposition that [reputation in defamation law] is a
form of property"213 but considers Post's analyses of reputation as honour214 and
reputation as dignity215 to be relevant to some extent for his theorizing about reputation as
a moral judgement. With respect to Post's concept of reputation as property, McNamara
argues that "[t[he connections between social and self-worth, and between honour,
reputation, and dignity, suggest that the idea of a moral taxonomy will also be a useful
way to think about honour and dignity, and about reputation and its relationships to
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defamation law."216 McNamara declares that his own approach does not allow for
looking at reputation as property because, in his view, this treatment does not reflect the
true nature of reputation.217 According to McNamara "[a]n individual's reputation is a
social judgment of the person based upon facts which are considered relevant by a
community."218 McNamara’s conclusion in the early part of his book is to defend
reputation as a moral judgment that may be derived from different sources: for example,
from various communities.219 He argues that a community "should be understood as a
moral construct."220 In the concluding chapter of his book, he proposes a theory of
reputation different from either Post's reputation as honour or Post's reputation as dignity:
a theory of reputation as a moral taxonomy.221 Having proposed his theory, McNamara
concludes that "there should be one test for what is defamatory and it should be stated in
the following terms: A publication will be defamatory if it has a tendency to cause 'the
right-thinking person' in the community to think the less of the plaintiff."222
A year after McNamara published his book, Dario Milo published a book
containing a chapter about reputation.223Milo disagreed with McNamara's rejection of
Post's theory of reputation as respect to reputation as property.224 Milo agrees with Post's
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theory and said that "reputation as property certainly explains some incongruous features
of the common law of defamation."225 Referring to Post theory of reputation as property,
Milo said that "[t]he classic aspect of defamation law that regards reputation as a form of
property is the rule that corporations can sue for defamation."226
Dario Milo, the year after McNamara published Reputation and Defamation,
published Defamation and Freedom of Speech.227 Dario Milo wrote a chapter on the right
to reputation, fully accepting Post's theory of reputation. 228 Milo's view was that
"[r]eputation is difficult to define and categorize, especially since it is not a static
concept; its contours adapt to fit changing social, economic, and legal mores of
society."229 Opposing McNamara's rejection of Post's concept of reputation as property,
Milo said "[a]s to the right to reputation, the rationales that are most applicable in modern
circumstances are the property and the dignity justifications for reputation."230 He added
that "[i]t is not just the individual sense of self-worth that is implicated in a defamation
action, but also society's interest in ensuring that its rules of civility are respected."231
Milo also said that "[t]he ambiguity that defamation law exhibits, especially between
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property and dignity reputation, is unsurprising."232 Milo added that "[r]eputation is a
complex concept; it represents the community's opinions of the image projected by an
individual, and individuals naturally 'constitute themselves in various milieus - business
associations, communities, families'."233 Ending his chapter on reputation, Dario Milo
said that "[a] coherent theory of reputation must recognize that our social world contains
important elements of both market and communitarian societies."234 He concludes that
"[i]t is probably too optimistic to expect reputation to be fully explained by only one
justification. It is better that the influences of property, and dignity, and, to a lesser
extent, honour, are acknowledged."235
Subsequent authors, like Milo, have accepted Post's original three-part approach
to reputation. Other than McNamara's reservation about reputation as property, no other
authors discussing Post appear to diverge from his three-part interpretation of reputation
in defamation. Canadian author Bob Tarantino, writing an article, “Chasing Reputation:
The Argument for Different Treatment of Public Figures in Canadian Defamation
Law”,236 in 2010, following his thesis work, discussed the concept of reputation from a
historical perspective and commented on the approaches taken by Post.237
Tarantino noted that “defamation law has failed to keep pace with a more
sophisticated understanding of reputation and the impact of mass media and interactive
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technologies, which makes the construction and repair of reputation markedly different
from what it once was.”238 Tarantino aligned himself with the Supreme Court of
Canada’s comment in Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto239 that “very little has been
written by the courts about that central concept [the reputation of the individual] and its
constitutive elements.”240 In addition to Hill, Tarantino discusses Grant v Torstar241 and
R v Lucas242 (a criminal case), but he also mentions three other Canadian civil defamation
cases: Vander Zalm v Times Publishers ,243 WIC Radio Ltd. v Simpson 244 and Quan v
Casson245 (all these cases are detailed and further empirically analyzed in Chapter 3).
Tarantino's discussion about reputation in defamation law is rather theoretical although
he moves the discussion further than Post, considering the modern technologies as
dictating adjustments to law.
To date, in addition to Tarantino’s work, Post’s approach to the concept of
reputation has been referred to in Canadian journals by the following authors: Chris Hunt,
Katie Duke, and Megan Richardson.
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Chris Hunt's 2015 article relies upon theoretical work, especially that of Post's
"influential exposition of defamation,"246 in examining analogies between privacy and
defamation. He asks "if defamation is concerned with one's public reputation, how can it
be anchored in the values of dignity at all, since dignity is characteristically concerned
with one's private personality?"247 He finds his answer in Post's discussion of reputation
as dignity.
Katie Duke, in her 2016 article, notes that "[t]he meaning of 'reputation' is rarely
addressed in Canadian defamation cases, despite repetition that it merits legal
protection."248 Duke follows this observation by mentioning that "Robert Post
understands the protection of reputation by defamation law as being motivated by
concerns for property, honour and dignity."249 Duke mentions Hill v Church of
Scientology of Toronto,250 Grant v Torstar Ltd.251, and WIC Radio v Simpson252 - but she
does not tie it (directly) to Post’s concepts on reputation.
In 2018, Megan Richardson discussed Post’s work in connection with her own
broad social perspective on understanding reputation in an article commenting the
American case of Garcia v Google, Inc.253 that deals with a case not involving
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defamation but connecting reputation to privacy (rather personal identity).254 Richardson
pointed to Post's focus on reputation as "the social apprehension that we have of each
other."255 Richardson's citations to Post's discussion of reputation as dignity links
Richardson's view to that of Post.

B - Other, "Non-Post," Theorizing About Reputation
Other authors have written about reputation in defamation without referring to
Post’s work.256 For example, Canadian law professor Robert Martin, in 2003, explored
the balance between the competing interests of freedom of expression and protection of
individuals' reputations, focusing on the protection of the reputation of journalists.257 He
noted that the concept of reputation in defamation law has to be balanced against the
concept of freedom of speech.258 While he did not cite to Post's article, he mentioned the
case of New York Times Co v Sullivan259 in connection with the debate about whether
"the defence of qualified privilege should be expanded to the point where any statement
made by the mass media on any matter of public interest would attract a Charter-based
privilege."260 Martin further noted that "[t]his argument was expressly and unequivocally
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rejected by the Supreme Court in 1995 in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto"
adding that "decision, while it did not directly involve mass media, set out important
conclusions about the general direction the law of defamation should take in Canada."261
Eugene Lim points out to the 2009 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Grant v
Torstar Corporation262 "held that the law of defamation should be changed to afford
greater protection to communications on matters of public interest, so as to give adequate
weight to the constitutional value of free speech enshrined in section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms."263 Lim states "[i]n order to encourage debate
on matters of public interest, a new defence to defamation was recognized - one that
protected reliable statements made in the context of such debate, even if the statements in
question were not entirely true."264 Citing to 2008 WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson,265 Lim
noted that "[a] separate, but related, issue that should be considered is the extent to which
responsible communication can be distinguished from the defence of fair comment, since
both defences involve communications concerning the public interest."266
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C - Conclusion
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,267 itself, does not mention
reputation, and the question of whether someone has a reputation is an entirely separate
concept from questions of freedom of expression (which is a protected right under the
Charter).
Defamation law is concerned with the concept of reputation only when it is being
alleged that a person’s reputation is being injured. Justice Cory, in Hill v Scientology,
said that reputation "is an attribute that must, just as much as freedom of expression, be
protected by society's laws."268 In WIC Radio Ltd. v Simpson, Justice Binnie said that "the
worth and dignity of each individual, including reputation, is an important value
underlying the Charter and is to be weighed in the balance with freedom of expression,
including freedom of the media."269 He also said that "[t]he function of the tort of
defamation is to vindicate reputation."270 The then Chief Justice McLachlin, in Grant v
Torstar emphasized that courts recognize that the Canadian Charter guarantees freedom
of expression as "essential to the functioning of our democracy"271 but also that this right
"is not absolute",272 that "[o]ne limitation on free expression is the law of defamation,
which protects a person's reputation from unjustified assault."273
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CHAPTER 3 - EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE MEANING OF
"REPUTATION" IN CANADIAN DEFAMATION LAW
A - The Role of Statute in the Common Law Tort of Defamation in Canada
As noted in Chapter 1, across Canada (except in the civil law province of
Quebec274) civil defamation is a common law tort.275 Nonetheless, aspects of defamation
have been affected more recently by various provincial statutory enactments. In the early
1980s, for instance, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada began a national law reform
process considering defamation law across the country.276 From this process, in 1994,
a model “Uniform Defamation Act”277 was created, which the promulgators intended to
serve as a model for the consideration of Canada’s common law jurisdictions. In fact, this
model was eventually adopted by most Canadian common law jurisdictions:
Newfoundland and Labrador,278 Nova Scotia,279 Prince Edward Island,280 New
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In Quebec, the Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c CCQ-1991 applies. This thesis focuses on Canada's
common law trials: proceedings under Quebec civil law were not included in this research.
Defamatory libel prosecuted under Canada’s Criminal Code is discussed later in this Chapter. As the
Law Commission of Ontario noted in 2017, “Ontario defamation law has developed primarily through
common law supplemented by the Libel and Slander Act (LSA) [footnote omitted]. The elements of the tort
are substantially similar in most common law jurisdictions with the exception of the United States.” Law
Commission of Ontario, Defamation Law in the Internet Age: Consultation Paper (Toronto: November
2017) at 22, online: <lco-cdo.org/en/our-current-projects/defamation-law-in-the-internet-age/consultationpaper/>.
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Brunswick,281 Manitoba,282 Alberta,283 the Northwest Territories,284 Nunavut,285 and
Yukon286 (see Table 2, below).
Table 2: Provinces and Territories Where the ‘Uniform Defamation Act’ Adopted
Provinces and
Territories that
adopted the
Uniform
Defamation Act
Newfoundland and
Labrador
Nova Scotia
Prince Edward
Island
New Brunswick
Manitoba
Alberta
Northwest
Territories
Nunavut

Yukon

Statute

Section

Expression eradicating the difference
between libel and slander

Defamation Act,
RSNL 1990, c D-3
Defamation Act,
RSNS 1989, c 122
Defamation Act,
RSPEI 1988, c D-5
Defamation Act,
RSNB 2011, c 139
Defamation Act,
CCSM, c D20
Defamation Act,
RSA 2000, c D-7
Defamation Act,
RSNWT 1988, c D1
Defamation Act,
RSNWT 1988, c D1
Defamation Act,
RSY 2002, c 52

s 2(b)

‘defamation’ means libel or slander

s 2(b)

‘defamation’ means libel or slander

s 1(b)

‘defamation’ means libel or slander

s1

‘defamation’ means libel or slander

s1

‘defamation’ means libel or slander

s 1(b)

‘defamation’ means libel or slander

s1

‘defamation’ means libel or slander

s1

‘defamation’ means libel or slander

s1

‘defamation’ means libel or slander

Only Ontario, Saskatchewan and British Columbia did not absorb any of the
model “Uniform Defamation Act” into their law (see Table 3, below).
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Table 3: Provinces with Sui Generis Statutes not the ‘Uniform Defamation Act’
Provinces that
created unique
statutes to
“combine” libel and
slander
Ontario

Statute

Section

Expressions diminishing the
difference between libel and slander

Libel and Slander Act,
RSO 1990, c L-12

ss 16-18
-----ss 19-23

"In an action for slander…"
-----------"In an action for libel or slander…"

Saskatchewan

Libel and Slander Act,
RSS 1978, c L-14

ss 3-4

"In an action for libel or slander"

British Columbia

Libel and Slander Act,
RSBC 1996, c 263

s 13(1)
-------s 13(2)

"In actions of libel and slander…"
-------------"…of the alleged libel or slander…"

One change instigated by adoption into legislation in nine jurisdictions in Canada
of the “Uniform Defamation Act” model was eradication of previous procedural
differences that had existed between libel and slander (see Table 2 above).287 Although,
as noted, the provinces of Ontario, Saskatchewan and British Columbia did not adopt the
provisions of the model “Uniform Defamation Act” – and the terms “libel” and “slander”
remain in their respective statutes – all three provinces have, nonetheless, reformed their
defamation legislation and each, though somewhat differently than the other, has
addressed giving libel and slander similar treatment.288 This chapter, therefore, will
generally refer to libel and slander collectively as “defamation.”

287

Note that the model statute was not intended only to be procedural; it proposed substantive changes
including model definitions for the terms "broadcasting", "court", "defamation", "newspaper" and "public
meeting."
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In Ontario, Libel and Slander Act, RSO 1990, c L-12, "slander" appears in ss 16-18, while the
expression "libel or slander" appears in ss 19-23. In Saskatchewan, Libel and Slander Act, RSS 1978, c L14, "libel or slander" appears in ss 3,4. In British Columbia, Libel and Slander Act, RSBC 1996, c 263,
"libel and slander" is mentioned in s 13(1), while "libel or slander" appears in s 13(2).

60
Despite statutory modifications made to the tort of defamation across all the
Canadian common law jurisdictions, this civil cause of action remains, at its core, a
common law tort.289

B - Reputation in Canadian Defamation Law, both Civil and Criminal
In a recent consultation paper published by the Law Commission of Ontario
(2017),290 it is noted that the common elements of the tort of defamation, across all
jurisdictions (except in jurisdictions in the United States), are that
In order to make out a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must establish three
things:
• that the words in issue refer to the plaintiff
• that they were published to a third party; and
• that they are defamatory in the sense that they tend to lower the
plaintiff’s reputation among reasonable persons in the
community.291
It is also important to the research being presented in this thesis on defamation
law to note that defamation is one of the last remaining civil causes of action in Canada
that can be tried either by judge and jury or by judge alone.292 In 1936 in the English case

In contrast, Canada’s criminal offence of defamatory libel, in s 298(1) of the Criminal Code (quoted in
part below) is entirely statutory.
289
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Supra note 275.
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Ibid. A similar formulation can be found in the Ontario case of Hodgson v Canadian Newspapers Co.,
(1998) 39 OR(3d) 235.
Robert Ivan Martin states that “[l]ibel actions are the last bastion of the jury in civil proceedings in
Canada.” (Robert Ivan Martin, Free Expression in Canada: Surrendered to Diversity and Multiculturalism
(Mount Vernon, Wash: Stairway Press, 2012 at 239). Note that juries are also empanelled in medical
malpractice suits in Canada: see Emily Wilson, “Medical Malpractice and Jury Secrecy: Is It Time to Lift
the Veil on Causation?”, online: < https://www.cba.org/Sections/HealthLaw/Resources/Resources/2020/Winner-of-the-2020Health-Law-Student-Essay-Contest >. Unlike juries in
criminal cases in Canada (where juries operate on a principle of unanimity: twelve out of twelve jurors
must be convinced that the accused is guilty in order for an accused to be convicted), civil juries in Canada
operate on the basis of majorities (five out of six members of a civil jury holding the defendant has libelled
the plaintiff is sufficient for the plaintiff to succeed in the lawsuit). See again Martin, Free Expression in
Canada, at 272.
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of Sim v Stretch, Lord Atkin stated that, in determining whether a communication is
defamatory:
there is no dispute as to the relative functions of judge and jury on law and
fact. … It is well settled that the judge must decide whether the words are
capable [italics added] of a defamatory meaning. … That is a question of
law: is there evidence of a tort? … If they are capable, then the jury is to
decide whether they are in fact defamatory. [emphasis added] 293
A key question in defamation litigation is whether the communication involved in
the litigation is defamatory. A communication is said to be defamatory “if it would tend
to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking people generally,”294 “if it would
tend to cause the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided?"295 or “if it would tend to expose the
plaintiff to be shunned or avoided.”296 Robert Ivan Martin notes that
The plaintiff is only required to establish that the material at the basis of
the action had that tendency. This is a remarkable feature of libel actions,
as compared to other tort actions, where the plaintiff is required to prove
injury. Once it is established that the material is libellous, injury to the
plaintiff is assumed.297
As noted above, a key element in establishing whether the defendant in a civil
defamation action will be liable is to establish “that [the words in issue are] defamatory in
the sense that they tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation among reasonable persons in
the community.”298 It can be seen that the plaintiff’s reputation thus forms a key aspect of
Canadian civil defamation litigation.
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As well as in civil defamation, reputation also plays a key part in Canadian
criminal libel:
s 298(1) A defamatory libel is matter published, without lawful
justification or excuse, that is likely to injure the reputation of any person
by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule or that is designed to
insult the person of or concerning whom it is published [emphasis
added]299.

Whether it is part of the function of the judge to ascertain the facts in a
defamation trial because he is sitting alone, without a jury, or whether it is the function of
a jury to ascertain the facts (in a defamation trial involving both judge and jury), both the
fact that a publication300 is capable of being defamatory and that it is capable of
damaging the plaintiff's reputation must be established in evidence at trial.

299

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 298(1) [emphasis added]. The remainder of the Criminal Code
provisions on defamatory libel are as follows:
Mode of expression
298(2) A defamatory libel may be expressed directly or by insinuation or irony
(a) in words legibly marked on any substance; or
(b) by any object signifying a defamatory libel otherwise than by words.
Publishing Publication
299 A person publishes a libel when he
(a) exhibits it in public;
(b) causes it to be read or seen; or
(c) shows or delivers it, or causes it to be shown or delivered, with intent that it should be
read or seen by any person other than the person whom it defames
Punishment of libel known to be false
300 Every person who publishes a defamatory libel that they know is false is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five
years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction
Punishment for defamatory libel
301 Every person who publishes a defamatory libel is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two
years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction
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Although the classic formula quoted by the Law Commission of Ontario immediately above uses the
language of “words” (as does Hodgson v Canadian Newspapers Co., (1998) 39 OR(3d) 235.), defamatory
publication can be in other than word format, e.g., a cartoon. (See details in Chapter 1).
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Since it is only triers of fact who can establish what facts have been proven at
trial, it follows that factual findings made at trial, virtually without exception, will never
be disturbed by appellate bodies. However, "[w]here the trial judge's finding of law on
[an] issue is appealed, the appellate court may simply substitute its opinion for that of the
trial judge."301 It has, however, been noted, in the context of defamation litigation when
juries have been involved, "it is not always easy to mark the boundaries between issues of
fact or decision by the jury from questions of law to be ruled on by the judge."302

C - The Conduct of Civil Defamation Trials Across Common Law Canada
The conduct of defamation actions in Canadian common law jurisdictions is
governed by the laws of each jurisdiction regulating civil trials (in general), and also,
procedurally, by each jurisdiction’s court rules and regulations.303 Nonetheless, because
of the presence of juries in defamation trials in Canada, a provision of the Criminal Code
is also relevant to Canadian civil defamation actions because it applies to both criminal
and civil jury trials.
Section 649 of Canada’s Criminal Code provides
Every member of a jury … who … [except for certain purposes related to
obstruction of justice under s 139 of the Code] … discloses any
information relating to the proceedings of the jury when it was absent
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at 295.
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The conduct of trials for criminal libel is governed by the Criminal Code. About civil juries across
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Institute, Civil Juries in British Columbia: Anachronism or Cornerstone of the Civil Justice Process?
(Vancouver: The University of British Columbia, 2021) at 14.
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from the courtroom that was not subsequently disclosed in open court is
guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.304

The Supreme Court has confirmed that this provision also applies to juries in civil
matters.305 Chris Richardson and Romayne Smith Fullerton, in their book about what
journalists should know when covering Canadian criminal cases, quoted long-time Globe
and Mail's Timothy Appleby:
Canada is a very different environment than America. One of the things I
think is really great in this country is our jury system. It's absolutely off
limits. It's illegal if jurors even talk about what they've discussed in their
deliberations."[italics in the original]306
In Newfoundland and Labrador, the Defamation Act explicitly addresses the
conduct of defamation actions. The statute reads as follows: "An action for defamation
shall be tried in the Trial Division before a judge or before a judge and jury."307
[emphasis added]. A civil jury in Newfoundland and Labrador consists of six jurors308. If
the verdict is not reached after three hours of deliberation, five jurors may return a
verdict.309
In Nova Scotia, in the Judicature Act (not in the Defamation Act) it says
unless the parties in person or by their counsel or solicitors consent to a
trial of the issues of fact or the assessment or inquiry of damages without a
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jury, the issues of fact shall be tried with a jury in the following cases: (i)
where the proceeding is an action [among other] for libel, slander.310
In Nova Scotia, a civil jury consists of seven jurors, of whom any five may return a
verdict.311
In Prince Edward Island, the Jury Act states that "a party may, by filing a jury
notice in accordance with the rules of court, require that the issues of fact be tried or the
damages assessed, or both, by a jury, unless otherwise provided."312 However, the statute
goes on to list actions that "shall be heard without a jury"313 and this list does not mention
defamation actions. However, the statute further says that "[o]n application, the court
may order that the issues of fact be tried or damages assessed, or both, without a jury."314
In Prince Edward Island, a civil jury consists of seven jurors.315 If the jury deliberates for
at least three hours without reaching unanimity, five jurors may return a verdict.316
In New Brunswick, according to the Rules of Court, "[i]f the questions in issue in
an action are more fit (1) for trial by a jury than by a judge, the court may, on motion by
any party, order trial by jury."317 Further, the Rules of Court says that "[a]n action for (a)
libel, (b) slander … shall be tried by jury if a party, not less than 14 days before the
Motions Day at which the action is to be set down for trial, serves on every other party
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and files with the clerk a Jury Notice (Form 46A) requiring trial by jury."318 A civil jury
in New Brunswick consists of seven jurors.319 After deliberating for at least three hours
without decision, five jurors may return a verdict.320
In Ontario, the Courts of Justice Act provides that "[i]n an action in the Superior
Court of Justice that is not in the Small Claims Court, a party may require that the issues
of fact be tried or the damages assessed, or both, by a jury, unless otherwise
provided."321 In addition, according to Regulation 194 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
[a] party to an action that is proceeding under this Rule may deliver a jury
notice under rule 47.01 if the action involves a claim for relief arising
from one of the following: 1. Slander, 2. Libel, 3. Malicious arrest, 4.
Malicious prosecution, 5. False imprisonment. O. Reg 344/19, s. 4322
[emphasis added].
In Ontario, a civil jury consists of six jurors.323 Five jurors may return a verdict.324
In Manitoba, the Court of Queen's Bench Act says "[a]n action for defamation,
malicious arrest, malicious prosecution or false imprisonment shall be tried with a jury,
unless the parties waive trial with a jury."325 In Manitoba, a civil jury consists of six
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jurors.326 Five jurors may return a verdict.327 In cases where parties agree to trial by five
jurors, instead of six, the verdict must be unanimous.328
In Saskatchewan, "[a]ny party may demand a jury in accordance with The
Queen’s Bench Rules in an action: (a) for libel, slander, malicious arrest, malicious
prosecution or false imprisonment."329 In Saskatchewan, a civil jury consists of six jurors,
five of whom may return a verdict.330
In Alberta, the Jury Act specifies in s 17(1):
Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), on application by a party to the
proceeding, the following shall be tried by a jury: (a) an action for
defamation, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, seduction or
breach of promise for marriage.331
Further, the statute says
[i]f, on an application made under subsection (1) [quoted above] or on a
subsequent application, a judge considers it appropriate, the judge may
direct that the proceeding be tried by judge alone pursuant to the summary
trial procedure set out in the Alberta Rules of Court.332
In Alberta, a civil jury consists of six jurors, five may return a verdict.333
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In British Columbia, the general rule is that a civil action in the Supreme Court is
to be tried without a jury unless a party files a jury notice334 but a further rule states that
"[the] Court may refuse [a] jury trial except in cases of defamation, false imprisonment
and malicious prosecution."335 A civil jury consists of eight jurors.336 The judge of the
court may receive the verdict of six jurors (75%) in case where the jury could not reach a
unanimous verdict after 3 hours of deliberation.337
In the Northwest Territories, in civil matters, in the s 2 (1) of the Jury Act, it says
that “Where, in any action (a) of libel, slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution
or breach of promise of marriage, (b) founded on a tort or contract in which the amount
claimed exceeds $1,000, or (c) for the recovery of real property, either party to the action
applies to the Court, not less than two weeks before the time fixed for the trial of the
action before a jury, the action shall, … be tried before a jury, but in no other case shall
an action be tried before a jury”.338 The Jury Act also says that "in any action of a class
specified in subsection (1) [i.e., libel, slander] … it appears to a judge ... that the trial will
involve any prolonged examination of documents or accounts … that, in the opinion of
the judge cannot conveniently be made by a jury, the judge may direct that the action be
tried without a jury or that the jury be dismissed in which case the action shall be tried or
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the trial continued, as the case may be, without a jury."339 In the Northwest Territories, a
civil jury consists of six jurors, though five can return a verdict.340
Nunavut has adopted the procedural legislation of the Northwest Territories for
civil actions.341 In Nunavut, a civil jury consists of six jurors, and any five can return a
verdict.342
The Yukon has legislated civil trials in much the same way as the Northwest
Territories (and, consequently, Nunavut).343 The difference in the Yukon is that "either
party to the action [can apply] to the Supreme Court, not less than 90 days before the time
set for the trial of the action before a jury, the action shall, … be tried before a jury, but
in no other case shall an action be tried before a jury."344In the Yukon, a civil jury
consists of six jurors, and any five of them can return a verdict.345
In summary, in all the common law jurisdictions in Canada, a defamation action
can be tried either before a judge or before a judge and jury (the procedures vary
depending on the parties' consent, the applications filed with the court, and the trial
judge's opinion about the most proper conduct for the specific case). In defamation jury
trials, the jury's role is limited to establishing whether a publication concerning the
plaintiff, in fact, is defamatory, and to assessing what damages the plaintiff should be
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awarded to compensate for the harm the defamatory publication could have caused to the
plaintiff's reputation.346
The question of whether a defamation trial is conducted with or without a jury is
important to this study – particularly because of its focus on the concept of reputation in
defamation. Whether a plaintiff has a reputation that deserves legal protection (in a civil
trial) or whether a person has a reputation such that the state needs to step in and protect
the public from the person alleged to have uttered the libel (in a criminal case) is a
question of fact.347 Where a jury is involved in a defamation trial, the jury will make that
determination of fact – and, as noted above, that determination cannot be further
investigated because jury decisions are secret. Where there has been a jury trial,
therefore, to the extent that the reported decisions concerning the trial (written by the trial
judge and, in the case of appeals, appellate judges) can only speculate and theorize in
their judgments about what the jury’s finding was on the topic of reputation (although
these judges are not required to speculate on this topic).348 Where there has been a trial
by judge alone, the reported decision can report the judge’s findings of fact concerning
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reputation349-- but, as will be discussed below, in no cases studied was any such comment
actually made by any judge.
In a civil defamation action in Canada’s common law jurisdictions,350 it is first
required that the plaintiff establish the libel:
[i]n the interpretive step, the court must determine exactly what the
statement attributes to the plaintiff. In the evaluative step, the court must
determine whether the statement, as properly interpreted and understood,
has the tendency to harm the plaintiff’s reputation.”351
It is the role of the judge to determine whether the allegedly defamatory publication is
capable of being defamatory. As Hilary Young has noted, “[d]efamation is an unusual
tort: it is strict liability”352 in that “[i]ntent is required for the publication element, but
only intent to convey – knowledge of the contents is not required”353 and “plaintiffs need
not prove actual injury to their reputations in order to be entitled to damages.”354
Once publication of controversial material has been established, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant. If, for instance, the defendant can establish that what is
alleged to be defamatory is true, the plaintiff cannot succeed in the defamation action.
Besides establishing the truth of an alleged libel or slander, there are other defences that
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can be established by the defendant which will defeat the plaintiff in a defamation action,
including the defences of fair comment, justification, absolute privilege, qualified
privilege and responsible communication.355
Speaking of defamation in early nineteenth century Nova Scotia, Lyndsay
Campbell found that “[i]n both civil and criminal actions, the defense had the
complicated side of the case; it was in the defenses that evolving understandings of the
needs of freedom of expression and of the press were expressed.”356
From modern Canadian data, Hilary Young found that liability was established (the
defendants were unsuccessful) in 52% of the 145 final judgments identified in Canadian

defamation cases between 1973 and 1983. On the other hand, between 2003 and 2013, she
found that the plaintiffs were successful in only 28% of the 480 final judgments identified.357

Young found that 11% of Canadian defamation cases between 1973 and 1983 were
unsuccessful because the statement was found not defamatory or was justified – and,
between 2003 and 2013, that proportion was 14% unsuccessful because the publication
was not defamatory or there were inadequate pleadings. These findings support, in the
case of modern defamation litigation, Campbell’s comment from the nineteenth century
about the burden that falls upon the defence in defamation actions: by far the majority of
successes for the defence in modern defamation litigation still come through defences
which require the defence, rather than the plaintiff, to adduce the majority of the
evidence.

355

Ibid at 625-6.

356

Lyndsay M Campbell, Truth and Privilege: Libel Law in Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, 1820-1840
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022) at 9-10.
357

Young, supra note 162 at 605.
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In a finding not incompatible with Campbell’s observation about the role of the
defence in nineteenth century Nova Scotian defamation actions, Young found that where
Canadian defendants were successful in both the twentieth and twenty-first century
periods she examined, the largest proportion of cases involved the defence of qualified
privilege358 (34% of cases between 1973 and 1983 and 21% of cases between 2003 and
2013).359

D - The Role of Statute with Respect to Reputation in Defamation
The term "reputation" has not been defined in any defamation statute in any
Canadian common law jurisdiction, despite the fact that defamation actions are known to
protect reputation.360 Indeed, across all the defamation statutes in common law Canada,
the term "reputation" appears only in the Defamation Act of Nova Scotia361 and in
the Libel and Slander Act of Ontario362 (in both provinces, in provisions dealing with the
defendant's defence of justification). In Nova Scotia, the Defamation Act provides as
follows:
s 9 Justification
In an action for defamation in respect of words containing two or more
distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not
fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the
words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff's

358

Cases in which the person alleged to have defamed another had a duty to make the statement at issue
and did so without malice.
359

Young, supra at note 162 at 625.
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See, for instance, Roger D McConchie & David A Potts, Canadian Libel and Slander Actions (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2004) at 1 ("The gist of the cause of action for libel or slander is injury to reputation. In the
common law provinces and three northern territories, the tort is firmly rooted in centuries of English
jurisprudence and is largely unaltered by statute.")
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Defamation Act, RSNS 1989, c 122, s 9.
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Libel and Slander Act, RSO 1990, c L-12, s 22.
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reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges.
[emphasis added]
In Ontario, the Libel and Slander Act provides as follows:
s 22 Justification
In an action for libel or slander for words containing two or more
distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not
fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the
words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff’s
reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges.
[emphasis added]
As can be seen, there is no statutory definition of the concept of reputation created
through either of these two statutory appearances of the term "reputation."

E - Civil Defamation Cases Analyzed for their Focus on Reputation
(a) Analytic strategy
For the analysis of Canadian defamation jurisprudence that follows, the guiding
principle in reporting on the cases was the mention of the term "reputation."363 Both
cases tried in the first instance by judge alone and cases tried by judge and jury are
included. Across the selected cases, the alleged defamatory statements appeared in
various formats, including newspapers, non-textual publications, broadcasting, and the
Internet.
In terms of the presentation of the jurisprudence in this chapter, it is important to
recall that defamation trials in common law Canada can be conducted either by judge

This research focused on finding Canadian defamation cases where the term “reputation” was mentioned
in the judgments. In addition, this research examined Canada’s major defamation cases (those brought
before the Supreme Court of Canada). Two digital databases (Westlaw and CanLII) were searched and
those searches confirm the fact that the legal decisions analyzed here, together, include those containing
discussion of ‘reputation’, including the most cited defamation decisions dealing with reputation.
363
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alone or by a judge sitting with a jury. When defamation trials are conducted with a jury
in Canada, the judge (whose role is to instruct the jury) almost invariably writes reasons
for decision – but, as noted earlier, no information about how the jurors reach their
findings can become of thesis reasons because jury deliberations cannot become public.
On the other hand, in defamation actions conducted before a judge alone, it is the role of
that trial judge to determine the facts about the plaintiff's reputation – and the judges are
not barred from discussing in their judgments how they come to their findings.
The cases to be examined that were decided by a judge sitting alone will be
presented first, namely Vander Zalm,364 WIC Radio,365 and Crookes.366 Vander Zalm was
subsequently appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal;367 WIC Radio was
ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, as was Crookes.368

364

Vander Zalm v Times Publishers, supra note 243 (Reasons for judgment delivered by Chief Justice
Nemetz and each Seaton, Hinkson, Craig, Aikins, JJA), reversing (1979), 96 DLR (3d) 172 Justice Munroe,
who had held for the plaintiff) [Vander Zalm 1980].
365

WIC Radio Ltd. v Simpson, supra note 244 (Justice Binnie delivered the reasons for judgment for
himself, Chief Justice McLachlin, and Justices Bastarache, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron (paras 165); Justice LeBel delivered partly concurring reasons (paras 66-107); Justice Rothstein also delivered
partly concurring reasons (paras 108--112)) [WIC Radio 2008].
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Crookes v Newton, 2011 SCC 47, [2011] 3 SCR 269 (Abella J delivered reasons for judgment for
Binnie, LeBel, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. Concurring; Chief Justice McLachlin and Fish J. joint
concurring reasons; Deschamps J. reasons concurring in the result) [Crookes 2011].
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The cases that will be discussed second were tried by judge and jury: Currie,369
Gouzenko,370 Hill,371 Grant,372 and Quan.373 Currie was appealed to the Ontario Court of
Appeal374; Gouzenko, Hill, Grant, and Quan were ultimately all appealed to the Supreme
Court of Canada.375

(b) Civil defamation cases tried before a judge alone
Vander Zalm v Times Publishers376
In this case, the defamatory communication involved a public figure, and the
defamatory communication was published in a daily newspaper,377 this time in a nontextual format.378

369

Currie v Preston and Wilson, [1928, Supreme Court of Ontario, Toronto] [Currie 1928].

370

Lefolii et al. v Gouzenko, [1969] SCR 3 (the judgment of Justices Martland, Ritchie and Hall was
delivered by Justice Hall; Justice Spence concurred with Justice Hall; Justice Judson dissented [Gouzenko
1969]
371

Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 (The judgment of La Forest, Gonthier,
Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ. was delivered by Cory J for the majority; Per L'Heureuxx-Dubé
J: Cory J.'s reasons were generally agreed with, except with respect to the scope of the defence of qualified
privilege) [Hill 1995].
372

Grant v Torstar Corporation, 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 SCR 640 (Chief Justice McLachlin delivered the
judgment for Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ; concurring reasons,
Abella J.) [Grant 2009].
373

Quan v Cusson, 2009 SCC 62, [2009] 3 SCR 712 (Reasons or judgment delivered by Chief Justice
McLachlin, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ concurring (paras 1-51)
Justice Abella concurring reasons (para 52) [Quan 2009].
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Robert J Sharpe, The Last Day, The Last Hour: The Currie Libel Trial (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2009), ch 14 “Appeal”.
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The Victoria Times is a daily newspaper of the City of Victoria, in British Columbia.
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The defamatory publication was a political cartoon published in the British Columbia newspaper the
Victoria Times on 22 June 1978.

77
In 1978, the Victoria Times (a daily newspaper of the City of Victoria) published
a political cartoon drawn by Robert Bierman depicting William N Vander Zalm, Minister
of Human Resources in British Columbia (as he then was, though the cartoon character
only had “Human Resources” on the nametag, not the name of the Minister), "engaged in
plucking the wings from a fly."379
Vander Zalm brought this libel action against the newspaper, the editor, the
publisher and the author (Mr. Bierman), claiming that the published cartoon depicted him
as "a person of cruel and sadistic nature who enjoys inflicting suffering and torture on
helpless beings who cannot protect themselves."380
Justice Monroe heard the matter at trial.381 The defendant pleaded that the cartoon
was not defamatory, and that in any event it was a fair comment. Justice Munroe referred
to the statement of defence:
The statement of defence pleads that the cartoon was intended to and did
depict the plaintiff as a person who, in his role as Minister, acted on
occasion in a cruel and thoughtless manner, and at times performed the
duties of his office in such a way as to inflict suffering on those who in
some instances were unable to protect their own interests. As such, the
defendants rely upon the plea of fair comment, made without malice, on a
matter of public interest. The defence of fair comment cannot prevail if
the facts on which comment is made are untrue and defamatory.
[emphasis added]382
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Vander Zalm 1980, supra note 243. The cartoon is reproduced in Justice Aikins’ reasons for judgment at

3.
380

Ibid (Reasons for judgment by Chief Justice Nemetz, at 2).

Ibid. Nemetz, CJ, noted on appeal "[t]he action was heard by Munroe, J., sitting without a jury.”
(Reasons for judgment by Chief Justice Nemetz, at 2).
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Vander Zalm v Times Publishers, (1979), 96 DLR (3d) 172 (Justice Munroe, judgment for the plaintiff,
at 173-174) at 173. [Vander Zalm 1979].
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Justice Munroe found, about the plaintiff's character383: "upon the evidence I find
that the controversial statements made by the plaintiff and relied upon by the defendants
were such that he [Vander Zalm, the plaintiff] was entitled to hold and to express."384
Further in his judgment, Justice Monroe said that the cartoon "was a false
misrepresentation of the character of the plaintiff, as a person or in his role as a
Minister."385
Justice Munroe held that
… the cartoon was defamatory because in the natural and ordinary
meaning that viewers would attribute to it, it meant and would be
understood to mean that the plaintiff is a person of a cruel and sadistic
nature who enjoys inflicting suffering on helpless persons, said false
pictorial representation adversely affecting and lowering his [Vander
Zalm's] reputation and standing in the estimation of right-thinking
members of society generally by exposing him to hatred, contempt or
ridicule, and disparaging him in his office as Minister of Human
Resources and upon the evidence I find that the cartoon was not
objectively a fair comment upon facts.386[emphasis added]
In writing his reasons for decision, Justice Munroe portrayed the plaintiff as the holder of
a public office, advancing his career in government, though also as a family man and a
father:
The plaintiff, a nurseryman by occupation, was first elected to public
office as an alderman in the Municipality of Surrey. Thereafter he served
as mayor of that municipality for six years. He was elected to the
Provincial Legislature in 1975 and served as Minister of Human
Resources from December,1975 until December,1978. He is still a

Distinguishing between the character of an individual and an individual’s reputation (the perception of
that individual by others) is a difficult task for a judge or jury deciding questions of defamation. This is
particularly the case because a person's "character" and a person’s "reputation" cannot always be clearly
distinguished. A characteristic such as ‘honesty’ can be related to a person’s character or reputation or to
both: meanings can overlap. (See also Brown, Defamation Law, supra note 154 at 6-7, footnote 20).
383
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Vander Zalm v Times Publishers (1979), supra note 382 at 173-174.
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Ibid at 173.
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Ibid at 175 [emphasis added].
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member of the Provincial Legislature and Executive Council thereof. He is
a married man and the father of four children.387

Having found for the plaintiff, Justice Munroe assessed damages "for the loss of
reputation suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defamatory cartoon."388 He noted
that
[s]ince the plaintiff's principal purpose in bringing this suit is the
vindication of his reputation rather than a large monetary award, … a
modest award will meet the ends of justice, notwithstanding the refusal of
the defendants to comply with the request for an apology.389
Justice Monroe’s judgment was appealed. In 1980, the Court of Appeal for British
Columbia (Chief Justice Nemetz and Justices Seaton, Hinkson, Craig and Aikins)
allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, reversing the judgment of the trial judge,
though each of the five appeal justices hearing the appeal wrote his own reasons.390 Chief
Justice Nemetz decided that the three elements establishing the defence of fair comment
(truth, public interest and an honest expression) should prevail in this case.391 The
controversy seemed to be, at least in part, about whether the “reputation” at issue was that
of the man or of the man in his position as Minister. Justice Aikins agreed "that the
defamation found by the trial judge is of the respondent [Vander Zalm] as a person, not
of the respondent in his role as Minister of Human Resources."392 (Recall that the trial

387

Ibid [emphasis added].
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Ibid [emphasis added]. Justice Munroe assessed the damages for the plaintiff "at the sum of $3,500." (at
176)
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supra note 380. Chief Justice Nemetz wrote at paras 1-13, Justice Seaton wrote at paras 14-23, Justice
Hinkson wrote at paras 24-49, Justice Craig wrote at paras 50-69, and Justice Aikins wrote at paras 70-90.
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judge, Justice Munroe, considered that the cartoon "was a false misrepresentation of the
character of the plaintiff, as a person or in his role as Minister.")393All five appeal judges
agreed there was defamation but also found that the defence of fair comment nonetheless
applied.
It may be noted that Justice Craig, in his own reasons for judgment in the Court of
Appeal, referred to evidence provided by the appellants (the defendants at trial) that was
intended to demonstrate that the respondent on appeal (plaintiff at trial, Vander Zalm)
had a reputation as a controversial politician:394 a list of 16 "[p]articulars of the facts upon
which the Defendants plead fair comment"395 This list focused solely on how Vander

393

Vander Zalm v Times Publishers (1979), supra note 382 at 173 [emphasis added].

394

Vander Zalm v Times Publishers (1980) supra note 243. Justice Craig, citing to the statement of the
defendants in his reasons for judgment at para 52.
395

Ibid:
6. a. That the Plaintiff, within hours of being appointed Human Resources Minister in
December,1975, stated that he would develop ways of dealing with welfare recipients
who refused to 'pick up their shovels'.
b. That the Plaintiff, since assuming the role of Minister of Human Resources, has cut off
funding for a number of community groups that had been providing valuable services for
those in need.
c. That the Plaintiff, in March 1976, made statements to a group of women to the effect that
women make better homemakers than they do plumbers or electricians.
d. That in March, 1976, the Plaintiff threatened to scrap all provincial day-care programs if
unionized staff engaged in strikes or labour disturbances.
e. That in March, 1976, the Plaintiff tightened regulations so that fewer people in British
Columbia would be classified as handicapped and so be eligible for handicapped benefits.
f. That in April, 1976, the Plaintiff tightened regulations so that persons refused jobs because
of unsuitable grooming or attire could be cut off welfare.
g. That in April, 1976, the Plaintiff changed welfare policies to make it much more difficult
for persons waiting for unemployment cheques to receive welfare on the grounds that this
change would encourage persons affected to complain to Unemployment Insurance
Commission to improve their efficiency.
h. That in May, 1976, the Plaintiff introduced an assets test for those receiving Mincome
supplements, making Mincome a variation of welfare instead of a separate program for
seniors.
i. That in September, 1976, the Plaintiff stated he was looking into the problems caused by
newly arrived immigrants to Canada going on welfare, Mincome and other programs.
j. That in January, 1977, the Plaintiff stated that legal aid subsidies to help people getting
divorces was 'garbage' and worked against goals of keeping families together.
k. That in February, 1977, the Plaintiff deliberated for several days before deciding whether a
man injured in a criminal attack would be allowed to keep the $300.00 awarded him by
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Zelm performed his duties in his public role as the Minister of Human Resources of the
Government of British Columbia.
Ultimately the five justices of the Court of Appeal, while each writing separate
reasons, concurred in the result and reversed the judgment of Justice Monroe at trial,
pointing out that the publication, the political cartoon, was a "fair comment" directed to
the Vander Zalm’s public rank and therefore not defamatory in such a sense as to cause
harm to Vander Zalm’s reputation as a person.
WIC Radio Ltd. v Simpson396
This case concerned Kari Simpson, a British Columbia social activist who took
the Rafe Mair, a radio show host, and the radio show’s broadcaster WIC Radio Ltd., to
court claiming an editorial aired in 1999 was defamatory.
In this editorial, Mair portrayed Simpson, who protested schools in BC hiring gay
teachers and introducing books about gay lifestyle, as someone who, as Mair said,
"placed herself [Simpson] alongside skinheads and the Klu Klux Klan … not talking
about the violent aspects of those groups but the philosophical parallels to other examples

the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board or whether it would be deducted from his
welfare payments.
l. That in October, 1977, the Plaintiff stated that young people should be denied assistance
because they have more mobility to find jobs.
m. That in January, 1978, the Plaintiff ordered that even emergency welfare aid be refused to
persons in areas where the picking of hallucinogenic mushrooms is common.
n. That in March, 1978, the Plaintiff suggested that the current level of unemployment
Insurance payments to single people should be reduced.
o. That in May, 1978, the Ministry of Human Resources announced that it was considering a
Plan of requiring persons helped by counselling and social work through the Ministry to
pay a fee for the service.
p. That in June, 1978, the Plaintiff commented that native Indians in Vancouver should
return to their reserves because there was 'more opportunity' there for them.
396
WIC Radio Ltd. v Simpson [2008], supra note 244.
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of intolerance."397 Simpson (the plaintiff) took the position that those words (just quoted),
and similar language in other parts of Mair's broadcast, "were defamatory according to
their ordinary and natural meaning."398 At trial, Madam Justice Koeningsberg found that
the plaintiff Simpson
had a significant public profile before the alleged defamation … [and that]
… she had a public reputation as a leader of those opposed to schools
teaching acceptance of a gay lifestyle. Simpson's reputation was earned
as a result of her very public actions and words. [emphasis added] 399
She also said that
[t]he parties agree that the law requires that allegedly defamatory
statements must be viewed objectively and from the point of view of what
a reasonable and right thinking reader or listener would have
understood from the words read or spoken.[emphasis added] 400
Madam Justice Koeningsberg went on to say that "[t]he ordinary and natural meaning of
the words guides the determination whether the statements are capable of bearing a
defamatory meaning."401 Further, she stated that
[i]t is not necessary to prove that the words would be understood in a
defamatory sense by everyone who hears them or that the words had an
actual effect on the person's reputation, as long as a reasonable
person402 to whom they were published would understand them in a
defamatory sense." [emphasis added]403
However, Madam Justice Koeningsberg found most of the sentences in the editorial
which the plaintiff claimed were facts were "statements of opinion." Commenting on the
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Person." (2017) LawNow, online: <https://www.lawnow.org/the-reasonable-person/> [emphasis added].
403

WIC Radio [2004] supra note 397 at para 22 [emphasis added].

83
final statement (in Rafa Mair's editorial) Madam Justice Koeningsberg said "[t]here is
nothing in this statement which could be understood by any reasonable person to be a
matter of fact. It is a matter of opinion or comment."404 Therefore, the defence of fair
comment prevailed and WIC Radio Ltd. was not liable.
The finding by Madam Justice Koeningsberg at trial in Simpson v Mair and WIC
Radio Ltd 405 is the singular and only piece of evidence of how reputation is established
to the satisfaction of the trier of fact in defamation litigation in Canada that was
uncovered by this entire examination of the state of defamation jurisprudence in Canada.
The finding, on the evidence before her, that Simpson “had a significant public profile …
[and that] she had a public reputation as a leader of those opposed to schools teaching
acceptance of a gay lifestyle” led to Madam Justice Koeningsberg’s finding that, as a
matter of law, Ms Simpson had a reputation protectable under defamation law (even
though Ms Simpson ultimately was not successful in her litigation before Madam Justice
Koeningsberg or, ultimately, before the Supreme Court of Canada, because the defence
of fair comment was established406).

The reference by Madam Justice Koeningsberg to the evidence before her in
making her finding about Ms Simpson’s reputation is the only clear evidence of
reputation found in the examination of defamation cases in Canada conducted as part of
this research.
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Simpson appealed the decision. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia
(Madam Justice Southin writing for herself and Justice Thackray, with Madam Justice
Prowse delivering concurring reasons) allowed the appeal, finding against Mair and WIC
Radio Ltd, and reversing the trial judgment.407 WIC Radio Ltd., and Rafe Mair appealed
the decision of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia to the Supreme Court of
Canada.408
The full Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judgment should be restored,
allowing the defence of fair comment to succeed. Justice Binnie, writing for the
majority,409 said that “the worth and dignity of each individual, including reputation, is an
important value underlying the Charter and is to be weighed in the balance in a
defamation case with freedom of expression, including freedom of the media.”410 He
explained there had been a ‘shift’ in Canada’s defamation law after the Charter was made
part of the Canadian Constitution in 1982, saying “[t]he function of the tort of defamation
is to vindicate reputation, but many courts have concluded that the traditional elements of
that tort may require modification to provide broader accommodation to the value of
freedom of expression.”411 However, he also said that, in his opinion, "Mair's editorial
about Kari Simpson clearly defamed her" and that it "tend[ed] to lower her in the opinion
of right-thinking people."412 He added that
[t]he trial judge found a difference between what Mair subjectively
intended to say … and objectively what he is taken to have said. The gap
407

Simpson v Mair and WIC Radio Ltd., 2006 BCCA 287 at paras 43-46 [WIC Radio 2006].

408
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between the intended meaning and what the court determined to be the
effect Mair's words conveyed to reasonable members of the audience
has important implications.413

In his partially concurring reasons, Justice LeBel said:
[a]lthough distinguishing facts from comment may sometimes be difficult,
a comment is by its subjective nature generally less capable of damaging
someone’s reputation than an objective statement of fact, because the
public is much more likely to be influenced in its belief by a statement of
fact than by a comment.414

Crookes v Newton415
Wayne Crookes, a member of the Green Party of Canada and his company West
Coast Title Search Ltd., (the plaintiffs), brought an action against Wikimedia Foundation
Inc, and Jon Newton (who operated and owned a website in British Columbia where he
posted various commentary) for posting an article that included two hyperlinks
connecting to websites with articles allegedly containing defamatory information about
Mr. Crookes.416 This case concerned internet publication.417
In his reasons for judgment (this was a summary trial418), Justice Kelleher said
that "[w]ithout proof that persons other than the plaintiff visited the defendant's website,
413

Ibid at para 46 [emphasis added].

414
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Crookes v Newton [2011] supra note 366.

416

Crookes v Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2008 BCSC 1424 at paras 2, 6,9. (Note: the alleged websites are
no longer operational at the time of this research) [Crookes 2008].
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Ibid at para 14. Evidence of this connection with the internet can be seen in the following comment by
Justice Kelleher in the first instance: "[t]he plaintiffs' case [was] that publication [accessible via the
hyperlink] is presumed.”
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Based on the Rule 18A - Summary Trial of the British Columbia Court Rules Act (In 1983, the Supreme
Court of British Columbia added Rule 18A - Summary Trial authorizing a judge in chambers to give
judgment based on affidavits or similar evidence).
https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/loo81/loo81/221_90_00
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clicked on the hyperlinks, and read the articles complained of, there cannot be a finding
of publication."419 Justice Kelleher dismissed the action due to lack of evidence.420 It was
agreed that the defendant did not publish any defamatory content on his (p2net)
website.421 The plaintiffs appealed Justice Kelleher’s decision.
The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the appeal.422
The plaintiffs (appellants) took the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. In
2011, Justice Abella delivered judgment for the majority423 and concluded "that a
hyperlink, by itself, should never be seen as "publication" of the content to which it
refers."424 The plaintiff erred in suing the wrong publisher (hyperlinks were not
equivalent to the publication). Regarding "reputation" in Crookes v Newton case, Justice
Abella (of the Supreme Court of Canada) said that "[p]reventing plaintiffs from suing
those who have merely referred their readers to other sources that may contain
defamatory content and not expressed defamatory meaning about plaintiffs will not leave
them unable to vindicate their reputation."425 She added that "most effective remedy lies
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with the person who actually created and controls the content."426 Justice Abella, writing
for the majority, said
Pre-Charter approaches to defamation law in Canada largely leaned
towards protecting reputation. That began to change when the Court
modified the “honest belief” element to the fair comment defence in WIC
Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, 2008 SCC 40, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420, and when,
in Grant, the Court developed a defence of responsible communication on
matters of public interest. These cases recognize the importance of
achieving a proper balance between protecting an individual’s reputation
and the foundational role of freedom of expression in the development of
democratic institutions and values (Grant, at para. 1; Hill, at para. 101).
[emphasis added]427

(c) Civil defamation cases tried before judge and jury
Currie v Preston and Wilson428
This libel trial involved First World War General Sir Arthur Currie, who sued
article author William Thomas Rochester Preston and Frederick W Wilson (owner and
publisher of small-town Ontario newspaper the Port Hope Evening Guide) for an article
published in the newspaper.
Because of the secrecy that surrounds jury deliberations in Canada, it is
impossible to know how the jury in this case, as in other cases, decided matters involving
the plaintiff's reputation. However, Robert J Sharpe, in his book, meticulously details the
Sir Arthur Currie case, supported by the transcripts and documents from the trial.429
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Sharpe, The Last Day, The Last Hour supra note 374, at Preface: “The Currie case … provides an
opportunity to reflect upon the law of defamation, not only as it appears to potential litigants, but from the
broader perspective of reconciling the conflicting claims of the need to protect personal reputation on the
one hand, and the desirability of free and open discussion of important public issues on the other.”(at p.x).
His research included broad sources related to the trial, including, for example, transcripts of the trial (see,
429
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Because this book brings a fully documented legal perspective to the Sir Arthur Currie
case (Robert J Sharpe is a Canadian author, lawyer, academic and judge), this study relies
on the descriptions of the evidence and processes of both trial and appeal as documented
in Sharpe's book.430
The alleged defamation was in an editorial431 published 13 June 1927 in the Port
Hope Evening Guide newspaper.432 The plaintiff Currie won at trial: “the Defendants are
guilty of libel, and that the award of five hundred dollars be given to the Plaintiff.”433 The
defendants appealed.434 The Ontario Court of Appeal denied the appeal.435
The article that appeared in the Evening Guide followed the unveiling of a plaque
at Mons (a town in Belgium near the French border) commemorating twenty years since
the city had been re-captured by the Canadians on the last day (11 November 1918) of the
Great War. A segment of the newspaper's article said that "it is doubtful whether in any

eg, chapter 12, which begins with direct quotation from the defendants’ lawyer’s cross-examination of Sir
Arthur Currie (at 186-205)).
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case there was a more deliberate and useless waste of human life than in the so-called
capture of Mons."436 In addition, the article said that
[i]t was … almost the last minute, when … the Commander-in-Chief [with
no mention of his name, though the reference had to be to Sir General
Arthur Currie who was the Commander of Canadian Corps at that time]
conceived the mad idea that it would be a fine thing to say that the
Canadians had fired the last shot in the Great War, and had captured the
last German entrenchment before … eleven o'clock, when the armistice,
which had been signed by both sides would begin officially.437
In its final paragraph, the article included the following sentences, clearly identifying Sir
Arthur Currie:
It does not seem to be remembered that even Ottawa, neither by
government nor Parliament, gave Sir Arthur Currie any official vote of
thanks, nor any special grant as an evidence of the esteem of appreciation
of his services. … He was allowed to return to Canada unnoticed by
officials of the government or of Parliament and permitted to sink into
comparative obscurity in a civilian position as President of McGill
University.438
Currie instructed his solicitor George H Montgomery "to retain a Toronto lawyer,
William Norman Tilley, KC, one of the leading advocates of the day, and to take
whatever steps were necessary to proceed with the lawsuit."439 The case, Currie v Preston
and Wilson, was tried with a jury,440 before Justice Hugh Rose, beginning 16 April 1928
in the Superior Court of Ontario during the Spring Assizes for Northumberland and
Durham, in Cobourg, Ontario,441 and ending 1 May 1928.442 In addition to the article in

436

Ibid at 10.

437

Ibid.

438

Ibid at 11.

439

Ibid at 15.

440

Ibid at 100. The "special jury" as it was in the 1928 Currie libel trial was comprised of twelve jurors
selected from the grand jury roll.
441

Ibid at 99.

442

Ibid at 221-222.

90
question being directed to Currie, Tilley explained to the jury "that the offending article
had been published" and that "the plaintiff [Currie] had only to establish that it was
defamatory."443 The newspaper article was presented as an exhibit, and Tilly called a
witness (Ralph Hodgson) who testified on Currie's behalf.444 Sharpe said that "Hodgson
was called to prove that the ordinary reader would infer that its [the newspaper article’s]
sting was directed at Currie. Hodgson swore that when he read the article, he took
'commander-in chief' … to mean General Currie and none other."445
Currie wanted to prove that his reputation as a highly ranked military public
figure was hurt, and during the trial, his witness, Sir Richard Turner, provided evidence
that Currie had that kind of reputation. The questioning of witness Turner by Currie’s
counsel Tilley, based on the transcripts of the trial recorded in Sharpe's book, reads as
follows:
Q Do you know General Currie?
A I do, sir.
Q Do you know his reputation?
A I do.
Q As a military man?
A I do.
Q What is it?
A Well, I should say that any man that could have a military reputation
such as General Currie would be envied. [emphasis added] 446
443
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Although the jury of twelve (with one dissent) found Preston and Wilson guilty of libel
and awarded Currie five hundred dollars, "the trial had been a much more stressful
experience than Currie had expected."447
The defendants filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeal denied the appeal
and no further action was taken by Currie: as author Tim Cook has said "he [Currie]
feared that, … his reputation might be damaged beyond repair as Canada's Great War
was refought in a Cobourg courtroom, the outcome being decided not by armies, but by
lawyers, judge, and jurors."448
The trial transcripts published in Sharpe's book provide unique evidence (such as
that just quoted above) establishing that Currie had a reputation. However, this was a jury
trial, and there is no evidence available about how the jury weighed this evidence of
Currie’s reputation when coming to its verdict and then deciding to award only $500 in
general damages449 (a significantly smaller amount than what Currie had initially
claimed).
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Lefolii et al. v Gouzenko450
This litigation was initiated by plaintiff Igor Gouzenko451 based on an article
published in Maclean's Magazine in 1964.452
The fact that this was a jury trial is apparent from the judgments of the two
appellate courts that were later involved.453 From judgment of Justice Hall in the
Supreme Court of Canada, it can be discerned that "[t]he trial was a short one"454 and that
"[at] the trial, the plaintiff did not appear and the only evidence adduced was on behalf of
[Gouzenko] and consisted of the reading of the actual article complained of and certain
limited portions of the examination for discovery of the three defendants Lefolii, Spears
and Fraser [the authors of the publication]."455 Lefolii, Spears and Fraser “called no
witnesses.”456
Gouzenko, the plaintiff, though successful at trial, appealed the trial judgment to
the Ontario Court of Appeal457 on the grounds that “the learned trial judge erroneously
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excluded evidence of express malice and, that the jury was prejudiced in their assessment
of the damages of the plaintiff … .”458
On the first ground (of exclusion of evidence), the Court of Appeal (Justice Kelly,
for himself and Justices McLennan and Laskin) found that “[i]t is impossible in this
Court, in the absence of the articles themselves and of any testimony as to their contents
and the circumstances of their publication, to say whether the learned trial judge was
right or wrong in his ruling.”459
In considering the second ground (that the jury was prejudiced), the Court of
Appeal noted “[the trial judge] should not permit his uncertainty as to the capability of
the words to be defamatory, to influence the jury’s assessment of the gravity of the injury
to the appellant caused by those words.”460 The Court of Appeal went on to say “the
words complained of taken in their entirety are capable of supporting some of the other
innuendos set out in the statement of claim in addition to those which the learned trial
judge left with the jury.”461
In deciding in favour of Gouzenko (the plaintiff at trial), the Court of Appeal
stated unequivocally that
the separate functions of a judge and a jury in an action for libel: [are] that
it was his [the trial judge's] function to decide whether the words were
capable of a defamatory meaning and that it was the jury's duty to decide
whether they were in fact defamatory.462
The Court of Appeal noted further that
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[h]e [the trial judge] should not have told them [the jury] of the motion
made in their absence or have said anything about his [the trial judge's]
difficulty in arriving at a conclusion as to whether the words were capable
of a defamatory meaning.463
Finally, the Court of Appeal stated
[i]n this action the duty of the jury was to determine liability and, having
done so, to assess damages. These were separate functions and should not
have been intermixed. The jury’s finding as to liability should have been
made with respect to words which the Judge had already ruled capable of
being defamatory or instructed the jury to assume to be so. The assessment
of damages should have been made uninfluenced by the charge with
respect to liability.464
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial “on all issues rather than limit the
new trial to the assessment of damages only, which is the usual order where there is an
appeal against assessment only.”465
Lefolii, Spears and Fraser, who had lost at trial and then lost again in the Court of
Appeal, appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada
dismissed the appeal, though it varied the costs portion of the judgment below,466 thus
leaving the Court of Appeal’s order for a new trial in place. There is no evidence that
such a trial ever took place.
Although the question of the reputation of the plaintiff Gouzenko was not
specifically discussed either the judgment of the Court of Appeal or in the opinions
rendered at the Supreme Court of Canada, the roles of judge and jury in considering
matters related to reputation featured in an important discussion in the Court of Appeal.
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Justice Spence (in his own judgment at the Supreme Court of Canada) agreed with the
following statements of Justice Kelly, who wrote the judgment of the Court of Appeal:
This statement of [the trial judge’s] difficulties in deciding whether the
words were capable of a defamatory meaning was repeated three times in
different but equally compelling language.467
… I doubt if this is a case where the trial Judge should have reserved his
ruling on the issue of whether the words were capable of a defamatory
meaning, but, assuming it was an appropriate case to reserve his ruling, he
should simply have told the jury to assume that the words were capable of
a defamatory meaning and that it was their duty to decide whether they
were so in fact. He should not have told them of the motion made in their
absence or have said anything about his difficulty in arriving at a
conclusion as to whether the words were capable of a defamatory
meaning. What happened in the jury's absence was wholly irrelevant to the
function of the jury. 468
… The [judge’s] emphasis placed upon his difficulties in making up his
mind could have one effect and one effect only on the jury to cause them
to believe that, if the words were defamatory at all, the effect on the
reputation of the appellant [plaintiff at trial] was trivial and that the
damages suffered by the appellant were likewise trivial. It may be that
what was said of the appellant [plaintiff at trial] was not serious: in a
proper context a trial Judge may properly express to the jury his own
views in regard to the words used. But he should not permit his
uncertainty as to the capability of the words to be defamatory, to influence
the jury's assessment of the gravity of the injury to the appellant [plaintiff
at trial] caused by those words.469
Justice Kelly makes it clear that it is the jury’s “duty to decide whether … [the words]
were … [defamatory] in fact”470 – and, as discussed earlier, juries in Canada must keep
their decisions secret.
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Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto471
The facts about this high profile jury trial are found in the judgment at trial
delivered by Justice Carruthers in 1992 Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto.472
Justice Carruthers established that "[t]he plaintiff Hill claimed that he was the object of
defamatory statements which the defendant [Morris] Manning made while he was acting
as counsel to the defendant Church Of Scientology."473 Justice Carruthers established that
the defendant Manning, "outside the front entrance to Osgoode Hall on September 17,
1984 … wearing his barrister's gown spoke to a number of representatives of the print
media and appeared before the television cameras of both CBC and CTV. Portion of what
the defendant Manning had to say at that time were published in newspapers and aired on
television networks' news broadcasts."474 Casey Hill, a high profile official at the Office
of the Ministry of Attorney General for Ontario, launched a defamation lawsuit, alleging
that Manning had portrayed Hill as misleading a judge and breaching orders sealing a
certain number of the Church of Scientology documents earlier seized by the police.475
In his judgment at trial, holding for the plaintiff Hill, Justice Carruthers affirmed:
"The trial began on September 3, 1991 and the jury verdict was received on the night of
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October 3, 1991. … The jury … found that the words of statements about which the
plaintiff complained were defamatory of him."476
The Church of Scientology of Toronto and its counsel Manning (the defendants at
trial) appealed.
In 1994, a unanimous Court of Appeal (Justices Griffiths, Catzman and Galligan)
made the general observation that "the common law has long held that in defamation
cases the jury represents society and, in that capacity, the jury expresses society's opinion
about the actions of the person who makes false statements about another.”477 The Court
of Appeal also observed that
each libel case is unique and it is virtually impossible to categorize or
compare them. The personality and character of the defamed person, the
nature of the libel and the circumstances surrounding its publication, the
motivation and persistence of the person who defames, and the effect of
the defamation upon the injured person depend upon many variables
which are rarely duplicated. No two cases are the same, indeed, they rarely
resemble one another. An award in one case is rarely, if ever, a useful
guide in another.478
The Court of Appeal noted, in general, “our final observation is that the most valuable
asset of any lawyer is one that, if lacking, cannot be compensated by any amount of talent
or industry: it is the justified reputation for integrity … A false statement which
disparages a lawyer’s professional integrity is a very grave matter.”479 But the Court of
Appeal went on to observe specifically, in the case before it,
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[w]hat the circumstances of this case demonstrated beyond peradventure
to the jury was that Scientology was engaged in an unceasing and
apparently unstoppable campaign to destroy Casey Hill and his reputation.
It must have been apparent to the jury that a very substantial penalty was
required because Scientology had not been deterred from its course of
conduct by a previous judicial determination that its allegations were
unfounded nor by its own knowledge that its principal allegation was
false. The jury chose an amount of $800,000. It appears to have decided
that a fine equivalent to the total amount of compensatory damages was
the appropriate penalty. That rationale is one which six reasonable people
could adopt and it is one which does not offend our conscience or our
sense of justice.480

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the Church of Scientology. The decision of
the Court of Appeal of Ontario was then appealed by the Church of Scientology to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
Justice Cory, writing the judgment for the majority481 in Supreme Court of
Canada’s 1995 decision in Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, dismissing the appeal
and affirming the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal, said that reputation “is an
attribute that must, just as much as freedom of expression, be protected by society’s
laws”.482 He recognized that the “reputation of a lawyer is of paramount importance to
clients, to other members of the profession and to the judiciary.”483 Justice Cory wrote
[a]nything that leads to the tarnishing of a professional reputation can be
disastrous for a lawyer. … As a lawyer, Hill would have no way of
knowing what members of the public, colleagues, other lawyers and
judges may have been affected by the dramatic presentation of the
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allegation that he had been instrumental in breaching an order of the court
and that he was guilty of criminal contempt. [emphasis added]484

Most details of the attack on Cassey Hill’s reputation are found in the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court took note of Justice Carruther’s
account, in his trial judgment, of the years of repeated attacks on Casey Hill's
"professional integrity, which added to the sting of the libel uttered to that
point."[emphasis added]485
About the conduct of the Church of Scientology during the trial, the Supreme
Court stated that "Scientology continued its attack against Casey Hill throughout the trial
of this action, both in the presence of the jury and in its absence. More than once, it
reiterated the libel even though it knew that these allegations were false. Clearly, it
sought to repeatedly attack Casey Hill's moral character.”[emphasis added] 486 In
comparison with other libel cases, Justice Cory said:
At the outset, I should state that I agree completely with the Court of
Appeal that each libel case is unique and that this particular case is in a
"class by itself". The assessment of damages in a libel case flows from a
particular confluence of the following elements: the nature and
circumstances of the publication of the libel, the nature and position of the
victim of the libel, the possible effects of the libel statement upon the life
of the plaintiff, and the actions and motivations of the defendants. It
follows that there is little to be gained from a detailed comparison of libel
awards.487
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This litigation began with a trial that involved a jury. The deliberations of the jury would
have included findings on the reputation of Cassey Hill -- but these jury findings, like
those of all other juries in defamation actions, were secret, as required by law.
It is remarkable how much discourse in these appeal judgments focuses on
reputation. The quotations above demonstrate this. While it would be tempting to draw
conclusions based on the language about reputation found in the judgments of the Court
of Appeal and, especially, the Supreme Court of Canada, that language is all expressing
generalities: "reputation of the lawyer" not the reputation of this lawyer specifically. The
courts are concerned about the plaintiff's future reputation – but it is the test of the
plaintiff’s reputation in the present that is germaine to a defamation action. A defamation
action cannot look to possible future changes to reputation.

Quan v Cusson488
In this case, the plaintiff Danno Cusson was an Ontario Provincial Police
Constable who took the initiative to join the rescue operations in New York immediately
after the September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre (taking with him his dog). “The
O.P.P. was publicly assailed for ordering the plaintiff to return to his duties in Ottawa.
[He] gave a number of media interviews and was portrayed as a hero for his rescue
efforts.”489
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Cusson later brought a defamation action against those involved in three articles
published in the Ottawa Citizen newspaper: Douglas Quan, Kelly Egan and Don
Campbell (the authors), the Ottawa Citizen, the Ottawa Citizen Group Inc, and Southam
Publications (a CanWest Company) and OPP Staff Sargeant Penny Barager.490 According
to the article written by Douglas Quan, as an example, Cusson “had identified himself to
the New York State Police Department as an R.C.M.P. officer trained in K-9 rescues and
that although the plaintiff had been hailed as a hero, he ‘may have compromised the
search and rescue mission after he is alleged to have misled the New York State Police
into thinking he was a fully trained K-9 handler with the R.C.M.P.’”491
Justice Maranger of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice at trial "ruled that all
three articles were of public interest, but that as there was no "compelling, moral or social
duty" to publish the Quan and Egan articles, those articles, Justice Maranger ruled, could
not possibly attract the defence of qualified privilege. Justice Maranger, however, did
leave the question of application of the defence of truth to the jury and:492
[a]nswering a long list of factual questions [posed by the trial judge]
which parsed the allegedly defamatory statements in considerable detail,
the jury found that many, but not all, of the factual imputations in the
articles had been proven true. It awarded Cst. Cusson $100,000 in general
damages against the Citizen defendants and $25,000 against Staff Sgt.
Barager. However, the jury also found no malice on the part of any of the
defendants and declined to award any special, aggravated or punitive
damages.493
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This list is reproduced in the Supreme Court judgment:
[21] … the jury found the defendants had proven the following facts:
- the plaintiff had failed in his duties as an OPP officer and
abandoned his responsibilities without justification;
-neither the plaintiff nor his dog had received formal training in
search and rescue operations;
- Sgt. Fischer or someone else intended to arrest the plaintiff;
- the plaintiff misled Sgt. Fischer into thinking he was an
RCMP officer;
- the plaintiff was trying to give the impression that he was an
RCMP officer.494
The list of allegations that the jury found had not been proven was also reproduced in the
Supreme Court judgment:
[22] … the jury … found that the following imputations had not been
proven [emphasis in the original]:
- the plaintiff may have compromised the World Trade Centre
rescue effort;
- the plaintiff deliberately misled the New York police by
representing himself as a trained RCMP K-9 officer;
- the plaintiff had no search and rescue training;
- the plaintiff told Sgt. Fischer that he was an RCMP officer
and his dog had received training;
- the plaintiff had concealed his true identity;
- the plaintiff had asked to be told about the most elementary
dog handling techniques and could not carry out even the
simplest manoeuvres with his dog;
- the plaintiff was responsible for a supposed ‘fiasco’;
- the plaintiff’s actions embarrassed the OPP and may have
harmed the force’s reputation.495
Having found truth in statements such as "the plaintiff had failed in his duties as
an OPP officer and abandoned his responsibilities without justification"496 meant the
defendants could not be found to have defamed Cusson in making those statements – and,
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in turn, that such statements could not be considered to impugn Cusson's reputation as
OPP officer.
On the other hand, the jury also finding that other facts, among them the statement
that "the plaintiff deliberately misled the New York police by representing himself as a
trained RCMP K-9 officer", were not proven,497 was evidence that, absent an applicable
defence other than the defence of truth, the publications containing those statements were
defamatory and therefore could harm the plaintiff's reputation.
The defendants Quan, Egan and Campbell (the authors), the Ottawa Citizen (and
its affiliated companies) and OPP Staff Sargeant Penny Barager appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeal for Ontario, arguing that the defence of qualified privilege was not
considered properly with respect to two of the three articles at issue. The Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal.498 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Supreme Court
of Canada (then Chief Justice McLachlin sitting for herself and the other seven justices
on the panel), did not consider reputation at any point in the judgment. The Court found
that “the time has come to recognize a new defence - the defence of responsible
communication on matters of public interest"499 and, in consequence, allowed the appeal
and ordered a new trial.500
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Grant v Torstar Corporation501
Peter Grant (the plaintiff) was a major employer and a local philanthropist in the
cottage area of Twin Lakes (Ontario), where he built his mansion and a headquarters for
his company Grant Forest Products Inc., (the corporate plaintiff) and a small golf course
adjacent to his property for which he partly purchased a Crown land.502 The plaintiffs
sued the Toronto Star newspaper for libel because the newspaper’s treatment of Grant's
proposal for an expansion of the golf course, which would have required purchasing an
additional larger piece of Crown land. The impugned article said, "[e]veryone thinks it's
a done deal because of Grant's influence -- but most of all his Mike Harris ties."503
The newspaper built its defence to the action based on the argument that the
article expressed the local cottagers' concern over the expansion of the golf course as it
would affect the environment and that Mr. Grant's political influence should not give him
special treatment in the government approval process (to purchase more Crown land).504
As then Chief Justice McLachlin expressed the facts in the case (and the outcome
of the trial), in paragraphs 4 and 5 of her majority judgment:
[4] Peter Grant and his company Grant Forest Products Inc. (“GFP”) sued
the Toronto Star in defamation for an article the newspaper published
on June 23, 2001, concerning a proposed private golf course
development on Grant’s lakefront estate. The story aired the views of
local residents who were critical of the development’s environmental
impact and suspicious that Grant was exercising political influence
behind the scenes to secure government approval for the new golf
501
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course. The reporter, an experienced journalist named Bill Schiller,
attempted to verify the allegations in the article, including asking
Grant for comment, which Grant chose not to provide. The article was
published, and Grant brought this libel action.505
[5] The trial proceeded with judge and jury. The jury found the
respondents (the “Star defendants”) liable and awarded general,
aggravated and punitive damages totalling $1.475 million.506
At trial Justice Rivard rejected the newspaper's defence of qualified privilege and,
as well, a claimed defence of responsible journalism (the latter a defence recognized in
England507 but not then recognized in Canadian courts) before putting the case to the jury
(with neither of those defences).508 The jury found the newspaper liable to Grant and
awarded Grant general, aggravated and punitive damages.
The newspaper appealed the verdict. The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the
appeal and ordered a new trial.509 Grant then appealed the decision of the Court of Appeal
for Ontario in favour of the newspaper to the Supreme Court of Canada, seeking to have
the jury verdict reinstated. The Toronto Star defendents cross-appealed, seeking to have
the Supreme Court of Canada dismiss the action either on the basis of the “new” defence
of responsible journalism510 or, in the alternative, on the basis of fair comment.511
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“responsible journalism” should have been put to the jury.
510

The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately did dismiss the action on the basis of the defence of
responsible journalism: see para 87 of the judgment of the Chief Justice (and paras 88-126) in Grant v
Torstar Corporation, supra note 241.
511

Ibid at para 25.
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Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was), in her reasons for judgment, 512
emphasized that “[w]hile freedom of expression is a fundamental freedom protected by s
2(b) of the Charter, courts have long recognized that protection of reputation is also
worthy of legal recognition” [emphasis added].513 She went on to explain, in dismissing
the appeal and cross-appeal, and ordering a new trial,514 that
A plaintiff in a defamation action is required to prove three things to
obtain judgment and an award of damages:
(1) that the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they
would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a
reasonable person;
(2) that the words in fact referred to the plaintiff; and
(3) that the words were published, meaning that they were
communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff.
If these elements are established on a balance of probabilities, falsity and
damage are presumed. [emphasis added]515
At paragraphs 127-133, then Chief Justice McLachlin specifically turned to the
procedural issues arising from the new defence of responsible communication in matters
of the public interest in a case involving a judge and jury:
[127] As a general rule, the judge decides questions of law, while the jury
decides questions of fact and applies the law to the facts… issues of
fact and law cannot be entirely disentangled…
[128] The judge decides whether the statement [at issue] relates to a matter
of public interest. If public interest is shown, the jury decides
whether on the evidence the defence is established…
…
[130] … The jury should be instructed to assess the responsibility of the
communication in light of the range of meanings the words are
512

Ibid at para 4.

513

Ibid at para 3 [emphasis added].

514

Ibid at para 141.

515

Ibid at para 28 [emphasis added].
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reasonably capable of bearing, including evidence as to the
defendant’s intended meaning.
[131] … Courts have interpreted s14 [of the Ontario Libel and Slander
Act] to mean that the jury cannot be required [emphasis in original]
to answer specific questions, and if they are asked to do so they must
be informed of their right to render a general verdict.516
[132] The plaintiffs argue against a central role for the jury. …517
[133] This argument cannot be sustained. …

Although the Supreme Court of Canada ordered a new trial, there are no available
reports to confirm whether or not it ever took place. One might conjecture that Grant
dropped the matter because, as the media reported, the projected expansion of the golf
course at the heart of the matter was abandoned.518

F - Criminal Libel Cases
Following in the footsteps of English law,519 defamatory libel has been a criminal
offence in Canada since the introduction of the Act Respecting the Crime of Libel in
1874.520 The offence was absorbed into the Criminal Code in 1892.521 A century later,

516

This, of course, renders it more difficult for researchers to ascertain what these civil juries are thinking
about when coming to findings of fact on questions like reputation.
517

Note that the Supreme Court justices overwhelmingly supported the Chief Justice in her reasoning on
this point – but it is on exactly this point that Justice Abella, in her concurring judgment, was the sole
dissenter: at para 144 she writes “I am unpersuaded that it is inconsistent with the statutory scheme to leave
the legal issues at stake here [in the case of the new “responsible communication “ defence] with the judge
and any disputed facts with the jury.”
518

Peter Grant abandoned his unfinished mansion on Twin Lakes after his company experienced
bankruptcy following the 2008 financial and economic crisis. See Erik White, "Multimillion-dollar
waterfront mansion was never finished now 'just decaying'" CBC news, posted 21 June 2018.
519

An Act to Amend the Law Respecting Defamatory Words and Libel 1843 (6 and 7 Vict), c 96 (also
known as "Lord Campbell's Act.
520

For the history of criminal defamatory libel see again Justice Linda Giesbrecht in R v Stevens, supra
note 111 at paras 104-105.
521

Criminal Code, 1892 [55-56 Vic c 29] Section: V Offences against the person and reputation.
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writing about the history of the Criminal Code in Canada [in a section of her defamatory
libel judgment in R v Stevens522], Provincial Court Judge Linda Giesbrecht pointed out
that "defamatory provisions of the Code have remained substantially unchanged since the
enactment of the first Criminal Code in 1892."523
Robert Martin wrote that, while "[c]ivil libel is the mechanism whereby
individuals may seek to protect their reputations,"524 "[t]he broad purpose of
criminal libel is to preserve public order."525

The definition of defamatory libel in Canada's Criminal Code speaks directly to
reputation:
Definition
298 (1) A defamatory libel is matter published, without lawful justification
or excuse, that is likely to injure the reputation of any person by
exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or that is designed to
insult the person of or concerning whom it is published. [emphasis
added]526
Although criminal defamation case numbers are low in Canada, these cases can be
complex and controversial at times.527
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R v Stevens, [1993] supra note 110, at paras 104-105.
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Ibid at para 117.
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See Robert Martin, Media Law, 2nd ed., supra note 131 at 69-70.
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Ibid at 70.
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Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 298(1) [emphasis added].

527

See Dylan J Williams, supra note 136 at 182.
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R v Stevens 528
As a result of the police investigation, B G Stevens was charged under s 300 of
the Criminal Code for publishing a defamatory libel (on posters) about the complainant
J.P. knowing that the publication's content was false.529 Mr. Stevens elected to be tried by
a Manitoba Provincial Court judge.530 Justice Linda Giesbrecht, sitting alone, found that
Mr. Stevens "intended to injure the complainant's reputation by exposing her to hatred,
contempt or ridicule, and that he intended to insult her."531 Justice Giesbrecht also
concluded that "the statements in the posters … were malicious and calculated to do the
most possible damage to J.P.'s reputation, and that the places where the posters were
published were selected to maximize their harmful effect on the complainant."532 She
found the accused guilty of the offence under s 300 of the Criminal Code.533

528

R v Stevens, [1995] 100 Man R(2d) 81 (Judgment delivered by Scott CJM, Helper JA concurring):
There are two appeals before the court. At the first trial held before L. Giesbrecht Prov. Ct. J., the
accused was convicted of defamatory libel and sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 15
months. He appeals both conviction and sentence…. Appeal dismissed.

529

R v Stevens [1993] supra note 110. The facts read:
In October, 1991, a number of posters were displayed at various locations at the University of
Manitoba campus where the complainant J.P. was a student in the Faculty of Education. These
posters identified J.P. by name, provided her address and telephone number, and contained a
photocopy of a photograph of her. The posters purported to be a request from J.P., for people to
call or write to her and made the following statements: HELP! I'M DESPERATE AND
SUICIDAL. I'M TIRED OF FINGERING MYSELF! I CAN'T KEEP A GUY CAUSE I'M 4
FOOT 11, BALDING, OVERWEIGHT, HAVE A BLADDER DISEASE AND I'V HAD AN
ABORTION …

530

Ibid at 102.
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Justice Giesbrecht found "that the overriding objective of the defamatory libel
provisions in the Code is the protection of reputation."534 Referring to R v Morgentaler,535
she said "[a] defamatory attack on a person's reputation involves a violation of that
person's integrity and human dignity in much the same way that a physical assault does,
and may in some circumstances have more serious consequences."536 She added that
harm to reputation may result in "emotional distress, shame, horror, worry, fear and
possible economic deprivation."537 Justice Giesbrecht, however, did not provide specifics
in her judgment against the accused about how the reputation of the victim had been
impugned by the accused.
The accused appealed from the judgment of Justice Giesbrecht but only as to the
length of the sentence. The Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.538

534

R v Stevens, [1993] supra at 110, at 119. Justice Giesbrecht noted
The Law Reform Commission of Canada in its 1984 Working Paper 35, "Defamatory Libel", at p.
45, concluded that the present crime of defamatory libel protects two fundamental values,
reputation and privacy. Protection of reputation, it said, is evident from the definition of
defamatory libel in s. 298; protection of privacy is apparent from the defence of justification in s.
311, which requires that as well as being true a libel must be published for the public benefit.

She also said
Protection of privacy may well be a secondary objective where the offence is defamatory libel
simpliciter under s. 301. That offence, however, is not the subject of these proceedings and should
be left to be considered in a case where that provision is directly in issue.
The distinction between the concepts of reputation and privacy are addressed above in Ch 1.
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R v Morgenthaler (1988), 37 CCC (3d) 449, 44 DLR (4 th) 385, [1988] 1 SCR 30 (SCC).
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R v Stevens, supra note 110, at 121.
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Ibid. For the connection between the "economic deprivation" and the "material injury to the plaintiff's
reputation" see an earlier discussion about reputation in the defamation statutes in Canada.
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R v Stevens, [1995] supra note 528.
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R v Lucas 539
In this case, the two accused (Mr John Lucas and Mrs Johanna Lucas) were both
found guilty of the offence of defamatory libel under s 300 of the Criminal Code for
"publish[ing] matter without lawful justification or excuse that was likely to injure the
reputation of [a police officer] by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule or that
was designed to insult [the officer], knowing that the matter published was false."540 In
his judgment, Justice Paul Hrabinsky, sitting alone, said that "[t]he essential feature of a
criminal libel remains, as in the past, the publication of a grave, not trivial, libel".541 He
discussed section 300 of the Criminal Code and said "[t]he objective of s. 300 of the
Criminal Code is the protection of individuals from false defamatory attacks on their

539

R v Lucas [1998] 1 SCR 439: sentence appeal dismissed. Justice Cory for himself, Lamer CJ, Gonthier,
Cory, Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ; Justice L'Heureaux-Dubé concurring; Justices McLachlin and Major JJ.
dissenting on Mrs. Johanna Lucas's sentencing appeal; Justice Sopinka took no part in the judgment. R v
Lucas, [1996] 137 Sask R 312: appeal from trial on the merits dismissed; sentence appeal allowed and
sentences for Mr and Mrs Lucas varied (Justice Vancise for himself and Justices Tallis and Lane). R v
Lucas [1995] 129 Sask R 53 (Hrabinsky J), trial judgment.
540

R v Lucas, [1995] 129 Sask R 53:
FACTS
Pursuant to s 655 of the Criminal Code the accused admitted the following facts:
…
2. On September 20, 1993 at 9:00 A.M. the accused were observed to be walking on a public
sidewalk in front of the Police Station in Q, Sask. carrying a sign which had printed on one side
the words "Did [rank] [police officer] just allow or help with the rape/sodomy of an 8 year old"
and on the other side the words "If you admit it [the police officer] then you might get help with
your touching problem".
…

This case was complex and controversial: Williams, supra note 134 at 189, notes that, although in this case
the Lucases were found guilty, "[y]ears later, the foster parents successfully brought a malicious
prosecution lawsuit against the officer … Ironically, the grievance underlying the Lucases inflammatory
protest was ultimately a valid criticism of police conduct".540
541

Ibid, under the heading: "The Law."
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privacy and reputations."542 He further said "[i]t cannot be disputed that reputation is a
significant facet of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person."543
The convictions and sentences imposed by the trial judge on the Lucases were
appealed. While the convictions were upheld, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
modified the sentences.544 The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the further
sentencing appeals made by Mr. and Mrs. Lucas.545
It was not possible to glean anything pertinent to this research from either R v
Stevens546 or R v Lucas547 because neither trial judge wrote directly about how they
interpreted reputation in the cases before them. Nor did either of them identify what
evidence before them supported their findings of reputation.

G - Conclusion
Civil defamation cases in Canada are among the few remaining civil causes of
action that can be tried by either a judge and jury or a judge alone.

542

Ibid, under the heading: "Objective." There is no mention of privacy in s 300 of the Criminal Code (See
the full citation of this provision in Appendix C). In addition, see Justice Giesbrecht about privacy and
reputation in R v Stevens, discussed above (in text at note 111).
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Ibid, under the heading: "Objective."
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R v Lucas, 1996 107 WAC 312, 137 Sask R 312, Sentence Appeal ("In the result, the appeal as to
conviction is dismissed. The sentence appeal is allowed and the sentences modified as above indicated.")
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R v Lucas, [1998] supra note 539: Justice Cory delivered the judgment of himself, Lamer CJ, Gonthier,
Cory, Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ; Justice L'Heureaux-Dubé concurred; Justices McLachlin and Major JJ.
dissented on Mrs. Johanna Lucas's appeal (though not on any aspect relevant to this discussion); and Justice
Sopinka took no part in the judgment.
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R v Stevens [1995], supra note 528.
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R v Lucas [1998], supra note 539.
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In cases tried before judge and jury, the jury decides issues involving reputation -and in Canada, by law, all jury deliberations are confidential.
As set out above,548 evidence of First World War General Currie’s reputation was
introduced at the trial of the defamation action he instigated – but, in the end, it appears
to have had less effect on the outcome than it might have done: while Currie won his libel
action, he was awarded only $500549 (of $50,000 claimed550).
Cases tried before judges alone were expected to provide direct evidence of
findings concerning the plaintiffs’ reputations. Vander Zalm v Times Publishers,551 WIC
Radio v Simpson552 and Crookes v Newton553 are only civil cases before a judge alone
analyzed. R v Stevens554 and R v Lucas,555 the two criminal cases analyzed, were also
tried before a judge alone. In none of these five cases (civil or criminal) do the judgments
reveal what evidence the trial judges used in making findings about the plaintiffs’ or
victims' reputations.
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See text at footnote 446 (above), quoting from Sharpe at 212-213.
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Sharpe, supra note 429, at 225.
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Ibid, at 224.
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Vander Zalm v Times Publishers (1980), supra note 243.
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WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson (2008), supra note 244.

553

Crookes v Newton (2011), supra note 366. As described above, this case never reached a stage that
involved considering evidence.
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R v Stevens [1993] supra note 110; appeal to the Court of Appeal dismissed, see R v Stevens [1995]
supra note 528.
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R v Lucas [1995] supra note 540, reversed in part by R v Lucas [1996] supra note 544, further appeal
dismissed, R v Lucas [1998] supra note 539.
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CHAPTER 4 - REPUTATION AS EXPRESSED IN THE CANADIAN
LAW OF MORAL RIGHTS
A – Background and International Presence
Reputation in Canada’s defamation law has been analyzed in the two previous
chapters. In addition to finding that the meaning of ‘reputation’ theorized by Post as
integral to defamation (described in Chapter 2) is neither discussed in Canadian
defamation jurisprudence nor supported by Canadian defamation jurisprudence, Chapter
3 has demonstrated that none of the reported Canadian cases involving defamation, either
civil or criminal, focuses on evidence related to proving the reputation at the core of the
defamation litigation. While this finding was to be expected in the cases involving jury
trials (because jury findings are confidential), it is an unexpected finding in the context of
defamation trials by judges sitting alone.
Because there is no evidence of reputation as applied in defamation cases
available, no analogy is possible between the concept of reputation as understood in
Canadian defamation law and the concept of reputation as it may be discovered in
connection with moral rights, prohibited marks or geographical indications.
In the chapters that follow, this research turns, then, to the central focus of this
thesis: analyzing the concept of reputation in the context, respectively, of moral rights
(Chapter 4), prohibited marks (Chapter 5) and geographical indications (Chapter 6).
This chapter asks whether reputation is involved in moral rights.556

556

Chapters 5 (on Prohibited Marks) and 6 (on Geographical Indications) each consider a second specific
question in connection with the analysis presented in them. However, it will be seen in this chapter that
asking a question such as “Is reputation in the moral rights context the same as reputation found in
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It has been pointed out by Margaret Ann Wilkinson and Natasha Gerolami that
moral rights and economic rights in copyright are best understood as the
implementation of information policy designed to further the interests of
society in an expanding supply of reliable, available information. The
economic rights are designed to address the supply of available
information, while moral rights are designed to address making reliability
of that supply ascertainable.557
They predict that “[w]ith the growing complexity of the information environment, moral
rights will become increasingly important as a guarantee for the authority and integrity of
the work.”558
Tanya Aplin and Ahmed Shaffan Mohamed (publishing in 2019 on the United
Kingdom’s legislation concerning the concept of reputation in the moral right of
integrity) 559 wrote "[c]rucial to the scope of the integrity right is the concept of prejudice
to the author's 'honour' or 'reputation.'"560 They noted that "there has been limited
exploration by courts or commentators of what 'honour' or 'reputation' means"561 and
argued that the test of prejudice to reputation should "legitimately borrow from the law of
defamation."562
After expanding the background to moral rights provided in Chapter 1 and then
discussing the presence of moral rights in international law, this chapter explores two

copyright?” is not a question that makes sense in context: this chapter makes clear that copyright is not in
any way dealing with reputation.
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Wilkinson & Gerolami, "The Author as Agent of Information Policy”, supra note 20 at 331.
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Tanya F Aplin & Ahmed Shaffan Mohamed, "The Concept of 'Reputation'' in the Moral Right of
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further topics: what commentators say about moral rights in Canada and what concept of
reputation is reflected in Canadian moral rights law.
Michelangelo Buonarroti was a leading artist in his day and likely his prominence
would have allowed him to insist upon his name being associated with his works, and his
works being left as he had created them, without ever exercising moral rights in
connection with his work563 -- but, in any case, in Michelangelo’s time (1475-1564), as
Susan Liemer points out,564 there was no law protecting authors’ or artists’ moral rights:
it was the pure force of Michelangelo's reputation that allowed him to succeed in
controlling uses of his name and his work (perhaps contracts were also involved because,
as Liemer points out, most of his artwork was commissioned565).
Moral rights566 came into existence after the concepts of copyright and droit
d’auteur had entered public international law.567 Moral rights cannot be assigned and are
inseparable from the individuals in whom they have arisen and inseparable from the heirs
of those individuals. This is in direct contrast to the economic rights involved in
copyright, which, as noted in Chapter 1, are transferable.To this day, it has been noted
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Susan P Liemer, "On the Origins of Le Droit Moral: How Non-Economic Rights Came to Be Protected
in French IP Law" (2011) 19:65 J Intell Prop L 65 at 78-79
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Moral rights originated from French civil law tradition (droits moraux), which refers to individual,
personal, thus inalienable rights of an author of literary or artistic works. (For the origin of "moral rights" in
intellectual property and its relationship to economic rights (copyright) see Wilkinson, "The Public Interest
in Moral Rights Protection" supra note 18; Wilkinson & Gerolami, "The Author as Agent of Information
Policy” supra note 20; see also Mistrale Goudreau, "Le droit moral de l’auteur au Canada" (1994) 25:3
RGD 403.
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The initiative for adding "moral rights" to the Berne Convention came from civil law countries of
continental Europe (France, Germany, Italy) while the common law countries (especially the US) initially
opposed adding them. See Margaret Ann Wilkinson & Natasha Gerolami "The Information Context of
Moral Rights under the Copyright Regime" (2004) Law Publications 78, online
<https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lawpub/78>.

117
that "in civil law countries [where moral rights originated], moral rights are of great
importance, … whereas in common law jurisdictions the rationale behind copyright is
generally more utilitarian and economic, whereas moral rights are weaker."568
As previously noted in Chapter 1, public international law efforts to expand the
rights of authors not only to protect their economic rights in literary and artistic works but
also to give them more control over their works first culminated in the 1928 Rome
Revision of the Berne Convention, which added Article 6bis: 569
1928

Original Article 6bis

Rome Revision

(1) Independently of the author's economic rights,
and even after the transfer of the said rights, the
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the
work, as well as the right to object to any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation [emphasis added].
(2) The determination of the conditions under which
these rights shall be exercised is reserved for the
national legislation of the countries of the Union.
The means of redress for safeguarding these rights
shall be regulated by the legislation of the country
where protection is claimed.

The 1948 Brussels Revision of the Berne Convention specified that "moral rights"
were to be bequeathed to the author's heirs for a minimum duration equivalent to the term
of economic rights. Ownership of and succession to the moral rights in works were to be

568

Iona Harding & Emily Sweetland, "Moral rights in the modern world: is it time for a change?" (2012)
7:8 J Intell Prop L & Prac 565 at 569.
569

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, completed at
Paris on 4 May 1896, revised at Berlin on 13 November 1908, completed at Berne on 20 March 1914,
revised at Rome on 2 June 1928.
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independent of ownership and succession in respect of the economic rights. The sections
of Article 6bis after the Brussels Revision read as follows570:
1948

Article 6bis (revisions are in bold)

Brussels Revision

(1) Independently of the author's economic rights,
and even after the transfer of the said rights, the
author shall have the right, during his lifetime, to
claim authorship of the work, and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
any other derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation. [emphasis added]
(2) In so far as the legislation of the countries of the
Union permits, the rights granted to the author in
accordance with the preceding paragraph shall,
after his death, be maintained, at least until the
expiry of the economic rights, and shall be
exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized
by the said legislation. [emphasis added]
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights
granted by this Article shall be governed by the
legislation of the country where protection is
claimed.

The text of Article 6bis was revised again in Stockholm in 1967. This revision of
the "moral rights" provision provided additional flexibility for members of the Union by
allowing member states whose law upon joining the Berne Union did not provide for
protection after death for all of the moral rights to continue to provide, in their legislation,
for provision of only some of the moral rights after death.571

570

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, completed at
Paris on 4 May 1896, revised at Berlin on 13 November 1908, completed at Berne on 20 March 1914,
revised at Rome on 2 June 1928, revised at Brussels 1948.
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Berne Convention, supra note 55.
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1967

Article 6bis (revisions made in 1967 are in bold)

Stockholm Revision (1) Independently of the author's economic rights,
and even after the transfer of the said rights, the
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance
with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death,
be maintained, at least until the expiry of the
economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the
persons or institutions authorized by the legislation
of the country where protection is claimed.
However, those countries whose legislation, at the
moment of their ratification of or accession to this
Act, does not provide for the protection after the
death of the author of all the rights set out in the
preceding paragraph may provide that some of
these rights may, after his death, cease to be
maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights
granted by this Article shall be governed by the
legislation of the country where protection is
claimed.
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Although the Berne Convention was also revised in Paris in 1971, and again
amended in 1979572, Article 6bis has not been changed since the Stockholm revision.573

572

Following the Paris Revision to the Berne Convention in 1971, the United States joined the Berne
Convention (at the 1971 level) in 1989, which means that the United States purports to have recognized
"moral rights." The American effort in this regard can, at best, be termed minimalist since their only
legislative expression in this area is the 1990 Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) 17 USC §106A. See
“Intellectual Property – Copyright – Second Circuit Finds Temporary Art Protected under the Visual Arts
Rights Act – Castillo v G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020)” (2021) 134:5 Harv L Rev 1881,
which begins
[t]he Visual Rights Act of 1990 grants the authors of visual artworks the “non-economic ‘moral
rights’” of attribution and integrity, a ‘statutory first in [U.S.] federal copyright law … Recently,
in Castillo v G&M Realty L.P., the Second Circuit extended VARA’s moral rights protections to
temporary works of art, holding that aerosol art in a warehouse exhibition space had achieved
‘recognized stature’ under VARA.[footnotes omitted]
According to the US Copyright Act 17 USC §101 Definitions:
A ‘work of visual art’ is –
a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively number by the author, or, in the case of a
sculpture, in multiple cast, carved or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author, or a still
photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is
signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author.
A work of visual art does not include –
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion
picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base,
electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item of advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging
material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
While there is no requirement in the Berne Convention that the moral rights be legislated in a jurisdiction –
or that the protection of moral rights be legislated as part of the legislation of copyright (and therefore the
moral rights can, in a common law jurisdictions, simply exist as a matter of common law), Laura
Gassaway, in “Copyright and Moral Rights” ((2002) 6:12 Information Outlook 40), noted the
[U.S.] Congress concluded [when the United States acceded to the Convention November 26,
1988] that various state and federal laws afforded U.S. authors the minimum protection necessary
for Berne accession. These laws include trademark law as well as laws governing
misappropriation, defamation, and the rights of publicity and privacy.
Additionally, 11 states already had some moral rights laws on their books.
However, most authors do not believe that the United States has even now fully fulfilled its Berne
obligation to provide law embracing moral rights: as Roberta Rosenthall Kwall noted, in chapter 3 “The
Current Legal Framework” in The Soul of Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the United States
(Stanford University Press, 2009), “Copyright law in the United States fails to afford authors, in an explicit
fashion, comprehensive moral rights…” (at 25) and she goes on to explicitly critique VARA, at 28:
VARA provides very circumscribed federal statutory protection for the moral rights of certain
visual artists… One significant problem with VARA is that the statute only applies to a very
narrow category of visual art… VARA specifically excludes protection for reproductions of
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While the term “moral rights” does not appear explicitly in the Berne Convention
in Article 6bis, it is used in the Berne Convention in Article 11bis (added in the 1928
Revision) under which authors shall have exclusive authorizing rights for broadcasting or
rebroadcasting or otherwise communicating their works (paraphrasing Article 11bis(1)).
Article 11bis(2) declares that the rights in Article 11bis(1) “shall not in any
circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author”.574 Though the Berne
Convention has consistently referred to "honour or reputation" together, it does not
provide specifics regarding either of these concepts.
The Berne Convention makes no mention of performers or performances. The
protection of "moral rights" for performers and their performances entered public
international law through the 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(WPPT),575 which Canada ratified in 2014:576
Article 5
Moral Rights of Performers
(1) Independently of a performer’s economic rights, and even after the
transfer of those rights, the performer shall, as regards his live aural
performances or performances fixed in phonograms, have the right to
claim to be identified as the performer of his performances, except where
omission is dictated by the manner of the use of the performance, and to
works, and fails to provide any remedy when works are used in a context found objectionable or
distasteful by the author.
By contrast to the situation in the United States, the United Kingdom added moral rights to its Copyright
Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) in 1988 (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK), c 48, - Chapter
IV Moral Rights, sections 77-89).
573

The expression "moral rights" does not appear in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. However, "the
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("The said Treaty will enter in into force, with respect to Canada, on August 13, 2014.").

122
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his
performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation.
(2) The rights granted to a performer in accordance with paragraph
(1) shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the
economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions
authorized by the legislation of the Contracting Party where protection is
claimed. However, those Contracting Parties whose legislation, at the
moment of their ratification of or accession to this Treaty, does not
provide for protection after the death of the performer of all rights set out
in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights will,
after his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted under this
Article shall be governed by the legislation of the Contracting Party where
protection is claimed.

It is noteworthy in the WPPT that Article 5 refers only to “reputation” and not to
the Berne Convention terminology of “honour or reputation”.
Australian author Dennis Lim has commented that, at the Brussels Conference in
1948, "a number of member countries indicated that they saw 'reputation' and 'honour' as
distinctly separate."577 Iona Harding and Emily Sweetland have commented that “[i]n any
case, ‘reputation and honour’ is difficult to define clearly” though “reputation is easier to
judge than honour”.578 Harding and Sweetland observe that "[h]onour is a more difficult
concept for British lawyers; however, in Japan, for example, honour is a well-established
cultural and legal concept."579 This chapter will explore whether consideration of the
moral rights by Canadian courts identifies any distinction being made in Canadian
jurisprudence between these two concepts.
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Dennis Lim, "Prejudice to Honour or Reputation in Copyright Law" (2007) 33:2 Monash U L Rev 290
at 293 [footnote omitted].
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Berne Article 6bis describes two distinct types of moral rights: the right of
paternity and the right of integrity.580 The right of paternity is expressed, in Article 6bis,
as “the right to claim authorship of the work.” The right of integrity is expressed as “the
right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of the said work.”
The relative weakness of moral rights protection on the global stage (as compared
to protection of copyrights, trademarks, patents, prohibited marks and geographical
indications581) stems from the fact that protection of moral rights is only set out in public
international law, in the Berne Convention. The reason that moral rights have been
locked out of international trade agreements is that the United States opposed their
introduction into TRIPS Agreement and therefore subsequent TRIPS-plus trade
agreements). This is because the United States has domestically come to oppose the
concept of moral rights, believing them to be incompatible with the rights created by
copyright.582 In terms of its Berne Convention obligation under Article 6bis, Patrick
Goold notes
When assessing the American potential compliance with article 6bis, an
Ad Hoc Working Group came to the controversial conclusion that, while
U.S. law contained no explicit moral rights provision, a “patchwork” of
federal and state causes of action, from state common law libel and
privacy actions to the federal Lanham Act [trademark] provisions on
unfair competition, provided sufficient protection to attribution and
integrity interests to enable the United States to join the Berne Convention
without further legislation on moral rights.583

Note below that there is a further right enacted in the moral rights provisions in Canada’s Copyright Act,
which may, in fact, be either an extension beyond the text of the Berne Convention in terms of the right to
integrity or a third right, separate and apart from either the right to integrity or the paternity right.
580
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The connection of the prohibited marks and geographical indications to the trade environment of the
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Goold, however, demonstrates that, during the twentieth century American courts did
create law that recognized rights now understood internationally to be moral rights but
that these initiatives lost ground after 1980 and eventually an American rhetoric of moral
rights as un-American replaced them.584
Canada having obligations respecting the moral rights under its trade agreements
is specifically ruled out by its membership in the TRIPS Agreement where, in Article
9(1), it specifies:
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne
Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members shall
not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights
conferred under Article 6bis of that Convention or of the rights derived
therefrom.
In light of Article 9(1) in TRIPS, an agreement from which all of Canada’s subsequent
trade treaties flow, no subsequent trade agreement into which Canada has entered has
dealt substantively with moral rights.585
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Ibid at 1124.
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Canada implemented CUSMA, the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, in 2020 through the
Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement Implementation Act, SC 2020, c 1. In CUSMA, Article 20.65
dealing with Contractual Transfers, provides:
Each Party shall provide that for copyright and related rights, any person acquiring or
holding an economic right Footnote 63 in a work, performance, or phonogram:
(a) may freely and separately transfer that right by contract; and
(b) by virtue of contract, including contracts of employment underlying the creation of
works, performances, or phonograms, must be able to exercise that right in that
person’s own name and enjoy fully the benefits derived from that right [2 nd footnote,
footnote 64, about Contractual transfers, omitted]
Footnote 63 to Article 20.65 reads “For greater certainty, this Article does not affect the exercise of moral
rights.”
The predecessor to CUSMA, the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]
between Canada, Mexico and the United States, which as signed before TRIPS, did not
contain any explicit mention of “moral rights”, though it did state, in Article 1701(2) of
NAFTA that “To provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights, each Party shall, at a minimum, give effect to this Chapter and to the
substantive provisions of… (b) the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
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B - Commentators on Moral Rights in Canada
(a) General Comments
In Théberge v Galerie d' Art du Petit Champlain,586 a decision of Canada’s
Supreme Court that will be discussed extensively below,587 Justice Binnie, in his majority
judgment, comments that
Moral rights, by contrast [with copyright], descend from the civil law
tradition. They adopt a more elevated and less dollars and cents view of
the relationship between an artist and his or her work. They treat the
artist’s oeuvre as an extension of his or her personality, possessing a
dignity which is deserving of protection. The focus on the artist’s right …
to protect throughout the duration of the economic rights … both the
integrity of the work and his or her authorship of it (or anonymity, as the
author wishes).
Margaret Ann Wilkinson has pointed more directly to the differing roles
copyright and the moral rights play (roles both increasingly important as the modern
information society advances):
The two regimes [copyright and moral rights] are undeniably related. The
nature of that relationship, from the public’s perspective, centers on the
contribution each system makes to the fundamental requirements of
individuals in society related to satisfying information needs: the need for
access to information and the need for indications of the authority of the
information available in order to make informed choices among available
sources. Copyright systematically addresses the first need and moral
rights systematically address the second.588
Dennis Lim has argued that the right of paternity has no direct connection to
reputation as the right of paternity is simply the right of an author to have that author’s

Artistic Work , 1971”. See https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/fta-ale/17.aspx?lang=eng
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name remain connected with a work.589 It is the position of this author, however, that
having the author’s name permanently associated with the author’s work will inevitably
mean that the work will either enhance or degrade its author’s reputation – and that, vice
versa, the reputation of the author will either enhance or degrade the reputation of the
work.
Quite apart from the role reputation plays in connection with the moral right of
paternity, it appears indisputable that reputation is directly connected to the moral right of
integrity. This thesis, focussing on the context of reputation as it is involved in specific
facets of intellectual property, is focused on exploring the concept of reputation
specifically in connection with moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical
indications and, in the latter two contexts (prohibited marks and geographical
indications), the marks involved are used in connection with certain specific products,
services, institutions or individuals. It is the moral right of integrity (linking a work with
its individual author or authors), rather than the moral right of paternity (which gives the
author or authors control over having their name or names linked to a work), that links a
work and its reputation in the same sense as reputation is linked in the contexts of
prohibited marks and geographical indications. Therefore, it must be the moral right of
integrity that is the focus of this chapter:590 while having the work’s author’s name
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Dennis Lim, supra note 577 at 293 [footnote omitted].

The author's moral right to attribution and right to integrity in a work were separated into two clear
provisions in 1988, when Canada amended its copyright statute (An Act to Amend the Copyright Act and to
Amend Other Acts in Consequence Thereof (Statutes of Canada 35-36-37 Elizabeth II (assented to 8 June
1988) c 15, s 18.2(1)(b)). In 2012 Canada added a performer's right to attribution with and integrity in their
performance (Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012, c 20 (in force 7 November 2012).590 Also added to
the Copyright Act, in 2012, was an entirely new provision stating that “[t] author’s or performer’s right to
the integrity of a work or performer’s performance is, to the prejudice of its author’s or performer’s honour
or reputation…(b) used in association with a product, service, cause or institution” (Copyright Act, s
28.2(1)(b)). Lesley Ellen Harris provides, as an illustration of a situation in which a moral rights holder
could sue under this new provision, the example of an artist objecting when the artist’s work is presented at
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associated with a work (the right of paternity) is clearly related to the reputation of that
author, the reputation of the work itself is directly connected with the moral right of
integrity.
Several commentators have, in the past, associated the concept of reputation in
moral rights with the concept of reputation in trademark: Iona Harding and Emily
Sweetland have noted that, in considering moral rights, "reputation is easier to judge than
[is] honour, [because of] reputation being a familiar idea relevant, for example, to the tort
of defamation and trade mark law"591; Rowland Lorimer has not only said "[moral rights]
are related to the reputation of an author and how the treatment by other rights holders of
an author's or creator's work affects that reputation"592 but also that "[moral rights] are
akin to the historical sense of a trademark, a sign of the reputation of the trader."593

(b) Commentator Dennis Lim on the moral rights and defamation law
Dennis Lim considered the moral rights in the context of defamation law and
argued a number of points:

“an art exhibit sponsored by a tobacco company where the artist’s reputation rides on the fact that she is a
no-smoking advocate” (Lesley Ellen Harris, “Moral Rights in Canadian Copyright Law” (2010) 34:5
LawNow 14 at 16). The provision has been identified as a new moral right (a right to association) separate
from Canada’s statutory moral rights of paternity and attribution (see Wilkinson and Gerolami, "The
Author as Agent of Information Policy” supra note 20 at 326-327. Other authors, as noted below, however,
interpret this statutory addition as merely expanding the right of integrity. It is interesting to note that the
federal government provides a description of moral rights that lists "right of paternity… right of integrity
… right of association…" The entry under "right of association" begins "part of the right of integrity is an
author's /creator's right of association …" [emphasis in original]. See online: < Moral Rights - Canada.ca.
591

Harding & Sweetland, supra note 568 at 569.

592

Lorimer, supra note 63 at 5 [emphasis added].

593

Ibid.

128
(1) that since the moral right of integrity is subject to the concept of prejudice to
the authors’ "honour or reputation", it goes beyond the law of defamation
which is solely dealing with "reputation ";594
(2) using Canadian cases as examples, that the test for reputation in defamation is
an objective test: the law of the moral right of integrity goes beyond the test
for reputation in defamation because, for moral rights, the test for reputation
involved in the right contains a subjective element;595
(3) that the concept of honour associated with the moral rights in the Berne
Convention is different from the concept of reputation and, therefore, nations,
in their laws, should be treating the two concepts separately;596
(4) finally, that, because of a lack of distinction being made between the terms
“honour” and “reputation” (which appear together in the Canadian statute),
Canadian courts always use the two terms together.597
With respect to Dennis Lim’s second argument, he stated that “Canadian courts
have interpreted the prejudice requirement in the right of integrity as involving a test that
contains subjective elements as well as the objective element of reasonableness.”598 He
pointed to the early decision in Snow v Eaton Shopping Centre, saying the approach of
the trial judge “was first to consider the plaintiff’s subjective evidence of prejudice, then
determine whether it was an objectively reasonable view of the prejudice.”599 Lim then
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Ibid at 302, citing to Snow v Eaton Shopping Centre supra note 637 (Justice O-Brien, Ontario High
Court of Justice). Note that this litigation was based on the original instantiation of moral rights in
Canada’s Copyright Act, s 12(7):
Independently of the author's copyright, and even after the assignment, either wholly or partially,
of the said copyright, the author has the right to claim authorship of the work, as well as the right
to restrain any distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work that would be prejudicial to
his honour or reputation.
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concluded that “[i]n Snow, the objective evidence of well respected authors and people
knowledgeable in the author’s field helped satisfy the objective/subjective test.”600
However, what Justice O’Brien actually wrote in his decision in Snow v Eaton Shopping
Centre was that the artist
is adamant in his belief that his naturalistic composition has been made to
look ridiculous…, [and] the artist’s opinion is shared by a number of other
well respected people knowledgeable in his field.
This finding speaks to the artist’s subjective opinion being bolstered by the subjective
opinions of ‘other well respected people knowledgeable in his field’ – and what that
finding of fact provided was objective evidence that the artist involved had a reputation
(the subjective opinions of ‘other well respected people knowledgeable in his field’) –
which were, themselves, objective evidence that Snow’s original “naturalist composition”
of flying geese, now festooned with ribbons, no longer appeared “naturalist” and was
therefore, in the opinion of the artists who gave evidence, ridiculous.
With respect to Dennis Lim’s third argument, that the concept of honour
associated with the moral rights in the Berne Convention is different from the concept of
reputation and, therefore, nations, in their laws, should be treating the two concepts
separately, Lim pointed to the 1997 Canadian case of Boudreau v Lin.601 Lim claimed
that Boudreau v Lin “was clearly not a prejudice to honour case, as the charges [sic]
could not have affected the plaintiff’s [Boudreau’s] reputation.”602 The plaintiff Boudreau
“was a part-time student in the M.B.A. program at the University of Ottawa” (para 2)
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Boudreau v Lin (1997) 75 CPR(3d), Ont Sup Ct (Justice Ducharme).

Dennis Lim supra note 577 at 304. Note that this was a civil action, not a criminal one, so Lim’s use of
the term “charges” must be a slip.
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who “took a Directed Reading course from the defendant [Professor Lin]” (para 3). The
litigation was over “a paper which [Boudreau] prepared for a University class [, a paper]
… published by … Professor Lin… without [Boudreau’s] knowledge or consent and
without attribution to [Boudreau] as author.” (para 1). At paragraph 39 of his judgment,
Justice Métivier set out Boudreau’s claims in the case:
Mr. Boudreau’s claims are founded on the appropriation of his work by a
non-author, the photocopying of it without permission and the interference
with the integrity of his work by the additions, deletions and changes to it
effected by Professor Lin.
Dennis Lim, in his article, stated
[t]he plaintiff [Boudreau] did not adduce any objective evidence of
prejudice to honour, … Métivier J nevertheless held that the additions,
deletions and changes to the plaintiff’s work had interfered with the
integrity of the work and infringed the right of integrity.603

It appears, however, that evidence was adduced at trial, evidence which Justice Métivier
considered. About the moral right to paternity, Justice Métivier found, at para 34, “I find
as a fact that the plaintiff Mr. Boudreau was the only author of the work in question. I
have no difficulty in finding Professor Lin is not a co-author [italics in original].” It also
appears that Justice Métivier’s recitation of the facts at para 8 clearly presents “objective
evidence adduced” which addresses the question of prejudice to honour:
In September of 1992, [former student of Professor Lin] Mr Boudreau was
amazed to learn that his paper from the previous August, amended in the
most minimal manner, with the omission of certain graphs and tables and
with a different title; but with no mention of his name, had been copied
and sold to M.B.A. students as a Case Note. He later learned that the
paper, in its altered state, had also been presented by Professor Lin at a
symposium in another city in September of 1992.
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On the merits, Justice Métivier found, concerning copyright infringement, at paragraph
52, that “[o]n all of the evidence, as examined in the framework of these rights granted by
the Copyright Act, I find that both defendants [Professor Lin and the University of
Ottawa] infringed the copyright belonging to the plaintiff.” Justice Métivier then
continued, under the heading “Moral Rights”, to find, at paragraph 53, that “[b]oth the
rights described (integrity of the work and association by name [paternity]) have been
breached by the actions of Professor Lin.” Justice Métivier then continued, at paragraphs
54-61 (the last paragraph in the reasons), to consider “Damages”.
In asserting that “[t]he plaintiff [Boudreau] did not adduce any objective evidence
of prejudice to honour, …”, it appears that Lim may have been referring to Justice
Métivier’s finding, at paragraph 57, that
[t]here is no evidence before me that the infringement of the plaintiff’s
moral rights has caused any loss to the plaintiff’s reputation. At best there
may have been a possibility of a loss of opportunity to acquire a reputation
in academic circles. I consider this possibility to be so remote that I accord
no weight to it.604

In the judgment in Boudreau v Lin, however, this finding of Justice Métivier’s is made
when he considers what remedies should flow from his earlier findings on the merits and
does not form part of his reasons concerning the liability of the professor to his student.
In terms of remedies, Justice Métivier, at paragraph 57, specifically considers whether
special or punitive damages should be awarded. Paragraph 56 reads:
Nevertheless, I do not find the conduct of either of the defendents meets
the standard of ‘flagrant behaviour and callous disregard’ for Mr.
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Boudreau’s rights such as would permit me to award punitive or
exemplary damages.

Justice Métivier buttresses his reasoning, in coming to the conclusion that he did on
damages (in paragraph 56) and that there has been no loss to the plaintiff’s reputation
(paragraph 57), in the following paragraph (paragraph 58):
It is an established principle that merely because there is no commercial
market for an academic treatise or paper does not mean that the protection
of the Copyright Act is unavailable. However, it does mean that, on
breach of those rights, the quantification of damages become problematic.
Justice Métivier concludes his consideration of damages with the following paragraphs
(in which he set out his judgment):
[59] I am of the view that an award of general damages in these
circumstances and on these facts would be fair and equitable in the amount
of $7,500. This sum is commensurate with the court’s appreciation of the
plaintiff’s indignation at the wrong committed, rather than a quantification
of the value of the plaintiff’s loss.
[60] Further the [University of Ottawa] and Professor Lin are enjoined
from further infringing the plaintiff’s copyright in the paper ‘Strategic
Information Technologies for Customized Manufacturing…”.
[61] The plaintiff shall be entitled to his costs on a solicitor/client basis.605
Dennis Lim’s fourth argument is that Canadian decisions demonstrate that judges
make no distinction between the two terms “honour” and “reputation” since they always
use the two terms together. Lim points to two Canadian decisions in making this point:

Note that costs on a “solicitor/client basis” is also an indication that Justice Métivier found the
behaviour of the defendants to be unacceptable. This type of order for costs now translates in Ontario to
either “substantial indemnity” or “full indemnity” costs and either can be used to punish reprehensible
conduct (see Rule 1.03 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure). See Manufacturers and Traders Trust
Company v Amlinger, [2006] OJ No 5547 at para 8, per Perell, J., and Burke v Hudson’s Bay Company,
[2008]OJ No 3936 at paras 17-18 (OCA).
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Boudreau v Lin606 and Pollock v CFCN Productions Ltd (1983).607 It appears, however,
that the jurisprudence he uses to support this argument cannot bear the weight Lim puts
upon it.608
In Boudreau, Justice Métivier’s use of the phrase “court’s appreciation of the
plaintiff’s indignation” (para 59) sounds very much like the Court addressing the
plaintiff’s “honour” rather than the plaintiff’s “reputation”. The case, discussed at length
by Lim, would therefore seem to refute his own hypothesis on this point.
In Pollock v CFCN Productions Ltd (1983)609, Lim refers to a decision of
Associate Chief Justice Moore, granting an interim injunction until trial of the action
because “[i]n my view, the plaintiff [playwright Pollock] demonstrated that there are
serious questions to be tried including … the interpretation and application of s. 12(7)
[the then moral rights provision] of the Copyright Act”.610 However, there is no
indication that a trial ever took place and therefore the Pollock v CFCN Productions
litigation does not appear to bear the weight of interpretation that Lim places upon it. In
coming to his decision on the motion, Associate Chief Justice Moore noted (at para 8)
that there were affidavits filed in evidence for the motion “that Pollock’s play and
screenplay have been seriously distorted, violated and mutilated to the extent that her
reputation will be damaged if the film is shown”, but the judgment itself is completely
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silent on the application of the concept of reputation in the context of Canada’s moral
rights.
(c) Other commentators on “reputation” in the context of moral rights
A number of other authors have focused directly on the concept of “reputation” in
the context of the moral rights.
Mark L Rudoff, in “The Dancer and the Dance” takes the position that
[i]t is … clear that the [Copyright] Act does not protect the public interest
as such. It does not leave room for a public interest group, for example, to
complain about damage to a work. No one can restrain an artist from
making changes to her own work. Further, since the moral rights are
coterminous with copyright, there is no protection afforded the integrity of
works in the public domain.611
He sees the integrity right in the Copyright Act as
resembl[ing] nothing so much as a statutory restive covenant attaching to
creative property. It my be enforced not only against the transferee who
receives a work from the author, but against all later owners and users
during the term of the copyright. The right is tied to the life of the
property (i.e., the copyright), not that of the author. The author may
bequeath the right or bargain it away. He may enforce his right with the
full range of remedies, including injunctive relief and damages. In effect,
the purchaser or user of an artwork or copyright takes subject to any claim
that its author may have in the work’s integrity.612
Lesley Ellen Harris has said that "the purpose of moral rights is to protect the
personality or reputation of an author (and not necessarily the owner) of a copyright-

Mark L Rudoff, “The Dancer and the Dance: An Essay on Composers, Performers, and Integrity
Rights,” (1991) 29:4 Alta L Rev 884 at 888. Note that this a different position from arguing that the moral
rights are not in the public interest: as is noted elsewhere in this Chapter, it has been argued by others
(among them, Wilkinson, “The Public Interest in Moral Rights Protection,” note 18 above) that the moral
rights do serve the public interest.
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protected work."613 Iona Harding and Emily Sweetland have said that "[m]oral rights are
personal rights in a work…[and] when that work is deformed or mutilated -- this
constitutes an attack on the person or the personality of the author"614 but have noted that
"[i]n any case, 'reputation and honour' is [sic] difficult to define clearly."615
In light of the preponderance of opinion concerning the reputation of the author
and the relationship between honour and reputation, it would seem that Dennis Lim’s
opinion and analysis are outliers and that his case has not be made out: the majority of
commentators use the terms “honour and reputation” together.

C - "Reputation" in the Context of Moral Rights in Canadian Law
(a) In the Copyright Act
Currently, in Canada’s Copyright Act,616 moral rights appear across several
widely separated sections.617 The statute “defines” moral rights, in section 2, by reference
to other sections of the Act: "‘moral rights’ means the rights described in subsections
14.1(1) and 17.1(1)."618 The s 14.1 provisions apply to moral rights of authors of works
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1988(An Act to Amend Copyright Act and to Amend Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, SC (35-36-37 Eliz
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while the s 17.1 provisions protect the rights of "a performer of a live aural performance
or a performance fixed in a sound recording".619
Subsection 14.1(1) states
[t]he author of the work has … the right to the integrity of the work and,
… the right … to be associated with the work as its author by name or
under a pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous.620

Subsection 17.1(1) states a performer has
the right to the integrity of the performance … [and] the right … to be
associated with the performance as its performer by name or under a
pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous.621

Both sections 14.1(1) and 17.1(1) intermingle two separate categories of moral
rights (rights to paternity and rights of integrity). The right to paternity appears, across
the two sections, in the words “the [author/performer] has … the right … to be associated
with the [work/performance] … as its [author/performer] by name or under a
pseudonym”. For authors, this right appears in subsection 14.1(1) of the Copyright Act
and for performers, in subsection 17.1(1). The right of integrity appears across the two
sections (14.1(1) and 17.1(1)) as “the right to the integrity of the [work/performance]”:
for authors in subsection 14.1(1) and, for performers, in subsection 17.1(1).
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Consequence Thereof, SC (35-36-37 Eliz II; assented to 8 June 1988) c 15). Further revision occurred in
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Copyright Act and to Amend Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, SC (35-36-37 Eliz II) (assented to 8 June
1988) c 15.) and in the Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012, c 20, s 10.
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There are scholarly disagreements about interpretation of both subsections 14.1(1)
and 17.1(1), one of which is over whether the language of “the right to remain
anonymous” actually embodies a moral right (as understood in the international context)
or not.622
A second scholarly disagreement about interpretation of both subsections 14.1(1)
and 17.1(1), as they have appeared since 1988, concerns the uniquely Canadian part of a
provision that appears to modify both s 14.1(1) and s 17.1(1). That provision is the
following (in s 28.2(1)):
28.2(1) The author’s or performer’s right to the integrity of a work or
performer’s performance is infringed only if the work or the performance
is, to the prejudice of its author’s or performer’s honour or reputation,
…
(b) used in association with a product, service, cause or institution
[emphasis added].
Although Canada’s Parliament created a statutory section that frames the novel authors’
and performers’ right to sue for moral rights infringement “if the work or the
performance is … used in association with a product, service, cause or institution” in a
subsection that begins with the language of “right to integrity”,623 scholars have pointed
out that such an interest as use “in association with a product, service, cause or
institution” has never been interpreted in international circles as a feature of the moral
right of integrity and is, in fact, creating a new moral right in Canada, apart from

622

Wilkinson argues that a right to anonymity cannot be part of the right to paternity because, by definition,
appearing anonymously as author of a work means that the public cannot identify the author of the work
and therefore cannot associate that work with its particular author (anonymity is inconsistent with the
concept of paternity, since the right of paternity is meant to ensure that authors are associated with their
works). See Wilkinson, "The Public Interest in Moral Rights Protection" supra note 18 at 224-231.
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Canada’s previously legislated two statutory moral rights of paternity and integrity.624
Others have maintained that, since Parliament itself, in s 28.2(1) appears to have framed
“[use] in association with a product, service, cause or institution” as part of the “author’s
or performer’s right to the integrity of a work or performer’s performance”, “[use] in
association with a product, service, cause or institution” must be considered, at least in
Canada, to be part of the right to integrity.625
In the context of this thesis, however, focussed, as it is, on the concept of
“reputation”, one of the key observations about the sections enshrining the moral rights
(14.1 and 17.1) in Canada is, first, that neither mentions "reputation".
A second key observation about the Canadian sections enshrining the moral rights
is that the concept of reputation is found in s 28.2(1):
The author’s right to the integrity of a work is infringed only if the work
is, to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author
(a) distorted mutilated or otherwise modified; or
(b) used in association with a product, service, cause or institution
[emphasis added].
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This argument points to the fact that the right to integrity in the Berne Convention and, consequently, in
the WPPT, has never included a concept of use in association with a product, service or institution and
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Public Interest in Moral Rights Protection" supra note 18 at 224 and Wilkinson & Gerolami, "The Author
as Agent of Information Policy,” supra note 20 at 326-327.
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David Vaver considers the right of the author or performer to be associated with the work under s
28.2(1)(b) to be a way to "control the use of the work " and adds that "[t]his right is part of the integrity
right. (Vaver, supra note 35 at 211 (footnote omitted)). Arguably staking out a middle position between the
position taken by Vaver and the position taken by Margaret Ann Wilkinson in "The Public Interest in
Moral Rights Protection" supra note 18 and by Wilkinson & Gerolami, "The Author as Agent of
Information Policy” supra note 20, is the position taken by Fraser Turnbull, in "The Morality of Mash-ups:
Moral Rights ad Canada's Non-Commercial User-Generated Content Exception"(2014) 26 IPJ 217. At 224,
Turnbull seems to treat the “association” language in s 28.2(1)(b) as a separate from the traditional ‘branch’
(or branches?) of integrity but, because of its position in the statute, describes it as not a separate right:
"Authors may also control how their works are used in association with products, services, causes and
institutions, although this is a discrete branch of the right to integrity, and not a separate right in itself."
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Mark L Rudoff proposes, in connection with this observation, that
[t]he parenthetical phrase, ‘to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of
the author’ should be read not as a separate proof requirement, but as
modifying what follows: ‘distorted, mutilated or otherwise modified.’ The
legislation wants the court to ignore trivial alterations. A significant
modification, one which changes the work’s character or impact, has the
effect of making the work say something that its author did not intend it to
say. It is in this sense that modifications that go to the essence of the work
prejudice the author’s honour or reputation while superficial alterations do
not. In short, ‘to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author’
sets a threshold for actionable alterations.626
He goes on to argue that “[t]his interpretation is supported by the second branch of
section 28.2(1), a new provision which speaks to use of a work “in association with a
product, cause or institution.”627 With or without considering the new provision about
use of a work “in association with a product, cause or institution”, however, Rudoff
argues proving actual damage would not be necessary since “the prejudice arises out of
the way in which the work is dealt with… The single test of whether the character of the
work has been changed is that which best fits both branches [of section 28.2(1)].”628 He
goes on to explain
That prejudice to reputation stands for a threshold and not actual damage
to the author is further supported by the later stipulation of deemed
prejudice: “In the case of a painting, sculpture or engraving, the prejudice
referred to in subsection (1) shall be deemed to have occurred as a result
of any distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work.”[s 28.2(2)]
There is no reason to single out visual artists as a class exempt from
having to prove actual damage. …. [V]isual works can be set apart in that
they are seen by the world exactly as they were created. Section 28.2(2)
takes notice of the fact that even minor changes will detract from a visual
work and can never be justified. By contrast, literary and musical works
are subject to adaptations and performance. Because both processes
require some flexibility, the strict protection accorded visual works would
be inappropriate. All that deeming prejudice does in the case of visual
626
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works is to relieve the visual artist from having to show that the damage is
significant, but the composer or writer must show that the detraction from
the work has been significant enough to warrant a remedy. This
comparison evinces a concern for the extent of damage to artistic works,
not types of harm to artists.629
Rudoff observes that “[c]onsidering prejudice to the author’s reputation as a threshold
question is …consistent with interpretations of the parallel provision in the Berne
Convention (Article 6bis).”630
Moral rights in Canada can, however, be waived.
The waiver concept entered Canadian law in the 1988 revision of the Copyright
Act631 and, as can be seen in the following sections, applies to both authors and
performers (and their heirs):
s 14 (2) Moral rights may not be assigned but may be waived in whole or
in part.
(3) An assignment of copyright in a work does not by that act alone
constitute a waiver of any moral rights.
(4) Where a waiver of any moral right is made in favour of an owner
or a licensee of copyright, it may be invoked by any person
authorized by the owner or licensee to use the work, unless there is
an indication to the contrary in the waiver.
s. 17.1 (3) An assignment of copyright in a performer’s performance
does not by itself constitute a waiver of any moral rights.
(4) If a waiver of any moral right is made in favour of an owner or a
licensee of a copyright, it may be invoked by any person
authorized by the owner or licensee to use the performer’s
performance, unless there is an indication to the contrary in
the waiver.

Margaret Ann Wilkinson and Natasha Gerolami have written that waiver of moral
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An Act to Amend Copyright Act and to Amend Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, SC (35-36-37 Eliz
II) (assented to 8 June 1988) c 15, s 12.1(2-4).
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rights “can be argued to weaken [moral] rights because authors, given the disparity in
bargaining power that exists between authors and publishers, can easily be required to
waive their rights as a condition of publication.”632 Regarding the waiver of "moral
rights", David Vaver has also commented that "[o]ne reason moral rights are more talked
about than exercised in Canada is because the Copyright Act explicitly allows their
waiver."633
In terms of civil enforcement of the moral rights, infringement of moral rights is
defined in Copyright Act s 28.1 as follows:
Any act or omission that is contrary to any of the moral rights of the
author of a work or of the performer of a performer’s performance is, in
the absence of the author’s or performer’s consent, an infringement of
those rights.
The Copyright Act also contains a criminal sanction, s 43(2), for certain situations that
mirrors aspects of moral rights protection:
Any person who makes or causes to be made any change in or suppression
of the title, or the name of the author, of any dramatic or operatic work or
musical composition in which copyright subsists in Canada, or who makes
or causes to be made any change in the work or composition itself without
the written consent of the author or of his legal representative, in order that
the work or composition may be performed in whole or in part in public
for private profit, is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction
to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars and, in the case of a second or
subsequent offence, either to that fine or to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding four months or to both.
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This is the only criminal provision concerning moral rights in Canadian law. Since the
year that the new moral rights provisions in ss 14.1, 17.1 and 28.2 have been added to the
Copyright Act in 1988, there appear to have been no criminal prosecutions under s
43(2).634
(b) In Canadian jurisprudence
Having established that the concept of ‘reputation’ forms part of Canada’s moral
rights legislation, through its appearance in s 28.2(1), it remains to canvas interpretation
of the concept of reputation in Canadian jurisprudence.635
The numbers of judgments that have considered the moral rights in Canada is not
large. At least two cases were decided early on, when the moral rights appeared as s
12(7) of the Copyright Act.636 One was Gnass et al v La Cité d’Alma, in which the
Quebec Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment below that had held that s12(7) did not
impose an affirmative duty regarding a work of art. The case focused on a number of
sculptures that had not been maintained properly (one was thrown into a river) but
nonetheless the court held that s 12(7) had not been breached.637
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Section 43(2), itself dates from the period before 1988 when the enactment of moral rights in the
Canadian Copyright Act was found in the former s 12(7):
Independently of the author's copyright, and even after the assignment, either wholly or partially,
of the said copyright, the author has the right to claim authorship of the work, as well as the right
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The other, more widely known judgment under s 12(7), is Snow v Eaton Centre
Ltd. (1982).638 Justice O’Brien referred to the plaintiff, in his nine-paragraph judgment,
as “an artist of international reputation.” He noted the artist “is adamant in his belief that
his naturalistic composition has been made to look ridiculous … While the matter is not
undisputed, the [artist’s] opinion is shared by a number of other well respected artists and
people knowledgeable in his field” and he granted the application to have the ribbons
which had been added to the sculpture removed, holding “I am satisfied the ribbons do
distort or modify the [artist’s] work and the [artist’s] concern this will be prejudicial to
his honour or reputation is reasonable under the circumstances.”
Twenty years later, in referring to the Snow case, Justice Binnie, for the majority
of the Supreme Court in Théberge v Galerie d’ Art du Petit Champlain,639 wrote
Could the economic rights of the sculptor of the descending geese at the
Eaton Centre be said to be infringed (quite apart from his moral rights)
because the seasonal ‘combination’ of geese plus Christmas ribbons could
be considered a ‘reproduction’? The be-ribboned flock incorporated the
original artistic work in more than ‘substantial part’, no doubt, but there
was no ‘reproduction’ in any legal sense, any more than there was
‘reproduction’ when the appellants in this case [the Théberge case]
contributed blank canvas to the ‘combination’ of ink layer and canvas.
The sculptor [Snow] rightly invoked his moral rights against the Eaton
Centre, not economic rights. [emphasis in original]
In Prise de Parole Inc. v Guérin, Éditeur Ltée (1995), which was ultimately
decided for the plaintiff on copyright grounds,640 Justice Denault noted that [moral rights]
"section 28.2(1) does not require the plaintiff to prove prejudice to his honour or
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reputation; rather, it must be proved that the work was distorted, mutilated or otherwise
modified ‘to prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author’."641 Justice Denault, in
his decision, cited the Snow case. He confirmed that in Snow, both subjective and
objective criteria were satisfied to prove that distortion, mutilation or modification to the
author's work was to the prejudice of the author's honour or reputation.642 In the case
before him, Justice Denault acknowledged that plaintiff Doric Germain had demonstrated
that his work had been distorted, mutilated or otherwise modified, but, based on
Germain’s acknowledgment that "he had not been ridiculed or mocked by his colleagues
or the newspapers and that he had not personally heard any complaints after the Libre
expression collection was published,"643 Justice Denault found that "the evidence has not
shown that, objectively, as required by section 28.2(1) of the Act, his work was modified
to the prejudice of his honour or reputation. Since this has not been proven, the plaintiff is
not entitled to moral damages."644
Author James Plotkin comments, about the decision in Prise de Parole, that the
Federal Court
set a relatively high standard for proving infringement of a work’s
integrity …elaborate[ing] a two-prong test: first, the plaintiff author must
meet a subjective standard showing that, in [the plaintiff’s] opinion, the
integrity of the work has been tarnished. Once this is established, the
plaintiff must then meet an objective standard by offering testimony from
peers in the field to the effect that they too feel that the work’s integrity
has been diminished by the defendant’s activity.645
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In the more recent case of Ritchie v Sawmill Creek Golf & Country Club Ltd.,
(2003),646 where "[t]he Plaintiff [Ritchie] alleged that when the defendants enlarged five
of the photographs to make them into posters they infringed his moral rights quite apart
from any copyright violation,"647 Justice Ducharme appears to have applied that same
standard, involving a two-prong test for both the question involving the moral right of
integrity and the question involving the paternity right.
Justice Ducharme found, in considering the question of infringement of Ritchie’s
moral rights, that "[i]n blowing up some of Mr. Ritchie's photographs from prints rather
than from the original negatives, the defendants certainly modified his original
photographs."648 However, in the opinion of Justice Ducharme, the blow ups were
not so markedly different in quality from the prints as to damage the
author's [Ritchie’s] honour or reputation. Indeed, no objective evidence of
prejudice was adduced to support Mr. Ritchie's own personal reaction. For
example, Mr. Windjack, a professional photographer of over 30 years
experience, was not asked his view of whether the enlargements were of
such poor quality as to offend the integrity of the author.649
Justice Ducharme was thus not satisfied with purely subjective evidence from the
plaintiff Ritchie on the question of infringement of moral rights. He referred, in para 50,
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to the difference between the evidence before him and the evidence that had been before
the court in Snow v The Eaton Centre Limited650, commenting that in Snow, “O’Brien J.
granted the application and ordered the ribbons removed, noting that the plaintiff’s own
opinion about the ‘distortion, mutilation or modification’ of his art was shared by a
number of well-respected artists and people knowledgeable in his field.” Justice
Ducharme said, in the case before him, that Mr. Ritchie had not provided corroborative
opinions from the people knowledgeable in the field and Justice Ducharme therefore
concluded that "[i]nfringement of the moral right of integrity has not been established."651
Justice Ducharme also considered whether Mr. Ritchie’s “moral right of
association was infringed after the defendants [the golf and country club] removed his
name from the Sawmill Creek website he had been paid to revamp."652 Justice Ducharme
found that “[h]aving been visited by the RCMP as part of an investigation, [the golf and
country club] acted quickly and, in my view, reasonably to remove Mr. Ritchie’s name
from their website and to lock him out of the site to prevent any possible sabotage of it”
and therefore the plaintiff, Mr. Ritchie, did not succeed in respect of this cause of action
either.
Though Justice Ducharme did not discuss “reputation”, per se, in his reasons, in
considering the question of damages (after making his findings about liability for moral
rights infringement in the case), he did say that if his decision was wrong "in finding that
Mr. Ritchie's moral rights have not been infringed, … he would "fix the damages he [Mr.
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Ritchie] has suffered to his honour and reputation as a non-professional photographer at
$200."653
None of the Canadian cases discussed to this point in this chapter have been
considered at beyond the trial level.
There is a case, cited earlier in this chapter, however, in which moral rights have
been considered at the Supreme Court of Canada, but the case,654 does not turn on issues
involving moral rights: it turns, instead, on questions of copyright. Théberge, an artist,
chose to sue on copyright grounds because the remedies available for copyright
infringement are not available in litigation involving moral rights. As Justice Binnie
explained in paragraph 3 of his majority judgment:
On August 19, 1999, [Théberge] arranged to have the bailiff seize canvasbacked reproductions from the [Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain] without
ever satisfying a judge that the appellants [the Galerie] had violated
the Copyright Act. Although seizure before judgment [available in a
copyright case] is designed purely as a conservation measure divorced
from the merits of the case, the appellants [the Galerie] claim that the
seizure of their inventory caused them a significant loss, both in sales and
reputation. [Théberge] has not proceeded with his [copyright] action on
the merits since the date of the seizure two and a half years ago.655
Justice Binnie, in finding against the artist Théberge (the plaintiff at trial), stated clearly
“… in this case, … [Théberge] is asserting a moral right in the guise of an economic
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right, and the attempt should be rejected.”656
Despite the case being brought on copyright grounds, rather than moral rights
grounds, the decision of the Supreme Court in Théberge v Galerie d'Art du Petit
Champlain contains reasoning about moral rights that is hugely important in the
Canadian context.
Justice Gonthier, writing for the minority, identified the roles of copyright and the
author’s moral rights as being completely different:
The [Copyright Act] provides protection for both copyright, defined by
s.3(1), and the author's moral rights, in particular in ss. 14.1 and 14.2.
While the intended purposes of those rights overlap in some respects, they
are nonetheless completely different legal instruments in terms of both
their definition and their scope.657
Justice Binnie, in his majority judgment also recognized the role of the moral rights as
separate from the role of copyright -- for instance at para 19:
The evidence here suggests that, at least in some instances, the
respondent’s name was deleted and was no longer on the posters when
they were offered for resale. The respondents could have asserted a moral
right to be publicly identified with his artistic work in this respect [but
chose not to do so].

Justice Binnie continued at paragraph 21,
Apart from the complaint of non-attribution (which is a moral rights
issue), it seems the respondent as an artist simply wishes to stop the
appellants from catering to the market for canvas-backed reproductions
that apparently exists.
And at paragraph 22
Moral rights act as a continuing restraint on what purchasers such as the
appellants [art gallery operators] can do with a work once it passes from
the author, but respect must be given to the limitations that are an essential
656
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part of the moral rights created by Parliament. Economic rights should not
be read so broadly that the cover the same ground as moral rights, making
inoperative the limits Parliament has imposed on moral rights.
At paragraph 60, Justice Binnie held
My view is that Parliament intended modifications without reproduction to
be dealt with under the provisions dealing with moral rights rather than
economic rights. To adopt a contrary view … would allow copyright
holders other than the artist to complain about modifications (despite the
non-assignability of moral rights). It would allow an artist who objected
to a “modification” of an authorized reproduction… to sidestep at a trial
anywhere in Canada the important requirement of showing prejudice to
honour or reputation in order to establish an infringement of moral rights.

As Jeremy de Beer and Robert Tomkowicz have pointed out, “speaking for the majority,
Justice Binnie rejected the suggestion of Justice Gontier, writing for the dissenting
judges, that the plaintiff could use moral rights to control the use of tangible property
after its disposition.”658

D – Conclusions on Reputation in Canadian Moral Rights Law
This canvas of moral rights law in Canada demonstrates that, while the concept of
reputation is part of the statutory environment of moral rights protection in Canada, the
jurisprudence reveals very little concrete evidence of interpretation or application of
reputation.659
In the case involving moral rights that reached the Supreme Court of Canada,
Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain,660 the plaintiff had deliberately avoided
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pleading infringement of moral rights and therefore, despite lengthy discussions of the
law of moral rights (discussions that arose as part of the defence mounted to the
copyright action brought), there is no discussion in the reasons delivered by the Supreme
Court justices about actual application of moral rights law on the facts before the Court.
The key case relating to the question of reputation in the moral rights context in
Canada is the very early Snow case, in which the trial judge pointed to specific evidence
before him in holding that the artist Snow’s reputation was affected and in issuing
judgment, on moral rights grounds, against the defendant Eaton Centre.661 In the
subsequent cases of Boudreau v Lin,662 Prise des Paroles,663 and Ritchie v Sawmill
Creek,664 the courts found that there was no evidence of the plaintiff’s reputation that
could sustain a finding of infringement of moral rights and therefore, there is nothing in
the judgments that can sustain an analysis of reputation.
When considering the first specific question posed at the outset of this chapter (“Is
reputation involved in moral rights?”), it is easy to point to an affirmative answer
because, in the Copyright Act s 28.2(1), the language of “reputation” has been used by
Parliament “[t]he author’s or performer’s right to the integrity of a work or performer’s
performance is infringed only if the work or the performance is, to the prejudice of its
author’s or performer’s honour or reputation…”. However, upon more in-depth
reflection, the involvement of reputation in moral rights may be seen most clearly in
terms of the function of moral rights presented earlier in this chapter, namely that
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“economic rights are designed to address the supply of available information, while
moral rights are designed to address making reliability of that supply ascertainable.”665
Ascertaining whether information is reliable involves forming impressions of the
reputation of the source of that information. It is important, therefore, to recall the
observation made earlier in this chapter that moral rights are not so much a function of
the identity of the author but a function of the role of the author in maintaining the
author’s identity as associated with the work - an identification which can aid users in
valuing the information in the work - and maintaining the integrity of the work which,
again, can be key for users in assessing the reliability of the information contained in the
work.666
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CHAPTER 5 - REPUTATION AS RELATED TO CANADA'S
PROHIBITED MARKS

In Chapter 4 the question asked was whether reputation was involved in Canada's
moral rights. This thesis findings confirm a positive answer because the language of
"reputation" has been used by Parliament in section 28.2(1) of the Copyright Act. Very
few cases discussed in Chapter 4 made a clear determination of moral rights
infringement. The key case regarding the question of reputation in the moral rights
context in Canada remains the Snow case in which the trial judge pointed to evidence that
the artist Snow's reputation was affected. However, the analysis of moral rights proved
that moral rights though residing in Canada's Copyright Act, have no economic function
(like copyright). The role of moral rights is not so much a function of the identity of the
author or performer, but a function of the role author or performer has in association with
the work or the performance.
This chapter considers whether the concept of reputation is involved in Canada’s
prohibited marks and, if so, whether reputation distinguishes prohibited marks from
trademarks.
A - Note on Terminology
The term “prohibited marks” entered Canada’s legislation in the 1953 Trade
Marks Act,667 as the heading above subsection 9(1), and has remained there ever since.
Canada’s current legislation668 on prohibited marks appears in Section 9 of the
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Trademarks Act669 under the heading “Unfair Competition and Prohibited Signs”. For
convenience, current Section 9 is set out in full at Appendix C.
The term "official marks", on the other hand, first appeared in Canadian
legislation in subsection 14(1)(j) of the 1932 Unfair Competition Act.670 In the current
trademark671 legislation, this term appears in subsection 9(1)(n)(iii): “any badge, crest,
emblem or mark…(iii) adopted and used by any public authority, in Canada as an official
mark for goods or services. [emphasis added]672
There is no definition of "prohibited marks" in the Trademarks Act, nor is there a
definition of "official mark", though “official mark” appears in section 9.673
Although the Trademarks Act legislates a definition of the term "trademark" ("a
sign or combination of signs that is used ... by a person to distinguish... their goods or
services … from those of others,"674), the Trademarks Act does not provide a definition

669

Trademarks Act, supra note 22, last amended on June 18, 2019. (The full name: An Act Relating to
Trademarks and Unfair Competition). In the 1932 Unfair Competition Act neither the term ‘prohibited
mark’ nor the term ‘official mark’ appears, though a marginal note near section 14 reads as follows: “Use
as trade marks of certain emblems, etc., forbidden.” (Unfair Competition Act, RSC 1932, c 38 (Marginal
note near section 14(1)).)
670

Unfair Competition Act, 1932, 22-23 George V, c 38, s 14(1)(j) ("any symbol adopted and used by any
public authority in Canada as an official mark on similar wares") [emphasis added]. This statute, while it
was in force, was the Canadian legislation that dealt with trademarks.
671

Note that, throughout this chapter, various spellings of trademark will appear (trademarks, trade marks,
trade-marks). This is because the spelling of trademarks in Canada from time to time – only becoming
“trademarks” in our statute very recently. Typically, in this chapter, the spelling will reflect the spelling
used in the applicable source for which a quotation, for example, has been taken.
672

Trademarks Act, supra note 22, s 9(1)(n)(iii) [emphasis added].

The term ‘official mark’ appears in s 9(1)(n)(iii). The term ‘official sign’ appears in s 9(1)(i.1). (See
Appendix C: Prohibited marks - Section 9 of the Trademarks Act, supra note 22.
673

674

Trademarks Act, supra note 22, s 2 Definitions: trademark means (a) a sign or combination of signs that
is used or proposed to be used by a person for the purpose of distinguishing or so as to distinguish their
goods or services from those of others.
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for the term “prohibited marks”. The term “prohibited marks” actually appears only as a
subheading above the current subsection 9(1) of the Trademarks Act.675
While the Canadian Interpretation Act676 explains the legal status and intended
use of marginal notes and historical references printed in a statute,677 it does not say
anything about the role of headings in a statute. However, in 2016, Canada's House of
Commons Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations, reported to
Parliament that statutory headings are to be "considered part of the enactment":
Section 14 of the Interpretation Act provides that marginal notes form no
part of the enactment, but are inserted for convenience of reference only.
This means that they should not be relied upon to interpret the meaning of
the enactment. This is not the case with respect to headings, which are
considered part of the enactment. This being the case, the
transformation of marginal notes into headings effectively amends
legislation by adding new elements to it. At the very least, the different
weight given to marginal notes and headings as tools of interpretation
leads to the conclusion that the meaning of the legislation has been altered.
[emphasis added] 678

Scholars use different expressions to identify prohibited marks. Teresa Scassa, for
instance, refers to official marks as a “type” of prohibited marks,679 while David Vaver,
on the other hand, uses the expression “official marks” for all prohibited marks.680 In
Canadian Intellectual Property Law: Cases and Materials (2nd ed) prohibited marks are

675

Trademarks Act, supra note 22.

676

Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21.

677

Ibid, s 14 ("Marginal notes and references to former enactments that appear after the end of a section or
other division in an enactment form no part of the enactment, but are inserted for convenience of reference
only.")
678

House of Commons, Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations, Report No 91 (22 March
2016 and 24 March 2016) at 2 (Joint Chairs Pana Merchant and Harold Albrecht) [emphasis added].
679

Scassa, supra note 21, (Ch 4 "Prohibited Marks") at 220.

680

David Vaver refers to prohibited marks solely as official marks. See Vaver, supra note 35 at 501.
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discussed in the section on "Special Marks."681 The authors said that "[t]he language
pertaining to prohibited marks is somewhat different from that used in other parts of the
Act."682
The terms "official marks" and “prohibited marks” appear to be roughly equally
used in scholarly literature and amongst legal practitioners.683

B - Canada’s ‘Prohibited Marks’
(a) Background
The provisions of Section 9 of Canada’s current Trademarks Act that deal purely
with Canada’s own domestic affairs684 are the following:
(a) the Royal Arms, Crest or Standard;
(c) the standard, arms or crest of His Excellency the Governor General;
(d) any word or symbol likely to lead to the belief that the goods or
services in association with which it is used have received, or are
produced, sold or performed under, royal, vice-regal or governmental
patronage, approval or authority;
(e) the arms, crest or flag adopted and used at any time by Canada or by
any province or municipal corporation in Canada in respect of which
the Registrar has, at the request of the Government of Canada or of
the province or municipal corporation concerned, given public notice
of its adoption and use;
(j) any scandalous, obscene or immoral word or device;
(k) any matter that may falsely suggest a connection with any living
individual;

681

Greg Hagen et al, Canadian Intellectual Property Law Cases and Materials, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond,
2018) (Chapter Four: "Registered Trademarks," section C. "Special Marks").
682

Ibid at 456-57.

683

For example, Renata Watkin, "Placing Canadian Geographical Indications on the Map"(2018) 30:2 IPJ
271 "Official Marks" at 294-296; Lisa James, "Make it Official: Trade-Marks, Official Marks, and the
Benefits of Registration" (2010) 120:9 Municipal World 25.
684

Recall that, under Canada’s Constitution, the Queen is Canada’s head of state.
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(l) the portrait or signature of any individual who is living or has died
within the preceding thirty years;
(n) any badge, crest, emblem or mark
(i) adopted or used by any of Her Majesty’s Forces as defined in
the National Defence Act,
(ii) of any university, or
(iii) adopted and used by any public authority, in Canada as an
official mark for goods or services, in respect of which the
Registrar has, at the request of Her Majesty or of the
university or public authority, as the case may be, given public
notice of its adoption and use;
(n.1) any armorial bearings granted, recorded or approved for use by a
recipient pursuant to the prerogative powers of Her Majesty as
exercised by the Governor General in respect of the granting of
armorial bearings, if the Registrar has, at the request of the Governor
General, given public notice of the grant, recording or approval;
(o) the name “Royal Canadian Mounted Police” or “R.C.M.P.” or any
other combination of letters relating to the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, or any pictorial representation of a uniformed member thereof.
[emphasis added]
Canada’s right to legislate these provisions, as a sovereign nation, is absolute, in
the sense that none of these provisions arises from obligations imposed upon Canada by
any foreign state.
The symbology dealt with under Section 9 that originates in connection with
Canada’s commitments to international organizations can be seen in the following
subsections of Canada’s current Trademarks Act:
(g) the emblem of the Red Crescent on a white ground adopted for the
same purpose as specified in paragraph (f) [paragraph (f) addresses
the Red Cross];
(g.1) the third Protocol emblem — commonly known as the “Red Crystal”
— referred to in Article 2, paragraph 2 of Schedule VII to the Geneva
Conventions Act and composed of a red frame in the shape of a
square on edge on a white ground, adopted for the same purpose as
specified in paragraph (f) [paragraph (f) addresses the Red Cross];
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(h) the equivalent sign of the Red Lion and Sun used by Iran for the same
purpose as specified in paragraph (f) [[paragraph (f) addresses the
Red Cross];
(h.1) the international distinctive sign of civil defence (equilateral blue
triangle on an orange ground) referred to in Article 66, paragraph 4 of
Schedule V to the Geneva Conventions Act;
(i) any territorial or civic flag or any national, territorial or civic arms,
crest or emblem, of a country of the Union, if the flag, arms, crest or
emblem is on a list communicated under article 6ter of the
Convention [emphasis added] or pursuant to the obligations under the
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
set out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement stemming from that
article, and the Registrar gives public notice of the communication;
(i.1) any official sign or hallmark indicating control or warranty adopted
by a country of the Union, if the sign or hallmark is on a list
communicated under article 6ter of the Convention [emphasis
added] or pursuant to the obligations under Agreement on Traderelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to
the WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the Registrar
gives public notice [emphasis added] of the communication;
(i.2) any national flag of a country of the Union;
(i.3) any armorial bearing, flag or other emblem, or the name or any
abbreviation of the name, of an international intergovernmental
organization, if the armorial bearing, flag, emblem, name or
abbreviation is on a list communicated under article 6ter of the
Convention [emphasis added] or pursuant to the obligations under the
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
set out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement stemming from that
article, and the Registrar gives public notice of the communication;
(m) the words “United Nations” or the official seal or emblem of the
United Nations.
[emphasis added]

There is one legislated symbol that would appear to be able to be interpreted as
being both domestic in origin and having an international connection:
(f) the emblem of the Red Cross on a white ground formed by reversing
the federal colours of Switzerland and retained by the Geneva
Convention for the Protection of War Victims in 1949 as the emblem
and distinctive sign of the Medical Service of armed forces and used
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by the Canadian Red Cross Society, or the expression “Red Cross” or
“Geneva Cross”.
[emphasis added]

From the international point of view in connection with the Red Cross symbology, it has
been noted that “[t]hose drafting the Geneva Convention of 1864 foresaw the need for a
universal symbol of protection easily recognizable on the battlefield. In honor of the
origin of this initiative, the symbol of a red cross on a white background (the reverse of
the Swiss flag) was identified as a protective emblem in conflict areas.”685 On the other
hand, from the domestic Canadian point of view, the Canadian Red Cross was founded in
1896,686 well before the concept of specifically identifying the prohibited mark symbol of
the “Red Cross” in Canada’s trademark legislation appeared in1932.687 Nonetheless, as
may be seen in the text of s 9(1)(f) itself (above), the provision currently enacted notes
“the emblem … retained by the Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims in
1949”.
Section 9 of the Trademarks Act continues, in subsection (2), with several
provisions that apply to a number of the subsections set out above. Its text reads as
follows:
Excepted uses
(2) Nothing in this section prevents the adoption, use or registration as a
trade-mark or otherwise, in connection with a business, of any mark

American Red Cross, “Summary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols,”
International Humanitarian Law, April 2011 at 7, online:
<https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/atg/PDF_s/International_Services/International_Humanita
rian_Law/IHL_SummaryGenevaConv.pdf>
685

686

Canadian Red Cross, online: <https://www.redcross.ca/about-us/about-the-canadian-red-cross>.

As provided in 1932 in the 1932 Unfair Competition Act, s 14(1)(g) “the emblem of the Red Cross
Society, consisting of a red cross on a white ground or the expression “Red Cross” or “Geneva Cross”.
687
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(a) described in subsection (1) with the consent of Her Majesty or
such other person, society, authority or organization as may be
considered to have been intended to be protected by this
section; or
(b) consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be likely to be
mistaken for
(i) an official sign or hallmark mentioned in paragraph
(1)(i.1), except in respect of goods that are the same or
similar to the goods in respect of which the official
sign or hallmark has been adopted, or
(ii) an armorial bearing, flag, emblem or abbreviation
mentioned in paragraph (1)(i.3), unless the use of the
mark is likely to mislead the public as to a connection
between the user and the organization.
There is a second type of mark now protected by Canada’s Trademarks Act
Section 9: symbols indicative of international bodies. These symbols are protected in the
following subsections of Section 9:
(g) the emblem of the Red Crescent on a white ground adopted for
the same purpose as specified in paragraph (f) [paragraph (f)
addressing the Red Cross];688
(g.1) the third Protocol emblem — commonly known as the “Red
Crystal” — referred to in Article 2, paragraph 2 of Schedule
VII to the Geneva Conventions Act and composed of a red
frame in the shape of a square on edge on a white ground,
adopted for the same purpose as specified in paragraph (f)
[paragraph (f) addressing the Red Cross];689

The red crescent was recognized by “a diplomatic conference in 1929”. American Red Cross,
“Summary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols,” International
Humanitarian Law, April 2011 at 7, online:
https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/atg/PDF_s/International_Services/International_Humanitari
an_Law/IHL_SummaryGenevaConv.pdf
688

According to the American Red Cross “Summary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their
Additional Protocols” at 7: In December 2005, governments adopted the Third Protocol adding the Red
Crystal. See online:
https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/atg/PDF_s/International_Services/International_Humanitari
an_Law/IHL_SummaryGenevaConv.pdf
689
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(h) the equivalent sign of the Red Lion and Sun used by Iran for
the same purpose as specified in paragraph (f) [[paragraph (f)
addressing the Red Cross];690
(h.1) the international distinctive sign of civil defence (equilateral
blue triangle on an orange ground) referred to in Article 66,
paragraph 4 of Schedule V to the Geneva Conventions Act;
(i) any territorial or civic flag or any national, territorial or civic
arms, crest or emblem, of a country of the Union, if the flag,
arms, crest or emblem is on a list communicated under article
6ter of the Convention or pursuant to the obligations under
the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement
stemming from that article, and the Registrar gives public
notice of the communication;
(i.1) any official sign or hallmark indicating control or warranty
adopted by a country of the Union, if the sign or hallmark is
on a list communicated under article 6ter of the Convention
or pursuant to the obligations under Agreement on Traderelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set out in
Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement stemming from that article,
and the Registrar gives public notice of the communication;
(i.2) any national flag of a country of the Union;
(i.3) any armorial bearing, flag or other emblem, or the name or
any abbreviation of the name, of an international
intergovernmental organization, if the armorial bearing, flag,
emblem, name or abbreviation is on a list communicated
under article 6ter of the Convention or pursuant to the
obligations under the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the WTO
Agreement stemming from that article, and the Registrar
gives public notice of the communication;
(m) the words “United Nations” or the official seal or emblem of
the United Nations.
[emphasis added]

According to the American Red Cross “Summary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their
Additional Protocols,” the red lion and sun, although adopted at the 1929 diplomatic conference, is no
longer in use. See American Red Cross, “Summary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their
Additional Protocols,” International Humanitarian Law, April 2011 at 7, online:
https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/atg/PDF_s/International_Services/International_Humanitari
an_Law/IHL_SummaryGenevaConv.pdf
690
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The language of section 9(1) begins “No person shall adopt in connection with a
business, as a trade-mark or otherwise, any mark consisting of, or so nearly resembling as
to be likely to be mistaken for [the symbols listed]”. This introductory language is
virtually identical in all previous versions of this statute.691
Section 9 is drafted as a stoplist:692 it sets out symbols that cannot be used as
trademarks. As the Committee set up in 1947 to review the 1932 Unfair Competition Act
wrote in the Report of Trade Mark Law Revision Committee to the Secretary of State of
Canada:
Under Section 14 of The Unfair Competition Act, 1932, certain symbols
are wholly excluded from registration and even use. In the main, these are
specific words and designs which are withdrawn from general
employment because of legislative policy, as in the case of the Royal
Arms and the national flag, because of treaty obligations, as in the case of
territorial flags and the emblem of the Red Cross, or because of private
rights, as in the case of signatures and portraits. Partly as a result of an
extension of our treaty obligations and partly as a result of requests for
protection, the list of such words and designs has been lengthened in
Section 9 of the Bill, but this does not involve a change in principle.693

691

Extending back to the original official marks enactment in 1932 of the Act Respecting Unfair
Competition in Trade and Commerce in 1932, 22-23 George V, c 38. See the almost identical language in
s1 of the 1932 statute, set out below (see Appendix F and Appendix G).
The term “stoplist” comes from computer science vocabulary, where it originally described a list of
words automatically omitted from a computer-generated concordance or index, typically the most frequent
words, which would slow down computer processing unacceptably. In a communication emanating from
WIPO itself, “WIPOMAGAZINE”, it is noted that the drafting of the international provision concerning
matters related to Canada’s Section 9, Article 6ter of the Paris Convention (discussed further below) is
explained as follows:
692

The intention of Article 6bis is not to create a special form of intellectual property right for States
and intergovernmental organizations, but to prevent the signs, names and abbreviations associated
with them from being used or appropriate as trademarks without proper authorization.
See WIPOMAGAZINE, online: <wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/03/article_0009.html>.
693

Report of Trade Mark Law Revision Committee to the Secretary of State of Canada (January 20, 1953).
The Report is reprinted in Harold G Fox, The Canadian Law of Trade Marks and Unfair Competition, 2nd
ed, vol 2 (Toronto: Carswell, 1956) (at 1142-1201) at 1155.
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It is clear, therefore, from the language of section 9, that these symbols cannot
share the characteristics of trademarks: for one thing, they are not involved in the
“trademark bargain” whereby trademark owners and their assigns enjoy the legal
protection of trademark (keeping others from using the mark in association with given
products or services) for however long the public understands that mark as representing
the goods or services of the trademark holder.694 The protection of the symbols protected
under Section 9 is perpetual.
The bulk of the reported modern litigation695 involving Section 9 of the
Trademarks Act has occurred in situations involving s 9(1)(n)(iii):
9(1) No person shall adopt in connection with a business, as a trade-mark
or otherwise, any mark consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be
likely to be mistaken for,…
(n) any badge, crest, emblem or mark …
(iii) adopted and used by any public authority, in Canada as an
official mark for goods or services, in respect of which the
Registrar has, at the request of Her Majesty or of the university or
694

Wilkinson, "What is the Role of New Technologies in Tensions in Intellectual Property?" supra note 62.
Wilkinson writes (at 14) that
once individual and corporate interests were separated during the nineteenth century – and
diverged even more during the twentieth – the concept of “balance” in intellectual property needed
to be reconceptualized in terms of “balancing” three sets of interests: those of individuals (as it is
undeniably individuals cognitive activity which produces creativity and innovation), those of
corporations (which have come to dominate in terms of both ownership … and influence upon
economies), and that of the public.
She points out, earlier in the chapter (at 9), that
[u]p until the mid-nineteenth century, when modern separation of a corporation from its owners
occurred, inventors, authors and creators were exclusively individuals, who, in turn, could only
engage in business with other individuals – and a business’s goodwill was only the goodwill of the
individual or individuals operating it.
Citing to France’s Manufacture and Goods Mark Act of 1857, she notes “legal recognition of trademarks
occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, roughly concurrent with the emergence of the legal device of the
corporation” and “[c]oincidentally, the original … Paris [Convention] 1883… appear[ed] either before or
just simultaneous with the beginnings of recognition of corporations as separate persons in law (1886 in
American courts, 1897 in British…)” (at 12-13). (All footnotes have been omitted).
695

Including the litigation in United States Postal Service v Canada Post Corporation, 2007 FCA 10 (leave
denied by SCC, 27 June 2007) which is noted again in the text at footnote 696 and fully discussed in the
section below entitled “D. Justice McTavish’s Taxonomy of Prohibited Marks” (text at footnotes 783-788).
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public authority, as the case may be, given public notice of its
adoption and use.696
The process in s 9(1)(n)(iii) of allowing a “public authority” entity to give “public
notice of the adoption [of an adopted symbol]”, rather than having to apply for trademark
protection as businesses are required to do, has attracted frequent challenges being
brought against those relying upon this section of the Trademarks Act from others who
believed the marks in question should be protected through the tort of passing off or
through registration under the Trademarks Act as a trademark.697 In other cases, the
holders of prohibited marks have challenged others.698
Subsection 9(1)(n)(ii) refers to “any badge, crest, emblem or mark” “(ii) of any
university”. The case of University of Texas System v Texas Longhorn Café Inc (1992)
42 CPR(3d) 211 (Trademark Opposition Board) is a reminder that this subsection is not
restricted to Canadian universities. The University of Texas availed itself of the
provision, although, in the result, on the merits, the Board found the café could rely upon
a mark that combined two of the University of Texas’ prohibited marks and have its mark
blending “Texas” and “Longhorns” registered in Canada.699

696

Trademarks Act, supra note 22, s 9(1)(n)(iii).

697

Wagon-Wheel Concessions Ltd v Stadium Corp. of Ontario (1988), 22 CIPR 1 (Fed TD), affirmed
(1989) 24 CIPR (FCA).
698

See, for instance, Ontario Federation of Anglers & Hunters v FW Woolworth Co. (1991), 39 CPR(3d)
272 (TMOB); British Columbia v Mihaljevic (1986), 10 CPR(3d) 274 (BCSC).
699

Compare this with the situation in United States Postal Service v Canada Post Corporation, 2007 FCA
10; United States Postal Service v Canada Post Corporation, 2007 FCA 10 (leave denied by SCC, 27 June
2007), noted above in the text at note 692, which was also decided under s 9(1)(n) but involved a ‘public
authority’ under s 9(1)(n) (iii) rather than a university under s9(1)(n)(ii). The case is fully discussed in the
section below entitled “D. Justice McTavish’s Taxonomy of Prohibited Marks” (text at footnotes 784-789).
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Although First Nations of Canada are not specifically mentioned in Section 9,
prohibited marks have been used by First Nations peoples as legal tools for protecting
their rights. For example, the Skatin Nations, the Kaska Tribal Council, the Council of
the Como Band of Indians, the Osoyoos Indian Band and the First Nations Summit have
protected the names SKATIN (090873), KASKA (091404), QUENEESH (0916618),
NK'MIP (0911487) and FIRST NATIONS SUMMIT (0907696), respectively, under
subsection 9(1)(n)(iii).700
In Canadian trademark law (both under the Trademarks Act701 and in the common
law action for passing off), reputation is a matter often litigated.702 Reputation has not
been litigated in the context of prohibited marks in Canada – and this is not surprising
because, as this chapter will demonstrate, the question of reputation in terms of
prohibited marks is one that has been considered and answered by Parliament (by
legislating the list of symbols in Section 9). The symbols protected under Section 9 and
its predecessor enactments in Canada have been chosen by Parliament for this perpetual
protection703 and they have been so chosen in order to protect the reputations associated
with them.

700

The number in brackets next to each name is the application number in the Canadian Trademarks
Database.
701

Trademarks Act, supra note 22.

702

Trademarks are one form of stimulus that businesses and marketing entities rely upon for
communicating about the source, quality and other characteristics of their goods or services and the
personality and reputation of their brands. See Terrance S Carter & U Shen Goh, Branding and Trademarks: Handbook for Charitable and Not for Profit Organizations (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2006) at
61-62; Teresa Scassa, “Trademarks Worth a Thousand Words: Freedom of Expression and the Use of the
Trademarks of Others” (2012) 53:4 Les Cahiers de droit 877 at 880-881.
As will be discussed further below, some of the subsections of Section 9 have been affected by Canada’s
commitments to its international obligations in public international law and international trade. Even given
this international influence on Canadian law, it is still the case that Canada is a sovereign nation and is not
703
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(b) History
(i) Beginnings in 1932
The 1932 revision to Canada’s trademark legislation, the Unfair Competition
Act,704 was hailed as an important landmark in Canadian law.705
The original list of symbols enacted in Canada was in the 1932 Act Respecting
Unfair Competition in Trade and Commerce.706 The 1932 legislation gave protection to
only eleven types of symbols (as opposed to the current list of twenty-three types of
protected symbols707):
14. (1) No person shall be entitled to adopt for use in connection with his
business, as a trade mark or otherwise, any symbol consisting of, or so
nearly resembling as to be likely to be mistaken for,
(a) the Royal Arms, Crest or Standard;
(b) the arms or crest of any member of the Royal Family;
(c) the national flag in any of its forms;
(d) the standard, arms or crest of His Excellency the GovernorGeneral;
(e) the arms or crest adopted or used at any time by Canada or by
any province or municipal corporation in Canada;
(f) any national flag, arms, crest or emblem commonly used as
such by any foreign state;
(g) the emblem of the Red Cross Society, consisting of a red cross
on a white ground or the expression “Red Cross” or “Geneva
Cross;”

legally obliged, under its system of laws, to accept into its domestic law the provisions to which it has
agreed by signing either international public law treaties or trade agreements.
704

Unfair Competition Act, 22-23 Geo V, c 38 (1932).

EG Gowling, “The Unfair Competition Act” (1932)10:8 Can Bar Rev 507 at 508. Gowling took a
historical approach to the history of trademark in Canada, noting that that the “first Canadian statute
granting protection to trade marks was passed in 1861, after which followed the first Trade Mark and
Design Act of 1868.” (Gowling did not include the topic of the prohibited marks provisions in this statute
in his discussion.) EG Gowling, “The Unfair Competition Act” (1932)10:8 Can Bar Rev 507 at 507.
705

706

Unfair Competition Act, supra note 704.

See Appendix D: Comparison of “Prohibited Marks” in the Current Trademarks Act and “Forbidden
Marks” in the 1932 Unfair Competition Act.
707
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(h) any national, territorial or civic flag, arms, crest, or emblem of
the prohibition of which as a commercial device notice has been
received and publicly given by the Registrar pursuant to the
provisions of the Convention more than two months before the
adoption of the symbol;
(i) the emblem of any fraternal society, the legal existence of
which is recognized under any law in force in Canada;
(j) any symbol adopted and used by any public authority in Canada
as an official mark on similar wares;
(k) the portrait or signature of any person who is living or has died
within thirty years.
(2) Nothing in this section shall prevent the use as a trade mark, or
otherwise in connection with a business, of any such symbol as aforesaid
with the consent and approval of His Majesty or such other person as may
be deemed to have been intended to be protected by the provisions hereof.
At least two708 of the provisions of this legislation involve symbols originating
outside Canada:
(f) any national flag, arms, crest or emblem commonly used as such by
any foreign state;
and
(h) any national, territorial or civic flag, arms, crest, or emblem of the
prohibition of which as a commercial device notice has been received.
Side by side comparison of the 1932 provision for protection of protected symbols
with the current Trademarks Act Section 9 (found in its entirety at Appendix D) indicates
that, with the exception of subsection (i) (“the emblem of any fraternal society, the legal
existence of which is recognized under any law of Canada”), all the statutory provisions
of 1932 have been carried forward, in identical or expanded terms, to the present.709

708

As will be discussed below, provision (g) (“the emblem of the Red Cross Society, consisting of a red
cross on a white ground or the expression “Red Cross” or “Geneva Cross”) could have been a domestic
initiative just as well as an initiative emanating from outside Canada.
The provision involving “the emblem of any fraternal society” was dropped from the statute in Canada’s
Trade Marks Act of 1952 (see Appendix G). A “fraternal organization” is defined in Wikipedia as
“an organization, society, club or fraternal order traditionally of men associated together for
various religious or secular aims”. In the United States, apparently, such organizations are protected under
the federal trademark legislation, as Cornell University notes on its website:
709

167
By 1932, when Canada’s Act Respecting Unfair Competition in Trade and
Commerce710 was passed, the 1925 Hague Revision to the international 1883 Paris
Convention,711 was in effect. Article 6ter of the Paris Convention appeared as ‘armorial
bearings, flags, state emblems …, official signs and hallmarks indicating control and
warranty … and all imitations thereof from a heraldic point of view’ (see Appendix E).712
Author Nedim Malovic has written about s 4(1)(d) of the UK Trade Marks Act
1994, which is similar to Canada’s current s 9(2)(a),713 saying the UK provision
involves an assessment of the impact that a trade mark would have on the
average consumer of the goods and/or services in relation to which the
The Lanham Act [15 USC § 1127] describes a ‘collective’ as a cooperative, association, or other
collective group or organization; fraternal organizations and unions are both considered to be
collectives. The mark adopted by a particular collective is only available for use by its members.
See Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/collective_mark.
Canada’s legislation currently does not include collective marks (see R Nelson Godfrey, “Five Significant
Developments Following the June 2019 Changes to Canadian Trademark Law,” Gowling WLG, online:
<https://gowlingwlg.com/en/insights-resources/articles/2020/five-changes-to-the-latest-canadiantrademark-law/>). However, the text of CUSMA (discussed further below in Chapter 8.B (a)) provides
Article 20.18: Collective and Certification Marks
Each Party shall provide that trademarks include collective marks and certification marks. A
Party is not required to treat certification marks as a separate category in its law, provided that
those marks are protected. Each Party shall also provide that signs that may serve as geographical
indications are capable of protection under its trademark system. [emphasis added; footnote
omitted]
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Unfair Competition Act, 1932, supra note 704.
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Further discussed below, in this chapter.
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Article 6ter(1). See Appendix E: Article 6ter of the Paris Convention in 1925, 1934, 1958 and 1967.
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UK Trade Marks Act (UK), 1994, c 26 pt 1, s 4(1)(d) reads:
4 Specially protected emblems.
(1)A trade mark which consists of or contains—
--(d) words, letters or devices likely to lead persons to think that the applicant either has or recently
has had Royal patronage or authorisation, shall not be registered unless it appears to the registrar
that consent has been given by or on behalf of Her Majesty or, as the case may be, the relevant
member of the Royal family.

Canada’s Trademarks Act, supra note 22, s 9(2) reads:
Nothing in this section prevents the adoption, use or registration as a trademark or otherwise, in
connection with any business, of any mark
(a) described in subsection (1) with the consent of Her Majesty or such other person, society,
authority or organization as may be considered to have been intended to be protected by this
section.
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mark would be used, including leading them [the average consumer] to
believe that the applicant either has or recently has had Royal patronage or
authorization.714
In discussing the UK provision in the context of Article 6ter of the Paris Convention,
Malovic notes that “certain royal insignia as trade marks is protected internationally
under Article 6ter of the Paris Convention.”715 He continues,
[a] country’s name, flag, emblem of coat of arms can therefore be said to
signal to the public that there is a relationship between the nation and the
products or services in respect of which it is being used.(1) Not only could
this become problematic for a nation, which may or may not have control
over the products being distributed using its identity and goodwill, but it
might also damage the reputation and brand value that a nation has built
up over time.716

Malovic goes on refer to the UK Intellectual Property Office’s Examination Guide717,
noting
it is specified that not all goods and/or services will prompt a consumer to
believe that there is a connection between the mark sought for and the
presence of a Royal patronage or authorization. Examples of goods or
services for which ‘royal’ may indicate Royal patronage include high
quality porcelain or glassware, luxury foods, organic food, confectionery,
alcoholic beverages, clothing, and organizations of sporting events. The
list is not exhaustive. However, everyday items, insurance or financial
services, double glazing services, provision of electricity, or goods which
are far enough removed from any association with the Royal family such

714

Nedim Malovic, “Royal Branding and Trade Marks” (2020) 15:6 J Intell Prop L & Prac 409 at 409.

715

Ibid.

Ibid, citing at footnote 1 to Natalie G.S. Corthésy, “Trade marks, country names …”, supra note 160 at
300.
716

717

Ibid, citing at footnote 6 to the "UK IPO, Manual of Trade Marks Practice (2009), p206.". Malovic
concludes by saying, “
Going back to where we began: could the couple [Meghan Markle and Prince Harry] … still style
themselves as ‘royal’ and thus exploit the Sussex Royal brand in doing so, without performing any
royal duties? Ultimately, it appears that the safest solution might be first to consult with … Her
Majesty.” (at 410).
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as skateboards, computers, computer games or T-shirts would likely
escape the application of the provision.718

Canada’s 1932 statute did not just enact “forbidden marks” (as this statute termed
‘prohibited marks’), it allowed the use of royal symbols (section 14(2)) “with the consent
and approval of His Majesty or such other person as may be deemed to have been
intended to be protected by the provisions hereof.”719 The provisions in the statute were
structured in two subsections, the first section listing the prohibited marks, followed by a
second section listing the exceptions to prohibitions: a structure for Section 9 that has
persisted to this day.
In 1934, in B Houde Co. v Canada (Commissioner of Patents),720 Justice Angers
delivered a judgment in which he noted that the Unfair Competition Act "enumerates the
emblems or symbols which may not be adopted as a trade-mark; neither [the provisions
enumerating emblems nor the provisions enumerating symbols] forbid the use of the
word "Royal."721 He wondered "how the words "Royal Flush" used in connection with
tobacco, cigars, cigarettes and cigarette papers may possibly be misdescriptive of the
character or quality of the wares or of the conditions of their production or of their place

Nedim Malovic, “Royal Branding and Trade Marks” (2020) 15:6 J Intell Prop L & Prac 409 at 409
[footnotes omitted].
718

719

Unfair Competition Act, (Can.) 1932, c 38 art 14(2) (The Unfair Competition Act was passed during the
reign of King George V, who served on the throne of the United Kingdom from 1910-1936. Canada, a selfgoverning Dominion since 1 July 1867, received equal status with the United Kingdom in 1931 within the
British Commonwealth of Nations, but only became a fully sovereign country in 1982 with the passing of
the Canada Act 1982).
720

B Houde Co. v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) 1934 CarswellNat 14, [1934] Ex. CR 149.

721

Ibid at para 6.

170
of origin"722 In the result, he allowed the petition of the appellant [B. Houde Company]
and directed the Commissioner of Patents to register the trade-mark "Royal Flush."723
In a 1938 decision that involved the 1932 provision for protection of prohibited
marks, Justice Angers, in Simms & Co. v Canada (Commissioner of Patents),724 on
appeal from the decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks refusing to register a design
trade mark that included a representation of the Imperial Crown, held that the Registrar of
Trade Marks was right in refusing the appellant's application.725 He based his decision on
the fact that "[t]he representation of the Design Mark includes the representation of the
Imperial Crown which is not permissible (s 14 of the Unfair Competition Act.)"726
On the other hand, one year later, in Nehi Inc v Canada (Registrar of Trade
Marks),727 a court allowed registration of the wordmark "Royal Crown" as a trademark,
based on doubt that "the public ever associate either of those words, when so used, with
the Royal Arms, Crest or Standard."728 A similar result occurred in Molson Cos v
Richmond Breweries Ltd 729 when the evidence did not support a finding that the
“ROYAL CANADIAN & DESIGN” mark would lead Canadians to believe that the
wares sold were sold under Royal Patronage. The same occurred, in terms of allegations

722

Ibid at para 7.

723

Ibid at para 15.

724

Simms & Co. v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 1938 CarswellNat 34, [1938] 3 DLR 453, [1938]
Ex. CR 326.
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Ibid para 16.
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Ibid at para 3.
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Nehi Inc. v Canada (Registrar of Trade Marks), 1939 CarswellNat 28, [1939] 2 DLR 614, [1939] Ex.
CR 217.
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Ibid para 6.
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Molson Cos v Richmond Breweries Ltd (1985), 5 CIPR 79 (TM Opposition Board)
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of confusion of Spanish royal patronage being discounted, in Spain v T.G. Bright & Co.
730

and the mark “Brights Spanish House” was found not to offend s 9(1)(d).
(ii) Reforms of 1953
In 1947, the Government of Canada established the Trade Mark Law Revision

Committee with the primary task of recommending changes to the 1932 Unfair
Competition Act.731 In his article describing the resulting legislation, E Gordon Gowling
described the Committee:
It is reassuring to know that the new Canadian Trade Marks Act is not the
creation of a few men dreaming in an ivory tower but the mature issue of
studies that may be unmatched in the history of Canadian legislation[:] …
a committee … with terms of reference sufficiently broad to enable it to
review and make recommendations in the whole field of trade marks and
unfair competition. The members were all familiar with the history and
operation of the law as it exists. Among themselves, the represented three
distinct points of view. There were, first of all, senior departmental
officials whose duty it will be to administer the new statute and conduct
the day to day affairs of the Trade Marks Office; then there were
professional advisors with long and extensive experience in this particular
branch of the law; and, finally, there were representatives of industry
specially nominated by the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the
Canadian Chamber of Commerce … under the chairmanship of Dr. Harold
G. Fox, Q.C. …732
In the preliminary stages of its work, in preparation for the revisions to be
presented (almost six years later) to the Secretary of State of Canada, the Committee
“thought it desirable to ascertain the views of interested persons and bodies, not only in
this country, but in Great Britain and the United States of America. Accordingly, [the
committee] prepared a questionnaire directed to those points which, in the statute [the

730

Spain v T.G. Bright & Co. 730(1987), 13 CIPR 251 (TM Opposition Board)

Daniel R Bereskin, “Canada’s Ill-Conceived New “Trademark” Law: A Venture into Constitutional
Quicksand” (2014) 104:5 Trademark Reporter 1112 at 1115.
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E Gordon Gowling, “The New Canadian Trade Marks Act.” [1953] 31 Can Bar Rev 664 at 665. It is
interesting to note that in the thirteen pages of the article, prohibited marks are nowhere discussed.
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committee was] considering, appeared to be unsatisfactory and to have given rise to
difficulties of interpretation or operation.”733
The “Report of the Trade Mark Law Revision Committee to the Secretary of State
of Canada” was submitted to the Government of Canada on January 20, 1953. In its
Report, the Committee devoted two paragraphs of attention to the “Prohibited Marks”:
Under Section 14 of The Unfair Competition Act, 1932, certain symbols
are wholly excluded from registration [as trade marks] and even use. In
the main, these are specific words and designs which are withdrawn from
general employment because of legislative policy, as in the case of the
Royal Arms and the national flag, because of treaty obligations, as in the
case of territorial flags and the emblem of the Red Cross, or because of
private rights, as in the case of signatures and portraits. Partly as a result
of an extension of our treaty obligations and partly as a result of requests
for protection, the list of such words and designs has been lengthened in
Section 9 of the Bill, but this does not involve a change of principle.
Without attempting to review the situation generally, it might be helpful to
mention that Section 9 contains broad provisions directed against the
adoption of any word or symbol likely to lead to the belief that wares or
services have received Royal, Vice-Regal or Governmental patronage,
approval or authority. In addition, the prohibitions exclude any
scandalous, obscene or immoral word or device or any matter that may
falsely suggest a connection with any living person. The remainder of the
provisions of Section 9 deal with particular situations which will be found
self-explanatory upon examination. 734
The result of the 1953 revision of the 1932 trademark legislation, the Unfair
Competition Act, was the enactment of "An Act Relating to Trade Marks and Unfair
Competition," (cited as the Trade Marks Act).735 The changes made in 1953 to the 1932
legislation for Prohibited Marks are illustrated in Appendix F.

733

Report of Trade Mark Law Revision Committee to the Secretary of State of Canada (January 20, 1953).
The Report is reprinted in Harold G Fox, The Canadian Law of Trade Marks and Unfair Competition, 2nd
ed, vol 2 (Toronto: Carswell, 1956) (at 1142-1201) at 1142.
734
735

Ibid at 1155.

Trade-Marks Act, 1952-53, c 49, s. 1. One of the biggest changes in this legislation in the context of
trademark law was to connect Canadian trademarks not just to goods or wares (to which Canadian
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In the 1953 Act, under the heading "Unfair Competition and Prohibited Marks,"
section 9 (titled "Prohibited marks) was comprised of two subsections – retaining the
structure originally introduced in 1932 (noted above): the 1953 Trade-Marks
Act expanded the 1932 prohibited marks section by adding seven new provisions (see
Appendix F).
The new subsections introduced in 1953 included prohibition against using as a
trademark “(d) any word or symbol likely to lead to the belief that the wares or services
in association with which it is used have received, or are produced, sold or performed
under royal, vice- regal or governmental patronage, approval or authority”.736
Also included amongst the new prohibitions were the following:
(i)

two new symbols (subsection 9(1)(g) and subsection 9(1)(h)) – the Red
Crescent emblem and Red Lion and Sun sign, respectively;

(ii)

any word or symbol that may be confused as being approved by any regal or
governmental authority (subsection 9(1)(d);

(iii) two subsections with general content: subsection 9(1)(j) any scandalous, obscene
or immoral word or device, and subsection 9(1)(k) any matter that may falsely
suggest a connection with any living individual; and
(iv)

a subsection related to institutions, one international (the United Nations in
subsection 9(1)(m)) and the other related to a domestic institution (the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police in subsection 9(1)(o)).

trademark legislation had applied in the past) but also to services: see E Gordon Gowling, “The New
Canadian Trade Marks Act.” [1953] 31 Can Bar Rev 664 at 673.
736

Ibid, s 9(1)(d).

174
In 1964, Justice Dumoulin in A.B. Statens Skogsindustrier v Registral of Trade
Marks (referring to the 1939 decision in Nehi Inc. v Registrar of Trade Marks737, but
making a decision more like the 1938 decision in Simms & Co. v Canada (Commissioner
of Patents738), allowed the registration of the trademark "Royal Board Three Crowns"
which, he held, "does not, in any manner or form, offend against [the new] s 9(1)(d) of
the Trade Marks Act, 1952-53 (Can.), c. 49, nor against any other section of the aforesaid
statute."739
(iii) To the present
There have been revisions to the Trade Marks Act since 1953 revision,
culminating in revisions made on June 18, 2019. As may be seen in Appendix G, the
revisions have been in relation to international symbols.
Since the introduction of ‘forbidden marks’ in subsection 14(1) of the 1932
Unfair Competition Act, through successive revisions to the present (including the 1953
revisions just discussed), the number of provisions for prohibited marks has almost
doubled from eleven in 1932 to the present twenty-one provisions. Juxtaposing section 14
of the 1932 Unfair Competition Act with the prohibited marks as they appear in section 9
of the current Trademarks Act of this chapter makes the comparison visual (see again
Appendix D).

737

Supra, text at note 725.

738

Supra, text at note 722.

739

AB Statens Skogsindustrier v Registrar of Trade Marks 1964 CarswellNat 76, 33 Fox Pat. C. 1 at para 1.
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C - The International History Relating to Prohibited Marks
(a) Development of the Paris Convention
The concept of official marks was recognized in the very first Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property [Paris Convention] in 1883. As Ahmad
Takouche explains,
The Paris Convention is essentially a compact between the various
member nations to accord in their own countries to citizens of the other
member nations trademark and other rights comparable to those accorded
their own citizens by their domestic law. The underlying principle is that
foreign nationals should be given the same treatment in each of the
member countries as that country makes available to its own citizens. The
Convention is not premised upon the idea that the trademark laws of each
member nation shall be given extraterritorial application, but on exactly
the converse principle that each nation’s law shall have only territorial
application. Thus, the Paris Convention creates nothing that even
remotely resembles a ‘world mark’ or an ‘international registration’.
Rather, it recognizes the principle of the territoriality of trademarks: a
mark exists only under the laws of each sovereign nation.740
The original 1883 text notes the original nations involved in the Paris Convention:
Article 1. The Governments of France, Belgium, Brazil, Guatemala, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland constitute
themselves into a Union for the protection of industrial property.

The United Kingdom became a member of the Union in 1884.741 Although
Canada had been made a self-governing country in 1867 through the Constitution Act,
1867742, Canada was not independent of Great Britain in matters of foreign affairs until

Ahmad Takouche, “Well-known, or Not Well-Known? That is the Question. The Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property’s Article 6bis in the Context of American Trademark Law” (2019) 9:2
UC Irvine Law Rev 495 at 505, citing to 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, (5th ed).
740
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Contracting Parties, Paris Convention, online:
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/ShowResults?search_what=C&treaty_id=2
742

Constitution Act, 1867, (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
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1931 (through Britain’s 1931 Statute of Westminster743). Therefore, in 1884, when the
United Kingdom joined the Paris Union, Canada was involved only through decisions
taken by the United Kingdom. In light of the date of the Statute of Westminster, it might
be thought that Canada would only have been able join the Paris Convention in its own
right after 1931.744 Canada, however, signed the Paris Convention in its own right on
September 1, 1923.745 It was able to do so because of developments in the Paris Union
itself, which took place in 1911 at the Washington Conference: an Article (Article 16bis)
was “adopted, without much debate, …opening up membership [in the Paris Union] to
the colonies, under the control of the colonies themselves or that of their parent states”.746
Canada, in joining the Paris Union, agreed to bring its domestic law into compliance with
the provisions of the Paris Convention at the level of adherence to which it had pledged
itself.747

UK 1931 Statute of Westminster s. 4: “No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the
commencement of this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that
Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion has requested, and consented to,
the enactment thereof.”
743

Indeed, in his 1932 article “The Unfair Competition Act” (1932) 10:8 Can Bar Rev 507, EG Gowling
acknowledged Canada’s independence, by 1932, in international affairs: “Parliament has accomplished the
twofold objective of fulfilling Canada’s obligations as a member of the International Convention, and at the
same time effecting many improvements in our trade mark laws.” (at 508).
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Contracting Parties, Paris Convention, online:
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/ShowResults?search_what=C&treaty_id=2
Gabriel Galvez-Behar, “The 1883 Paris Convention and the Impossible Unification of Industrial
Property”, in Graeme Gooday & Steven Wilf, eds, Patent Cultures: Diversity and Harmonization in
Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2020) (Part 1, at 38-68) at 64.
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Canada is currently committed to the Paris Convention at its most recent, 1967, level. The current
Article 25 of the Paris Convention, titled “Implementation of the Convention on the Domestic Level”
provides
(1)Any country party to this Convention undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its constitution,
the measures necessary to ensure the application of this Convention;
(2) It is understood that, at the time a country deposits its instrument of ratification or accession, it
will be in a position under its domestic law to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.
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The heart of the original Paris Convention lay in Article 6, which provided:
Article 6.
[1] Every trade mark duly filed in the country of origin shall be accepted
for filing and protected in its original form in the other countries of
the Union.
[2] The country in which the applicant has his principal establishment
shall be considered as the country of origin.
[3] If the principal establishment is not situated in one of the countries of
the Union, the country to which the applicant belongs shall be
considered as the country of origin.
[4] The filing may be refused if the object for which it is requested is
considered as contrary to morality or public order
It was in subsection (4) of Article 6 that the international commitment to the concept of
“official marks” lay: “[a trade mark] filing may be refused if the object for which it is
requested is considered as contrary to morality or public order.”748
In connection with “official marks” there are two provisions that are of interest in
the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property Final Protocol of
March 20th, 1883. First, the Final Protocol clarified that
1. The words ‘industrial property’ should be understood in the broadest
sense: they relate not only to the products of industry in the strict sense but
also to agricultural products… and mineral products which are put into
trade.
And, second, the Final Protocol explained
4 [2] In order to avoid improper interpretation, it is understood that the use
of public armorial bearings and decorations may be considered as contrary
to public order, in the sense of the last paragraph of Article 6 [which dealt
with symbols not to be trademarks].

748

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (March 20, 1883; effective July 7, 1884).
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The direct connection between official marks and “morality or public order” was
made explicit in 1911 when, at the Washington Conference, Article 6 of the Paris
Convention was revised as follows:
(4) Every trade mark duly registered in the country of origin shall be
accepted for filing and protected in its original form in other countries
of the [Paris] Union.
(5) Nevertheless, the following may be refused or invalidated…
…
3. Marks which are contrary to morality or public order.

It was pursuant to existence of these provisions in the 1883 and 1911 versions of
the Paris Convention (as mentioned in Chapter 1) that, in the 1925 Hague Revision of the
Paris Convention, the concept of prohibiting registration as trademarks marks through
creating a list of non-trademarkable categories first appeared: “armorial bearings, flags,
state emblems of the contracting countries, official signs and hallmarks indicating control
and warranty adopted by them and all imitations thereof from a heraldic point of
view”.749
It was only two years after Canada acceded to the Paris Convention in 1923, that,
at the 1925 Revision Conference of the Hague, Article 6ter creating “[p]rohibitions
concerning State Emblems, Official Hallmarks, and Emblems of Intergovernmental
Organizations”750 was added to the text of the Convention.

749

Article 6ter (1). See Appendix E.

See “Article 6ter of the Paris Convention: Legal and Administrative Aspects” prepared by the
Secretariat of the Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical
Indications, 15th session (Geneva, Nov 28 to Dec 2, 2005), WIPO October 14, 2005, Annex 1 at 2, online:
<https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_15/sct_15_3.pdf>.
750
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The World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], which now administers
public international intellectual property treaties,751 has noted that “Article 6ter [of the
Paris Convention] does not generate a trademark right, or any other type of [intellectual
property] right, over the signs that are covered by that provision.”752 In 2009, a piece in
“WIPOMAGAZINE”, issued by WIPO, notes “[u]nlike trademarks, which have a
commercial purpose and are owned by individual persons, companies and entities, State
signs or the signs , names and abbreviations of international governmental organizations
cannot be the subject of individual property rights.”753
Unlike trademarks (which have a commercial purpose and are owned by
individual persons, companies or entities), official marks, such as State signs or the signs,
names and abbreviations of international intergovernmental organizations cannot be the
subject of individual property rights. Article 6ter, therefore prohibits the registration or
use of such signs, names and abbreviations as trademarks. The provision also covers
official signs and hallmarks indicating control and warranty adopted by States.
The intention of Article 6ter is not to create a special form of intellectual property
right754 for States and intergovernmental organizations, but to prevent the signs, names

751

The Paris Union, which is the group of member countries of the Paris Convention, still is the body that
considers and would enact any changes to the Paris Convention: it is a body within the World Intellectual
Property Organization [WIPO], which was, itself, formed in 1967 (see Convention Establishing the World
Intellectual Property Organization, United Nations General Assembly (1967) 14 July 1967, 828 UNTS 3)
and became an organ of the United Nations in 1970. The current members of the Paris Union may be found
at WIPO, Assembly (Paris Union),
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/ShowResults?search_what=B&bo_id=5
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See WIPO, Article 6ter, online: <https://www.wipo.int/article6ter/en/ >.
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See WIPOMAGAZINE, online: <wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/03/article_0009.html>.

754

Even as early as 1878, Gabriel Galvez-Behar notes that international gatherings were bedevilled with
“[t]he recurring question of assimilating industrial property to property under common law… but the lines
of the division on this issue did not align with the nationality of those taking part in the debate.” (at 56)
Eventually, however, at that 1878 gathering, “industrial property was not entirely identified with a positive
right. Nor was it broadly attributed the status of a natural right. The tones and nuances had changed. While
the utilitarian and positive position was affirmed on the banks of the Danube, on the banks of the Seine,
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and abbreviations associated with them from being used or appropriate as trademarks
without proper authorization.
Article 6ter has been revised since its inception in 1925, first in the 1934 London
Revision to the Paris Convention755, then at Lisbon in 1958756and most recently, in the
1967 Stockholm Revision.757 (See Appendix E, which presents each article of Article 6ter
in all the versions of the Paris Convention (with changes from version to version
highlighted).
At the 1958 Conference of the Paris Union in Lisbon there was an extensive
elaboration of the concepts relevant to prohibited marks. One key aspect of the 1958
Paris Revision was the extension of the provisions of Article 6ter to the armorial
bearings, flags, other emblems, abbreviations and names of international governmental
organizations.758 A second new inclusion was the provision that provided that in order
for a state or international governmental organization to get protection under Article 6ter
for prohibited marks (other than flags of states), the state or international governmental

supporters of natural right had received a better hearing without questioning the basic consensus.” (at 58),
Gabriel Galvez-Behar, “The 1883 Paris Convention and the Impossible Unification of Industrial Property,”
in Graeme Gooday & Steven Wilf, eds, Patent Cultures: Diversity and Harmonization in Historical
Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2020) (Part 1, at 38-68).
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Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as revised at Brussels on
December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on
June 2, 1934.
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Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as revised at Brussels on
December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on
June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958.
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Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as revised at Brussels on
December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on
June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967.
In 1992 the Paris Union adopted “Guidelines for the Interpretation of Article 6ter(1)(b) and 3(b) of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property” which are intended to clarify elements
concerning the protection of symbology relating to international governmental organizations. See online:
<wipo.int/article6ter/en/legal_texts/guidelines.html>
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organization was to communicate with the International Bureau of WIPO.759
As can be seen in Appendix E, many of the 1967 changes made to Article 6ter
were editorial changes. One change made in 1967, however, to Article 1(c), would
appear to have substantive implications.
Originally, in 1925, Article 1 read simply
The contracting countries agree to refuse or to invalidate the registration,
and to prohibit by appropriate measures the use, without authorization by
the competent authorities, either as trademarks or as elements of
trademarks, of armorial bearings, flags and other State emblems of the
contracting countries, official signs and hallmarks indicating control and
warranty adopted by them and all imitations thereof from a heraldic point
of view.760
In 1958 Article 1(b) was added to the Paris Agreement, reading:
The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) above apply equally to armorial
bearings, flags and other emblems, abbreviations or titles of international
intergovernmental organizations of which one or more countries of the
Union are members, with the exception of armorial bearings, flags and
other emblems, abbreviations or titles that are already the subject of
existing international agreements intended to ensure their protection,

and, in that same year (1958), Article 1(c) was added:
No country of the Union shall be required to apply the provisions of subparagraph (b) above to the prejudice of the owners of rights acquired in
good faith before the entry into force, in that country, of the present
Convention. The countries of the Union shall not be required to apply the
said provisions when the use or registration covered by sub-paragraph (a)
above is not of such a nature as to suggest to the public that a connection
exists between the organization concerned and the armorial bearings,
flags, emblems, abbreviations or titles, or if such use or registration is
clearly not of a nature to mislead the public as to the existence of a
connection between the user and the organization [emphasis added].
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See WIPO, Article 6ter, online: <https://www.wipo.int/article6ter/en/general_info.html>

As can be seen in Appendix E, in 1934 the words “contracting countries” were replaced by “countries
of the Union”.
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In the 1967 revision of the Paris Convention, Article 1(c) was changed to read:
No country of the Union shall be required to apply the provisions of subparagraph (b) above to the prejudice of the owners of rights acquired in
good faith before the entry into force, in that country, of this Convention.
The countries of the Union shall not be required to apply the said
provisions when the use or registration referred to in sub-paragraph (a)
above is not of such a nature as to suggest to the public that a connection
exists between the organization concerned and the armorial bearings,
flags, emblems, abbreviations and names, or if such use or registration is
probably not of such a nature as to mislead the public as to the existence
of a connection between the user and the organization [emphasis added].

The change in the text of Article 1(c) from “clearly not of a nature to mislead the public”
in 1958 to “probably not of such a nature as to mislead the public” in 1967 appears to be
a substantive change, not an editorial one.
In the overall context of Article 1(c), the 1967 change would appear to less often
require countries to apply Article 6ter (1)(a) than was the case previous to the 1967
change.
Recall that Article 6ter (1)(a) [quoted above in its original 1925 form and here in
its 1967 form] requires states to refuse or invalidate trademarks comprised of (or
containing elements of) prohibited marks:
(a) The countries of the Union agree to refuse or to invalidate the
registration, and to prohibit by appropriate measures the use, without
authorization by the competent authorities, either as trademarks or as
elements of trademarks, of armorial bearings, flags and other State
emblems of the countries of the Union, official signs and hallmarks
indicating control and warranty adopted by them and any imitation
from a heraldic point of view.

The 1967 change to Article 6ter 1(c) allows a country to decide not to refuse or invalidate
or prohibit the use of a mark under Article 6ter (1)(a) if that mark is “probably” (rather
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than the earlier “clearly”) “not of a nature to mislead the public” – which means countries
can now, in more cases, prioritize trademarks over prohibited marks.
Article 6ter (2) of the Paris Convention sets limits on countries’ abilities to
impose on a trademark holder in terms of ensuring that a trademark does not use a
prohibited mark:
Prohibition of the use of official signs and hallmarks indicating control
and warranty shall apply solely in cases where the marks in which they are
incorporated are intended to be used on goods of the same or similar kind.

The requirement of countries to involve WIPO’s bureaucracy in administration of
prohibited marks (other than flags of States) is made clear in Paris Convention Article
6ter:761
(3)(a) For the application of these provisions the countries of the Union
agree to communicate reciprocally, through the International
Bureau, the list of State emblems and official signs and hallmarks
indicating control and warranty which they desire, or may hereafter
desire, to place wholly or within certain limits under the protection
of the present Article, and all subsequent modifications of such list.
Each country of the Union shall in due course make available to the
public the lists so communicated. Nevertheless such communication
is not obligatory in respect of flags of States.

(b) Matters whose inclusion in Article 6ter of Paris has been debated
In 1967, as chronicled by Natalie Corthésy, an international debate arose about
whether Article 6ter protects country names.762 The debate raised the possibility that if

Both states and intergovernmental organizations can access WIPO’s processes in this regard through its
website at https://www.wipo.int/article6ter/en/
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Natalie Corthésy, “Trade Marks, Country Names and Misappropriation of National Identity” (2017)
12:4 J Intell Prop L & Prac 297 at 299.
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Article 6ter did not protect country names, Article 10bis the Paris Convention’s
prohibition on ‘Unfair Competition' does:
(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such
countries effective protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
(i) all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means
whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or
commercial activities, of a competitor;
(ii) false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to
discredit the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or
commercial activities, of a competitor;
(iii) indications or allegations the use of which in the course of
trade is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the
manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for
their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods.

Although at the 1982 WIPO Diplomatic Conference for the revision of the Paris
Convention “it was resolved that official names of states would be excluded from the
scope of Article 6ter and … recommended that protection of country names should be
implemented under Article 10 by means of unfair competition”763 there was no change to
the wording of Article 6ter of the Paris Convention.
While claiming that “Article 10bis … establishes a well-entrenched negative right
of protection against unfair competition”,764 Corthésy also admits that “national rules of
unfair competition are as varied and unique in each jurisdiction, as country names

Natalie Corthésy, “Brand New IP: ‘Country name designation’ – from France with love”, Chapter 16 in
Daniel J Gervais, The Future of Intellectual Property, ATRIP Intellectual Property Series (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 2021) Chapter 16 (at 322-345) at 332.
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themselves”765 and, despite the 1982 resolution recommending protection of country
names under Paris Convention Article 10, Corthésy reports that “[i]nsignias of
sovereignty, albeit delimited in Article 6ter to flags, emblems, armorial bearings from a
heraldic point of view, are nevertheless interpreted by some countries as including
country names.”766
When discussing Article 6ter of the Paris Convention767 with respect to its
protection of country names, Natalie Corthésy, noted
When branding products with country names, the moral compass guiding
the management of industrial property has been ‘Thou shalt not lie.’
Article 6ter of the Paris Convention has clearly incorporated this
perspective by providing for the protection of national emblems and like
indicators from a heraldic point of view. … However, there is no specific
mention of official country names.768
Corthésy states that
There is no homogeneity in how WIPO Member States treat with country
names in their national IP systems. There is no requirement in most WIPO
member states to have or make reference to a list of country names in their
examination of trade mark applications. Trade marks examiners will
usually be required to search various sources to determine whether the
application under review incorporates a country name. These include UN
databases, the WIPO database, national trade mark guidelines, gazettes
and dictionaries.769
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Corthésy, “Trade Marks, Country Names …”, supra note 762 at 303. Corthésy ultimately calls for “a
protection-based system that acknowledges that, in modern global trade, a country name has two pivotal
functions: the communication of the source of goods for consumer protection, and the communication of
the reputation of the quality associated with the nation brand to promote fair competition between
producers. This can only be achieved by devising a scheme to protect country names on both economic
and moral grounds. Perhaps the better view is that an image rights approach is a more pragmatic method of
realising this objective.” (citing to herself in Natalie Corthésy, “Brand New IP” supra note 761 at 336).
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She also notes both that “[t]he nexus between the distinctiveness of country names, and
their pervasive use in branding is evident”770 and that “[e]conomists assert that country
names can function as a brand.”771 Having said that “[t]he distinctiveness of a country
name (and all the cultural and qualitative values that it evokes) imbues it with undeniable
marketing value.”772 Corthésy has, on the other hand, conceded that “country names are
widely considered as geographic commons … [and] a number of economists do not
consider some country names as nation brands at all.”773
Corthésy goes on to observe that current “multilateral proposals for increased IP
protection of country names should contemplate safeguards for official names of States as
distinct from nation brands, as well as rules related co-branding and country of origin
labelling”.774 She notes, publishing in 2021, that there is present, in international circles,
“a request for the WIPO General Assembly to adopt a workable mechanism that will
implement a higher threshold of protection for country names”.775
Later in Corthésy’s article, she states that
The Paris Convention was not intended to regulate or protect the
sovereign personality of its signatories: neither the exclusive right of a
State to its name and reputation nor the quasi-property right of a State to
determine criteria for co-branding its name in commerce [but]…[i]f it
decided that the function of country names has expanded beyond its
communication function as an indication of source to prevent unfair
competition, surpassed its quality function as an appellation of origin
guaranteeing geographic place reputation, exceeded its value multiplier
function as a geographical indication that protects evocative value of the
geographic name, and now embodies a novel national competitive identity
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function, consideration should be given to adopting policies related to IP
protection of country names to address new and emerging paradigms.776

Section 9 of Canada's Trademarks Act does not include protection of country names.
(c) Canada’s implementation of its international obligations
The provisions of Section 9 of Canada’s Trademarks Act that deal with
international matters to which an international treaty or agreement could apply are (as set
out above):
(g) the emblem of the Red Crescent on a white ground adopted for the
same purpose as specified in paragraph (f) [paragraph (f) addressing
the Red Cross];
(g.1) the third Protocol emblem — commonly known as the “Red Crystal”
— referred to in Article 2, paragraph 2 of Schedule VII to the Geneva
Conventions Act and composed of a red frame in the shape of a
square on edge on a white ground, adopted for the same purpose as
specified in paragraph (f) [paragraph (f) addressing the Red Cross];
(h) the equivalent sign of the Red Lion and Sun used by Iran for the same
purpose as specified in paragraph (f) [[paragraph (f) addressing the
Red Cross];
(h.1) the international distinctive sign of civil defence (equilateral blue
triangle on an orange ground) referred to in Article 66, paragraph 4 of
Schedule V to the Geneva Conventions Act;
(i) any territorial or civic flag or any national, territorial or civic arms,
crest or emblem, of a country of the Union, if the flag, arms, crest or
emblem is on a list communicated under article 6ter of the
Convention or pursuant to the obligations under the Agreement on
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set out in Annex
1C to the WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the
Registrar gives public notice of the communication;
(i.1) any official sign or hallmark indicating control or warranty adopted
by a country of the Union, if the sign or hallmark is on a list
communicated under article 6ter of the Convention or pursuant to
the obligations under Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the WTO

776

Ibid at 363.

188
Agreement stemming from that article, and the Registrar gives public
notice of the communication;
(i.2) any national flag of a country of the Union;
(i.3) any armorial bearing, flag or other emblem, or the name or any
abbreviation of the name, of an international intergovernmental
organization, if the armorial bearing, flag, emblem, name or
abbreviation is on a list communicated under article 6ter of the
Convention or pursuant to the obligations under the Agreement on
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set out in Annex
1C to the WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the
Registrar gives public notice of the communication;
(m) the words “United Nations” or the official seal or emblem of the
United Nations.
Procedurally, as noted by Natalie Corthésy, an international consensus was
reached in 1967 “that each contracting State should be required to elaborate a list of
insignias of sovereignty for which they seek protection and give notice to the
international bureau, the WIPO.”777
Member states of the World Trade Organization [WTO] are required to observe
Article 6ter of the Paris Convention (at the 1967 level), even if they are not members of
the Paris Union. This requirement for WTO members arises through Article 2.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement778: “In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement, Members shall
comply with Articles 1 through 12 [which, of course, includes Article 6ter], and Article
19, of the Paris Convention (1967)”. Article 2.2 of TRIPS continues: “Nothing in Parts I
to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that members may have
to each other under the Paris Convention…”
When the multilateral TRIPS Agreement was being negotiated, an Agreement
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was concluded between the public international World Intellectual Property Organization
and the nascent World Trade Organization, “Agreement Between the World Intellectual
Property Organization and the World Trade Organization (1995)”. Article 3 of this
agreement deals with “Implementation of Article 6ter of the Paris Agreement for the
Purposes of the TRIPS Agreement.” Article 3 consists of three subsections, the effect of
which are, as the WTO advises, that “[t]he International Bureau of WIPO administers the
communication procedures under Article 6ter for the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement
in accordance with the procedure applicable under Article 6ter of the Paris Convention
(1967).”779
In 2009, WIPO decided that the
The reciprocal communication through the intermediary of the
International Bureau, under Article 6ter (3)(a) and (b) of the Paris
Convention …of signs for which protection under Article 6ter (1)(a) and
(b) is requested will be made through a semi-annual publication, in an
electronic database one the website of [WIPO].780
As the WTO notes “[a]fter the TRIPS Agreement entered into force, notifications
made under Article 6ter of the Paris Convention became effective under the agreement
for all WTO members whether they were parties to the Paris Convention or not.”781
Canada’s Trademarks Act, in subsections 9(1)(i), 9(1)(i.1) and 9(1)(i.3), refer

WTO, “Procedures for Notifying and Sharing Information: State Emblems”, online:
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specifically to both Article 6ter of the Paris Convention782 and the obligations for the
members of the Union arising from the TRIPS Agreement:783
9 (1) No person shall adopt in connection with a business, as a trade-mark
or otherwise, any mark consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be
likely to be mistaken for,
(i) any territorial or civic flag or any national, territorial or civic
arms, crest or emblem, of a country of the Union, if the flag, arms,
crest or emblem is on a list communicated under article 6ter of
the Convention or pursuant to the obligations under the
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights set out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement stemming
from that article, and the Registrar gives public notice of the
communication [emphasis added];
(i.1) any official sign or hallmark indicating control or warranty
adopted by a country of the Union, if the sign or hallmark is on a
list communicated under article 6ter of the Convention or
pursuant to the obligations under the Agreement on Traderelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set out in Annex
1C to the WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the
Registrar gives public notice of the communication [emphasis
added];
(i.3) any armorial bearing, flag or other emblem, or the name or
any abbreviation of the name, of an international
intergovernmental organization, if the armorial bearing, flag,
emblem, name or abbreviation is on a list communicated under
article 6ter of the Convention or pursuant to the obligations
under the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement
stemming from that article, and the Registrar gives public notice
of the communication [emphasis added].
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D - Justice Mactavish’s Taxonomy of Prohibited Marks
In the 2005 Canada Post Corporation v United States Postal Service decision,784
Justice Mactavish proposed a conceptual grouping of prohibited marks785 as follows:
[53] In this regard, it appears that the provisions of subsection 9(1) can be
grouped into four categories:
1. Provisions preventing use of a specific mark or symbol…
2. Provisions that Parliament clearly intended to have application
to foreign entities…
3. Provisions that Parliament intended to have apply only to
Canadian entities…
4. Provisions intended to apply to any entity regardless of
location…
In her judgment, Justice Mactavish, at para 53, lists the four categories set out
above and then cites to provisions of Section 9 of the Trademarks Act as examples of
each of the four categories she has identified. Taken together, the categories and
subsections of Section 9 to which Justice Mactavish cited as examples are set out below
in Table 4. For whatever reason, Justice Mactavish did not include the following
subsection of Section 9786 amongst her examples:
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Justice Mactavish wrote, at paragraph 53, In this regard, it appears that the provisions of subsection 9(1)
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(d) any word or symbol likely to lead to the belief that the goods or
services in association with which it is used have received, or are
produced, sold or performed under, royal, vice-regal or governmental
patronage, approval or authority;

Table 4: Justice Mactavish's Taxonomy of Prohibited Marks, Section 9 of the
Trademarks Act
I - Provisions Preventing Use of a Specific Mark or Symbol
(a) the Royal Arms, Crest or Standard;
(b) the arms or crest of any member of the Royal Family;
(c) the standard, arms or crest of His Excellency the Governor General;
(f) the emblem of the Red Cross on a white ground, formed by reversing the federal colours of
Switzerland and retained by the Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims of 1949 as the
emblem and distinctive sign of the Medical Service of armed forces and used by the Canadian Red Cross
Society, or the expression “Red Cross” or “Geneva Cross”;
(g) the emblem of the Red Crescent on a white ground adopted for the same purpose as specified in
paragraph (f);
(h) the equivalent sign of the Red Lion and Sun used by Iran for the same purpose as specified in
paragraph (f);
(h.1) the international distinctive sign of civil defence (equilateral blue triangle on an orange ground)
referred to in Article 66, paragraph 4 of Schedule V to the Geneva Conventions Act;
(j) any scandalous, obscene or immoral word or device;
(k) any matter that may falsely suggest a connection with any living individual;
(l) the portrait or signature of any individual who is living or has died within the preceding thirty years;
(m) the words “United Nations” or the official seal or emblem of the United Nations.
II - Provisions Applying to Foreign Entities
(i) any territorial or civic flag or any national, territorial or civic arms, crest or emblem, of a country of
the Union, if the flag, arms, crest or emblem is on a list communicated under article 6ter of the
Convention or pursuant to the obligations under the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the
Registrar gives public notice of the communication;
(i.1) any official sign or hallmark indicating control or warranty adopted by a country of the Union, if
the sign or hallmark is on a list communicated under article 6ter of the Convention or pursuant to the
obligations under the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set out in
Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the Registrar gives public notice of
the communication;
(i.2) any national flag of a country of the Union;
(i.3) any armorial bearing, flag or other emblem, or the name or any abbreviation of the name, of an
international intergovernmental organization, if the armorial bearing, flag, emblem, name or
abbreviation is on a list communicated under article 6ter of the Convention or pursuant to the obligations
under the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the
WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the Registrar gives public notice of the
communication;
III - Provisions Applying Only to Canadian Entities

the third Protocol emblem – commonly known as the “Red Crystal” – referred to in Article 2,
paragraph 2 of Schedule VII to the Geneva Conventions Act and composed of a red frame in the
shape of a square on edge on a white background, adopted for the same purpose as specified in
paragraph (f).
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(e) the arms, crest or flag adopted and used at any time by Canada or by any province or municipal
corporation in Canada in respect of which the Registrar has, at the request of the Government of Canada
or of the province or municipal corporation concerned, given public notice of its adoption and use;
(n) (1) Any badge, crest, emblem or mark
(i) adopted or used by any of Her Majesty’s Forces as defined in the National Defence Act
(n) (1) Any badge, crest, emblem or mark
(iii) adopted and used by any public authority, in Canada as an official mark for goods or services, in
respect of which the Registrar has, at the request of Her Majesty or of the university or public authority,
as the case may be, given public notice of its adoption and use;
(n.1) any armorial bearings granted, recorded or approved for use by a recipient pursuant to the
prerogative powers of Her Majesty as exercised by the Governor General in respect of the granting of
armorial bearings, if the Registrar has, at the request of the Governor General, given public notice of the
grant, recording or approval;
(o) the name “Royal Canadian Mounted Police” or “R.C.M.P.” or any other combination of letters
relating to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or any pictorial representation of a uniformed member
thereof.
IV - Provision Intended to Apply to any Entity Regardless of Location
(n) (ii) any badge, crest, emblem or mark …(ii) of any university

Justice Mactavish does not explain her categorization in her judgment: by inspection,
it does not appear that the categorizing factor through which she created her taxonomy
could relate to reputation.
The litigation arose because Canada Post Corporation had applied to the Federal
Court for judicial review of the Registrar of Trade-marks’ decisions “to give public
notice of the adoption and use of 13 official marks by the United States Postal
Service”.787 Justice Mactavish held that s 9(1)(n)(iii) does require that a public authority
be a Canadian public authority – and set aside decisions of the Registrar to give public
notice of the adoption and use of the marks of the United States Postal Service.788 On
appeal from Justice Mactavish’s judgment, the Ontario Court of Appeal again found
unanimously (Justice Sharlow for himself and Justices Nadon and Sexton) for Canada
Post, in one paragraph:
We are all of the view that this Appeal must be dismissed… to be a
‘public authority’ within the meaning of subparagraph 9(1)(n)(iii)… an
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entity must be subject to government control and must engage in activities
that benefit the public. In our view, to fulfil the intention of Parliament,
the government exercising the control must be a Canadian government.
We are not persuaded that this interpretation of the statute offends the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property or the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 789

E - Olympics and Litigation Involving the Prohibited Marks Legislation
A considerable number of cases regarding the courts’ interpretations of "public
authority" under subsection 9(1)(n)(iii) have involved the Canadian Olympic Association.
The cases Techniquip Ltd v Canadian Olympic Assn, 1999 CanLII 8993(FCA),
Canadian Olympic Assn. v Konica Canada Inc, (C.A.) 1991 CanLII 8363 (FCA), [1992]
1 FC 797, and Canadian Olympic Assn. v Gym Tonic Ltd. (1988), 19 CIPR 127 (Fed.
T.D.) are just a few of many.
In connection with the 1988 Calgary Olympics, a case arose, Canadian Olympic
Assn v Hipson (1987) 15 CIPR 99 (Alta QB), in which the Canadian Olympic Assn (a
public authority) was able to rely on s 9(1)(e). Since 2007, however, matters in Canada
“respecting the protection of marks related to the Olympic Games and the Paralympic
Games and protection against certain misleading business associations …”790 have been
dealt with through a specific federal enactment: the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act,
SC 2007, c 25, which has been amended by SC 2014 c 20 and c 32, and by SC 2017 c 6.
This legislation deals with prohibited marks. The term “reputation” does not appear
anywhere in the statute.
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F - Concluding Remarks on Reputation as Implied in Prohibited Marks
The term “reputation” does not appear in any of the provisions of section 9 of the
Trademarks Act. However, the historical and social significance of all the individuals
and institutions listed as bearers of symbols protected by prohibited marks legislation
indicate reputation as an inseparable characteristic of their existence (e.g., the arms or
crest of any member of the Royal Family (s 9(1)(b)), or the standard, arms or crest of Her
Excellency the Governor General (s 9(1)(c)); the emblem of the Red Cross (s 9(1)(m))
the words "United Nations" or the official seal or emblem of the United Nations (s
9(1)(m)); the name "Royal Canadian Mounted Police" or "R.C.M.P." (s 9(1)(o)).
Certain of the provisions of Section 9 contain language that appears to broadcast
the connection of the provision with the concept of “reputation”. As Teresa Scassa notes,
in reference to subsections 9(1)(a), 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(c), "the use of words ‘royal’ or
‘crown’ will be allowed in trademarks so long as there is no likelihood that the public
will believe there has been royal endorsement or approval."791 Inverting her statement, it
can be seen that if the public believes that there has been royal endorsement or approval
where there has not, it could bring the reputations of the royal persons involved in
subsections (a) and (b) and Her Excellency the Governor General (in subsection (c)) into
disrepute. In addition to subsection 9(1)(a), (b), and (c), it appears clear that reputation is
directly involved in consideration of the following subsections of Section 9:
•
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subsection (d), “any word or symbol likely to lead to the belief that the
goods or services in association with which it is used have received, or
are produced, sold or performed under, royal, vice-regal or
governmental patronage, approval or authority [emphasis added]”
focuses directly on the reputations of “royal, vice-regal or

Scassa, supra note 21 (Ch 4 “Prohibited Marks”) at 204.
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governmental” individuals;
•

subsection (k), “any matter that may falsely suggest a connection with
any living individual”: this language is very similar to language found
in defamation cases and moral rights legislation and cases
(particularly, in the case of moral rights, in connection with the right of
paternity) – Johnny Carson’s reputation helped defeat an application to
register a trademark “HERE’S JOHNNY” on the ground that to do so
would violate s 9(1)(k) (Carson v Reynolds (1980), 49 CPR(2d) 57
(Fed. T.D.) – and in Baron Philippe de Rothschild SA v Casa de
Habana Inc (1987), 17 CIPR 185 (Ont HC), the Court held the Casa
de Habana could not use “Rothschild” as a trademark or tradename
because the name would give the impression to the public that the
establishment was prestigious, through a connection with a living
individual: use of the name was found to be grossly improper even
without proof of actual injury or damage;

•

subsection 9(l) “in connection with a business, as a trade-mark or
otherwise, any mark consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be
likely to be mistaken for the portrait or signature of any individual who
is living or has died within the preceding thirty years”.

The language of “likely to believe”, emphasized above in the quotation of s 9(1)(d) is
very close to the language of defamation litigation, as described in Chapter 3.
Although not explicitly articulated, ‘reputation’ has been demonstrated in this
chapter as a pre-existing element that has led historically to these prohibited marks being
protected under the Trademarks Act. The answer to the first part of the question set out at
the beginning of this chapter is that the concept of reputation is, indeed, involved in
Canada's prohibited marks.
The answer to the second part of the question is explained as follows. In Canada's
Trademarks Act, the protection of prohibited marks is legislated as an exception to
trademark protection. In addition to being non-tradeable, non-transferable, and nonlicensable (and thus inalienable), these marks should not be characterized as classic
intellectual property (like trademarks). As noted early in this chapter, prohibited marks
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are not involved in the “trademark bargain” whereby trademark owners and their assigns
enjoy the legal protection of trademark (keeping others from using the mark in
association with given products or services) for however long the public understands that
mark as representing the goods or services of the trademark holder.792 The protection of
the symbols protected under Section 9 is perpetual.
Although the word “reputation” does not appear in Section 9 of the Trademarks
Act, in legislating marks into Section 9, as this chapter has demonstrated, Parliament has
recognized the inherent value of reputation to the holders of these marks – and has
legislated to protect it, by making these marks. In some cases, this recognition of the
inherent value of a mark’s reputation is recognition that Parliament has legislated – but,
as has been demonstrated, in a number of the categories listed in Section 9, Canada’s
recognition of an inherent reputation has been at least reinforced, if not dictated, by
Canada’s participation in the World Intellectual Property Organization (acting on behalf
of both the Paris Convention and the World Trade Organization).
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See again Wilkinson, "What is the Role of New Technologies” supra note 62. Wilkinson writes (at p 14)
that
once individual and corporate interests were separated during the nineteenth century – and
diverged even more during the twentieth – the concept of “balance” in intellectual property needed
to be reconceptualized in terms of “balancing” three sets of interests: those of individuals (as it is
undeniably individuals cognitive activity which produces creativity and innovation), those of
corporations (which have come to dominate in terms of both ownership … and influence upon
economies), and that of the public.
Wilkinson points out, earlier in the chapter (at p 9) that
[u]p until the mid-nineteenth century, when modern separation of a corporation from its owners
occurred, inventors, authors and creators were exclusively individuals, who, in turn, could only
engage in business with other individuals – and a business’s goodwill was only the goodwill of the
individual or individuals operating it.
Citing to France’s Manufacture and Goods Mark Act of 1857, she points (at pp 12-13) to the fact that
“legal recognition of trademarks occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, roughly concurrent with the
emergence of the legal device of the corporation” and notes that “[c]oincidentally, the original … Paris
[Convention] 1883… appear[ed] either before or just simultaneous with the beginnings of recognition of
corporations as separate persons in law (1886 in American courts, 1897 in British…).” (All footnotes have
been omitted).
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This demonstrates that the value of reputation captured by the provisions of
Section 9 of Canada’s Trademarks Act that are echoed in the Paris Convention is a shared
value across virtually every nation state on the globe.
Unlike reputation in moral rights as seen in Chapter 4, in this chapter, exploring
reputation in prohibited marks - there is no articulation of the term reputation in Section 9
of Canada's Trademarks Act. However, as seen in this chapter, Parliament has recognized
the inherent value of reputation to the holders of symbols listed in Section 9 of the
trademark statute. It is noteworthy that the progenitors of the 1883 Paris Convention
protected prohibited marks from commercialization even as they were creating an
international structure for trademark.
The context of prohibited marks in the Trademarks Act is not dissimilar to the
context of the moral rights in the Copyright Act. Neither prohibited marks nor moral
rights are tradable, licensable or transferable rights (whereas both copyright and
trademarks are).
Both moral rights and prohibited marks clearly involve reputation, albeit at
different stages.
The reputations protected in prohibited marks are reputations Parliament
recognized before legislating the prohibited marks, but the reputations connected with
moral rights must be proven when asserting the moral rights.
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CHAPTER 6 - REPUTATION AS EXPRESSED IN THE CANADIAN
LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS

The findings from the previous two chapters (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) have
shown that there are similarities between moral rights in the Copyright Act and prohibited
marks in the Trademarks Act: particularly, that, although reputation in prohibited marks
is differently demonstrated (being recognized by Parliament before these marks are
legislated), reputation is the concept that links prohibited marks to moral rights because
the concept of reputation is also expressed in moral rights (reputation being identified
directly in moral rights enactment). Jurisprudence regarding reputation, however, is
scarce for prohibited marks just as it is for moral rights.
This chapter will analyze the concept of reputation in geographical indications. It
will also consider whether the concept of reputation inherent in defamation law can in
any way assist with understanding the concept of reputation in geographical indications.
A – The Arrival of Geographical Indications in International Law
(a) The origin of the term
Article 1(2) of the original 1883 Paris Convention notes
The protection of industrial property has as its object patents, utility
models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names,
indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of
unfair competition [emphasis added].
However, despite inclusion of “indications of source” and “appellations of origin” in the
list of the objects of industrial property, the 1883 Paris Convention did not include any
provisions related to the governance of indications of source or appellations of origin.
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The concepts of indications of source and appellations of origin had been
emerging in Europe (and, particularly, in France) since the eighteenth century.793
Particularly in the case of the initial French preoccupation with protecting “Champagne”
through legislation in the nineteenth century, Dev Gangjee has noted that “[r]eputation
and quality were not central to the enquiry”794—“the initial emphasis [was] on physical
geography in wine regulation systems.”795
The name Champagne (a wine region in France) and wines produced from the
specific type of grapes grown in the Champagne region have been legally protected in the
countries of Europe since the 1891 Madrid Treaty.796 Article 1 of the Madrid Treaty says
that "[a]ll goods bearing a false or deceptive indication by which one of the countries to
793

Dev Gangjee. Relocating the Law of Geographical Indications. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012, “The Appellation of Origin in France”
794

Ibid at 97.
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Ibid at 125.
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Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source of Goods, 14 April
1891, (Act revised at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on June
2, 1934, and at Lisbon on October 31, 1958) [Madrid Agreement], online:
<https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/286776>. The 1891 Madrid Agreement came only eight years after the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883 (later revised at Brussels on
December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on
June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967). Since the inception of the
Madrid Agreement, the term "indication of source" has appeared in Article 10.1 and has remained almost
unchanged into the latest 1967 Stockholm revision of the Paris Convention, which reads as follows:
Article 10 [False Indications: Seizure, on Importation, etc., of Goods Bearing False Indications as
to their Source or the Identity of the Producer]:
(1) The provisions of the preceding Article shall apply in cases of direct or indirect use of a false
indication of the source of the goods or the identity of the producer, manufacturer, or merchant.
(2) Any producer, manufacturer, or merchant, whether a natural person or a legal entity, engaged
in the production or manufacture of or trade in such goods and established either in the locality
falsely indicated as the source, or in the region where such locality is situated, or in the country
falsely indicated, or in the country where the false indication of source is used, shall in any case
be deemed an interested party. [emphasis added]
It was through in the 1925 Hague revision of the Paris Convention that, in Article 1(1)(2), the phrase
"indications of source or appellations of origin" appeared for the first time. In the latest 1967 Stockholm
Revision of the Paris Convention, it reads as follows:
Article 1(1)(2) The protection of industrial property has as its object patents, utility models,
industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of
origin, and the repression of unfair competition.
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which this Agreement applies, or a place situated therein, is directly or indirectly
indicated as being the country or place of origin shall be seized on importation into any
of the said countries"797 [emphasis added]. Standards defining the quality of wine
production and marking the zone of the Champagne region were further regulated by
French laws in the twentieth century, which led to the establishment of the principle of
Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée (AOC) and the establishment of the Institut national de
l’origine et de la qualité (INAO) (which regulates and controls the origin and quality of
the Champagne wine to this day).
The opening paragraph of a case brought before the Trademarks Opposition
Board of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO)798 notes that
[t]he Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité (INAO) is a French
government agency that has for responsibility,… to define the controlled
designations of origin (appellation d’origine contrôlée (AOC))…[while]
the Comité interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne (CIVC) is a French
organization … of the Champagne winemaking region in France and has
for mission … to insure the recognition and the protection around the
world of the Champagne controlled designation of origin … including
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Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source of Goods, (14 April
1891, last revised 31 October 1958) [Madrid Agreement] art 1(1). Article 1 reads:
(1) All goods bearing a false or deceptive indication by which one of the countries to which this
Agreement applies, or a place situated therein, is directly or indirectly indicated as being the
country or place of origin shall be seized on importation into any of the said countries.
(2) Seizure shall also be effected in the country where the false or deceptive indication of source
has been applied, or into which the goods bearing the false or deceptive indication have been
imported.
(3) If the laws of a country do not permit seizure upon importation, such seizure shall be replaced
by prohibition of importation.
(4) If the laws of a country permit neither seizure upon importation nor prohibition of importation
nor seizure within the country, then, until such time as the laws are modified accordingly,
those measures shall be replaced by the actions and remedies available in such cases to
nationals under the laws of such country.
(5) In the absence of any special sanctions ensuring the repression of false or deceptive
indications of source, the sanctions provided by the corresponding provisions of the laws
relating to marks or trade names shall be applicable. [emphasis added].
Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité and Comité interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne v
Sugarfina, Inc., 2021 TMOB [Trademarks Opposition Board] 238. [INAO v Sugarfina].
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the requirements that these wines meet … their geographical origin and
conditions of production.799 [emphasis added]
In addition to geography, Gangjee notes a “gradual recognition of human factors”800
including recognition that “historic ties serve as an anchor [but] … the emphasis on
human intervention and methods of production implies that tools and techniques can
migrate, perhaps with perfect fidelity.”801
The legal protection of the "appellation of origin" that began in France led
eventually to the internationally recognized protection of "geographical indications" at
the end of the twentieth century under the TRIPS Agreement.802
Part II of the TRIPS Agreement (Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope
and Use of Intellectual Property Rights) contains a discrete section, Section 3 (comprised
of articles 22, 23 and 24) dealing with geographical indications.803
Section 3 begins with Article 22: Protection of Geographical Indications. Its first
subsection provides the first definition of “geographical indications” in any multilateral
international instrument. Article 22(1) reads as follows:
Geographical indications are, for the purposes of this Agreement,
indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a
Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to
its geographical origin. 804 [emphasis added]
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Ibid at para 1.
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Gangjee, Relocating the Law…, supra note 793 at 125.
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Ibid.
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TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9.
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TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, arts 22-24.
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Ibid, art 22(1) [emphasis added].
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This definition does not impose any legal obligation upon member states. It is Article 23
that requires TRIPS member states to legally regulate protection of geographical
indications – and only geographical indications specific to wines and spirits:
[e]ach Member shall provide the legal means ... to prevent use of a
geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in the
place indicated by the geographical indication in question … even where
the true origin of the goods is indicated or the geographical indication is
used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as "kind", "type",
"style", "imitation" or the like.805

Irene Calboli has noted, however,
TRIPs’ inclusion of the word “reputation” in the definition of art.22(1)
clearly validated not only the trend of products not entirely made in the
GI-denominated regions, but also the possibility of securing a monopoly
on the exploitation of the value of the reputation associated with GIs
on a commercial scale. Not surprisingly, in an increasingly competitive
(and less subsidised) marketplace for both agricultural and nonagricultural products, the value of GIs as signifiers of quality, tradition,
and, in turn, reputation, can be paramount to securing a large market share
against competing products.806 [emphasis added]
The subsequent and final article dealing with geographical indications (Article 24)
is titled “International Negotiations: Exceptions”. Its first paragraph states "[m]embers
agree to enter into negotiations to increase the protection of individual geographical
indications under Article 23. …”.
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Ibid, art 23.1.

Irene Calboli, “In Territorio Veritas? Bringing Geographical Coherence into the Ambiguous Definition
of Geographical Indications Origin” (2014) 6:1 WIPO Journal 6:1 57 at 67 [emphasis added]. She goes on
to note, at 67, however, that “This status quo, however, runs directly against the rationale for GI
protection—providing accurate information to consumers about the geographical origin of the products,
while offering incentives to local communities to invest in local production."
806
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(b) Beyond wines and spirits
The question of expansion of geographical indications beyond wines and spirits
led to one of the longest international negotiations that took place during the formation of
the World Trade Organization, a round of negotiations known as the Doha Round.807
These negotiations over the expansion of geographical indications were described as an
“Old World – New World” contest between the "Old World" countries of Europe, with
centuries long traditions (especially in wine making), and the "New World" countries
relatively new to wine making, such as Canada, the United States, and Australia but also
New Zealand, Argentina, Chile and South Africa.808
Some countries, particularly an enthusiastic group of "Old World" countries,
insisted any expansion of geographical indications be also regulated to a ‘higher level of
protection’ than was already the case with wines and spirits.809
The Doha Round810 did advance the agenda on geographical indications to
exploring possibilities for creating an internationally acceptable common approach to
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See The Doha Round Texts and Related Documents (Geneva: WTO, 2009), online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/doha_round_texts_e.pdf>.
In this research, the “Old World” term generally refers to Europe. It is used in conversation about ‘Old
World’ – ‘New World’ contest relevant in making decisions about granting the geographical indications
protection domestically and in international negotiations. For example, Europe is a natural adopter of
geographical indications because of its long history, while, on the other hand, ‘New World’ countries are
relatively new to wine making that has been known for centuries in the countries of the ‘Old World’. The
discussion about “Old World” – “New World” has been discussed in Sara Zborovski & Patrick Duke,
"Shining a Light on the Protection of Geographic Indications in Canada: The Battle Between GIS and
Generic Terms" (2013) 29:2 CIPR 201; also addressed in Loucks, Trademarks and Geographical
Indications, supra note 27; and in Michele Ballagh, "Geographical Indications Versus Trade-Marks:
Collective Versus Private Rights?" (2009) 25:1 CIPR 137 at 143.
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World Trade Organization, TRIPS-Geographical Indications: Background and the Current Situation.
Extending the “Higher Level of Protection” Beyond Wines and Spirits (2008) online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm>.
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The Doha Ministerial Declaration adopted 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 in The Doha
Round Texts and Related Documents (Geneva: WTO, 2009) at para 18, at 27 [Doha Round]
Paragraph 18 reads as follows:
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regulating various “foodstuff”811 (in addition to the already established protection for
selected wines and spirits, predominantly from wine regions across Europe).
Eventually, negotiations focused on creating a multilateral register for the
geographical indications for wines and spirits (already protected in the TRIPS
Agreement, Article 23) were separated from tnegotiations with respect to extending the
TRIPS Agreement of geographical indications beyond wines and spirits to encompassing
food and agricultural products.812
The initiative to add required geographical indication protection for food and
agricultural products into the TRIPS Agreement came from Europe, the birthplace of
“appellation of origin.”813 The concept of appellation of origin is analogous in some ways
to the concept of geographical indication: international protection of appellations of
origin predates protection of geographical indications: the Lisbon Agreement for the
Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International Registration, was, as noted

18. With a view to completing the work started in the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (Council for TRIPS) on the implementation of Article 23.4, we agree to
negotiate the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical
indications for wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference. We note that issues
related to the extension of the protection of geographical indications provided for in Article 23 to
products other than wines and spirits will be addressed in the Council for TRIPS pursuant to
paragraph 12 of this Declaration, online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/doha_round_texts_e.pdf> [emphasis added].
811

The term "foodstuff" appears in EU documents. See e.g., Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14
July 1992 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products
and foodstuffs.
The Doha Round Texts, supra note 807. “Multilateral register for wines and spirits.” (“The work began
in 1997 under Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement and now also comes under the Doha Agenda (the Doha
Declaration’s paragraph 18)”).
812
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A term defined in the 1958 Lisbon Agreement, supra note 78. There are currently thirty member
countries.
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in Chapter 1, agreed in 1958 but only entered into force, for its members, in 1983.814 As
noted above in Chapter 1, Canada has never been, and is still not, a member.815
The enthusiasm from European countries (but also other countries worldwide) in
the Doha Round to include in the TRIPS Agreement protection of geographical
indications beyond wines and spirits (i.e., for various agricultural products and food) was
understandable considering the production of handicrafts and various food and
agricultural products where centuries-long renown or renommé was directly associated
with the quality or reputation built upon the terroir of their origin. The idea of adding
appellations of origin to TRIPS was also supported by several developing and leastdeveloped countries.816 These countries viewed the expansion of geographical indications
as an opportunity, especially for their small food and agricultural producers, to seize a
valuable niche in the global market. These countries recognized that expanding the
protection of geographical indications beyond wines and spirits (especially in those
countries where wine making was not part of traditional culture) could become a
powerful instrument in securing a better position in international trade (through
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Although Canada is not signatory to the Lisbon Agreement, certain regulatory regimes analogous to the
type of protection protected under the Lisbon Agreement have been introduced by Canadian provinces.
Protection of ‘appellations’ for wines have been introduced by Ontario under its Vintners Quality Alliance
Act, 1999, SO 1999, c 3 (see VQA Ontario Appellations of Origin, online:
https://www.vqaontario.ca/Appellations) and by British Columbia under its Wines of Marked Quality
Regulation, BC Reg 168/2018, pursuant to the Food and Agricultural Products Classification Act, SBC
2016, c.1. In April 2022, Nova Scotia passed the Nova Scotia Wine Authority Act, SNS 2022, c 6. In
Québec, on the other hand, an appellation of origin for Québec wines has been secured by obtaining the
geographical indication “Vin du Québec”, listed in the Canadian government’s CIPO database (and thus
enforceable) as of 1 June 2022.
815
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See text at note 78.

The WTO recognizes as least-developed countries (LDCs) those countries which have been designated
as such by the United Nations. There are currently 49 least-developed countries on the UN list, 30 of which
to date have become WTO members, online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/brief_e/brief03_e.htm> [accessed 20 March
2022]
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acceptable and recognizable identification of their unique agricultural and food products),
therefore, creating a broader social and political space for them on the world map. In
most cases, least-developed countries already have traditional, predominantly agricultural
products having a "quality, reputation or other characteristic" attributable to the territory
of their origin. On the other hand, many of these least-developed countries lacked
adequate domestic regulatory instruments to protect those products even within their own
national boundaries. The lack of domestic legal instruments for protecting geographical
indications creates a considerable obstacle in preparing these products for competitive
global markets.817
(c) Old World versus New World
At a time when the least-developed countries were recognizing possibilities to
access global markets through an accessible, standardized geographical indications
registry, WTO member states with advanced economies, such as Canada, had a different
view on expanding geographical indications.818 Regardless of their advanced economies,
in terms of geographical indications, the countries of the "New World" could not respond
to the "Old World" with reciprocity in terms of a number of products capable of being
promoted for geographical indication protection.
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Envisioning the importance of the expansion of geographical indications for economic growth, cultural
development, and a way to reduce poverty, Uganda, for example, adopted The Geographical Indications
Act No 8 of 2013, a sui generis system for the protection and registration of geographical indications.
818

See e.g., Michelle Agdomar, "Removing the Greek from Feta and Adding Korbel to Champagne: The
Paradox of Geographical Indications in International Law" (2008) 18:2 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent
LJ 541 at 543.
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CETA819 provides an example of the disparity between a “New World” nation,
Canada, and the European Union's 28 “Old World” countries820: in Annex 20-A to
CETA, the 2017 trade agreement between Canada and European Union, Part A contains a
list of 172 products originating in the European Union, while part B, “Geographical
Indications Identifying a Product Originating in Canada” lists no products at all.821
WTO members like Canada, Australia and New Zealand opposed the proposal for
broader inclusion of products for inclusion as geographical indications in a revised
TRIPS Agreement that are already covered in the original TRIPS Agreement: these
countries saw the expansion of geographical indications protection beyond wines and
spirits as an administrative burden as well as a limitation on free production, export, and
trade.822
In the production of goods aspiring to geographical indications protection, the
balance between human input and a "quality, reputation or other characteristic"
originating in the specific geographic region (i.e., strictly tied to the nature-related
features of the locality) was another issue for the "New World" countries. Knowledge of
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CETA, supra note 94.
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The number of EU member countries is down to 27 since the United Kingdom left the EU in 2020.
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CETA, supra note 94, Annex 20-A, Part A-- Geographical Indications Identifying a Product Originating
in the European Union; Part B -- Geographical Indications Identifying a Product Originating in Canada,
online: <https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agracc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/20-A.aspx?lang=eng#a> This data reflects the number of products as they were at
the time the agreement was signed (in 2017): it is expected that these numbers will change as new products
are added to the two lists over time).
822

World Trade Organization, TRIPS-Geographical Indications: Background and the Current Situation.
Extending the "Higher Level of Protection" Beyond Wines and Spirits (2008) ("They caution that providing
enhanced protection would be a burden and would disrupt existing legitimate marketing practices. They
also reject the "usurping" accusation, particularly when migrants have taken the methods of making the
products and the names with them to their new homes and have been using them in good faith.”), online:
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm#protection >.
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production processes have been transferred from the Old World and recreated in "New
World" territories -- but geographical indications will not protect (indeed, will be a
barrier to) these products when emanating from the “New World.”823
While protection of geographical indications for wines and spirits was relatively
smoothly accepted worldwide through the TRIPS Agreement, global expansion of
geographical indication protection beyond wines and spirits has faltered. The lengthy
Doha Round of negotiations failed to secure widespread multilateral international
agreement on expanded geographical indications. International expansion of categories of
protection through geographical indications, at this point, has been limited to bilateral and
smaller multilateral free trade agreements between countries.824
Daniel Gervais noted, after geographical indications entered the TRIPS
Agreement but in light of the failure of a further attempt to enhance multilateral
geographical indication protection during negotiations for the Lisbon Agreement825, that
Reputation could be considered at first glance as a soft, subjective
criterion. However, it can be measured. Reputation is the result of years
of work in association with a product that has created a mental link
between that product and its geographical origin, but reputation is also a
cause that can be measured by its effects. For example, consumer surveys,
price differentials attributable to the perceived advantage of the product
because of its origin, etc. The other criteria mentioned in TRIPS Article
22.1 are “harder” and perhaps easier to prove, namely the quality and
(other) characteristics of the product itself. But even “quality” may be
defined in a number of ways according to a consumer’s priorities. In the
same vein, at least the selection of which (other) characteristics are
relevant may be subject to the same criticism. In other words, while all the
criteria mentioned in Article 22 are potentially partially “subjective,” they
can be considered by way of rational demonstration and comparative
Irene Calboli, “In Territorio Veritas? Bringing Geographical Coherence into the Ambiguous Definition
of Geographical Indications Origin” (2014) 6:1 WIPO Journal 57 at 59-60.
823
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See, for example, the Canada-Korea FTA, art 16.10.
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Supra note 78.
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analysis. Presumably, if potential buyers of a product want it because of a
quality or characteristic associated with it stem from its geographical
origin (whether the cause is human or natural factors or a combination of
both), then that product could be said to have a given reputation. The
difference in treatment of reputation between Lisbon and TRIPS would
then not be functionally different. [emphasis in original]826

B - Reputation in geographical indications in Canadian law
(a) In the Trademarks Act
In the light of its obligations arising from the TRIPS Agreement, Canada, in 1996,
amended its Trade-marks Act definition section (Section 2), to include, for the first time,
a definition of "geographical indications". That definition read as follows:
geographical indication means, in respect of a wine or spirit, an
indication that
(a) identifies the wine or spirit as originating in the territory of a
WTO Member, or a region or locality of that territory, where a
quality, reputation or other characteristic of the wine or spirit is
essentially attributable to its geographical origin, and
(b) except in the case of an indication identifying a wine or spirit
originating in Canada, is protected by the laws applicable to that
WTO Member. [emphasis added] 827
In the same amendment, the term "reputation" was added as part of new section
11.12(3)(e) of the Trade-marks Act:
(3) For the purpose of subsection (2), the statement by the Minister must
set out all of the following information in respect of an indication:

826

Daniel Gervais, "The Lisbon Agreement's Misunderstood Potential" (2009) 22:1 IPJ 57 at 61 [emphasis
in original].
827

Trade-marks Act, supra note 22, s 2 (1996-2012). The current text of this definition in s 2 is set out
below in the text a footnote 828.
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(e) the quality, reputation or other characteristic of the wine or
spirit that, in the opinion of the Minister, qualifies that indication
as a geographical indication. [emphasis added]828

While global multilateral international negotiations have failed since the TRIPS
Agreement to extend standards respecting geographical indications beyond those for
wines and spirits, the failure of those negotiations has not prevented WTO members from
entering into bilateral and multilateral agreements in which geographical indications
respecting food and other agricultural products have been agreed. The first step in this
direction for Canada was the 2014 Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement,829 followed by
CETA830.
In the Canada-Korea FTA, the term "reputation" appears only in the definition of
geographical indications (the text of that definition is almost identical to the definition of
geographical indications in the TRIPS Agreement).831 Article 16.10 of the Canada-Korea
FTA articulates further legal obligations regarding geographical indications for the
parties. It reads as follows:

1. Canada shall, with respect to the geographical indications of
“GoryeoHongsam”, “GoryeoBaeksam”, “GoryeoSusam”, and
“IcheonSsal” and their translations, respectively, “Korean Red
Ginseng”, “Korean White Ginseng”, “Korean Fresh Ginseng” and
“Icheon Rice”, provide the legal means for interested parties to
prevent

828

Trade-marks Act, supra note 22..

829

Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 93, art 16.10 "Protection of Geographical Indications”.

830

Supra note 93.

831

Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 93, art 16.10 Footnote 3: Geographical indications are, for the purposes
of this Article, indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Party, or a region or
locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially
attributable to its geographical origin." [emphasis added].
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(a) the use of any means in the designation or originates in a
geographical area other than the true place of origin in a manner
that misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the good;
(b) the use of any of these geographical indications for ginseng or
rice, as the case may be, that does not originate in the place
indicated by the geographical indication in question, even where
the true origin of the relevant good is indicated or the
geographical indication is used in translation or transcription or
accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”,
“imitation” or the like; and
(c) any other use that constitutes an act of unfair competition within
the meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.
2. Korea shall, with respect to the geographical indications of
“Canadian Whisky” and “Canadian Rye Whisky”, provide the legal
means for interested parties to prevent
(a) the use of any means in the designation or originates in a
geographical area other than the true place of origin in a manner
that misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the good;
(b) the use of any of these geographical indications for ginseng or
rice, as the case may be, that does not originate in the place
indicated by the geographical indication in question, even where
the true origin of the relevant good is indicated or the
geographical indication is used in translation or transcription or
accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”,
“imitation” or the like; and
(c) any other use that constitutes an act of unfair competition within
the meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.
[footnotes omitted] [emphasis added] 832

As a result of Canada-Korea FTA and CETA, Canada amended its Trade-marks
Act provisions respecting geographical indications. The definition of ‘geographical
indication’ was changed to the current definition:
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Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 93, art 16.10.
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geographical indication means an indication that identifies a wine or
spirit, or an agricultural product or food of a category set out in the
schedule, as originating in the territory of a WTO Member, or a region or
locality of that territory, if a quality, reputation or other characteristic of
the wine or spirit or the agricultural product or food is essentially
attributable to its geographical origin [emphasis added]833
This definition incorporates any "agricultural product or food of a category set out in the
schedule."834 The schedule currently consists of a list of 24 categories of food and
agricultural products.835
Section 11.12(3)(e) of the Trade-marks Act, quoted above as containing the term
"reputation", was amended, in light of the Canada-Korea FTA, to reflect the inclusion of
agricultural products and food. It now reads as follows:
(e) the quality, reputation or other characteristic of the wine or spirit or
the agricultural product or food that, in the Minister’s opinion,
qualifies that indication as a geographical indication [emphasis added]
As set out in the Canada-Korea FTA, Canada was required to protect a number of Korean
food products: a list was added in 2017 to the Trade-marks Act at s 11.23.836
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Trade-marks Act, supra note 22, s 2.

834

Ibid, Schedule, online: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/t-13/.

835

See online: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/t-13/.

836

Trademarks Act, supra note 22, s 11.23 (added by SC 2017, c 6, s 67):
Canada — Korea indications
Paragraphs 11.18(2)(a) and (c) and section 11.21 do not apply with respect to an indication
that is a protected geographical indication and that is included in the following list:
(a) GoryeoHongsam;
(b) GoryeoBaeksam;
(c) GoryeoSusam;
(d) IcheonSsal;
(e) ginseng rouge de Corée;
(f) ginseng blanc de Corée;
(g) ginseng frais de Corée;
(h) riz Icheon;
(i) Korean Red Ginseng;
(j) Korean White Ginseng;
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After Canada signed the Comprehensive Economic Agreement between the
European Union and Canada in 2016 (an agreement which entered into force in 2017),837
in addition to the list of 24 agricultural products and food categories already added to its
trademark statute following an earlier Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Canada
added 172 specific geographical indications identifying various categories of agricultural
products and food originating in the countries of European Union.838 The applicable
provision of the Canadian Trademarks Act (s 11.22) now states, however, that the list of
wines, spirits, agricultural products or foods from Korea whose geographical indications
are to be protected in Canada can be "amended from time to time."839
In CETA Chapter 20 Intellectual Property, Sub-section C – Geographical
Indications, Article 20.16 – Definitions, it is provided that
For the purposes of this Sub-section:
geographical indication means an indication which identifies an
agricultural product or foodstuff as originating in the territory of a Party,
or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation
or other characteristic of the product is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin; and product class means a product class listed in
Annex 20-C [emphasis added].840

(k) Korean Fresh Ginseng;
(l) Icheon Rice.
837

See again CETA, supra note 94, Annex 20-A, Part A- Geographical Indications Identifying a Product
Originating in the European Union; Part B - Geographical Indications Identifying a Product Originating in
Canada, online: <https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/20-A.aspx?lang=eng#a>
See Trade-marks Act, supra note 22, Schedule 6. As noted by Ed White (“ ‘Geographical indications’
can have mixed results’ https://www.producer.com/markets/geographical-indications-can-have-mixedresults/, May 27, 2021), “In the Canada-EU CETA deal, Canada accepted GIs for many European-based
foods, although it won an exception for existing Canadian feta cheese makers.”
838

839
840

Ibid, s 11.22.

CETA, supra note 94, Chapter 20: Intellectual property, Sub-section C -Geographical Indications, art
20.16.
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When Canada became a member of the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which came into effect 30 December
2018 and now comprises Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam, it took on, amongst many other things, an
obligation relating to geographical indications that, again, expressly links geographical
indications to reputation:
Chapter 18 – Intellectual Property
Section A: General Provisions
…
Article 18.1: Definitions
…
geographical indication means an indication that identifies a good as
originating in the territory of a Party, or a region or locality in that
territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the
good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin;841
Canada, Mexico and the United States have entered into CUSMA,842 which
includes “TRIPS-plus”843 provisions for geographical indications, including, in Section
A: General Provisions:
Article 20.1 Definitions
1. For the purposes of this Chapter: geographical indication means an
indication that identifies a good as originating in the territory of a Party,
or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality,
reputation, or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable
to its geographical origin [emphasis added] 844

841

Consolidated TPP Text -- Chapter 18- Intellectual Property, online:
<https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tppptp/text-texte/18.aspx?lang=eng>.
842

Supra note 102.

“TRIPS-Plus” is an informal term for protection of intellectual property rights that goes beyond the
requirements in the TRIPS Agreement.
843

844

Canada - United States - Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) 2020, Chapter 20 - Intellectual Property Rights Section A: General Provisions, art 20.1: Definitions
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When the United Kingdom left the European Union at the start of 2020, Canada
and the UK agreed by December 2020 to the Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity
Agreement, which entered into force on 1 April 2021.845 This Canada-UK agreement
incorporated the text of CETA and did not make any substantive changes to the
provisions already instantiated in the CETA.
None of these trade agreements to which Canada has become signatory since
TRIPS846 have required Canada to make any changes to its Trademarks Act that have had
any impact regarding the concept of reputation as already expressed in Canada's
geographical indications law.
(b) Protection of geographical indications
Canada protects geographical indications by applying numerous provisions of
its Trademarks Act. For example, section 11.12 empowers the Registrar to supervise the
list of geographical indications. It reads as follows:
11.12 (1) There shall be kept under the supervision of the Registrar a list
of geographical indications and, in the case of geographical indications
identifying an agricultural product or food, translations of those
indications.847
The prohibition against adopting geographical indications for wine and spirits "in
connection with a business, as a trademark or otherwise" is set out in section 11.14, and

845

Canada - UK Trade Continuity Agreement (Canada - UK TCA) <https://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cuktca-acccru/agreement_trade_continuityaccord_continuite_commerciale.aspx?lang=eng>
846

In addition to the Canada-Korea FTA, supra note 93, and CETA, discussed above, Canada has also
entered into the Canada - United States - Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), which entered into force 1 July
2020, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), entered
into force 30 December 2018.
847

Trademarks Act, supra note 22, s 11.12.
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the prohibition against adopting geographical indications for agricultural products and
food as trademarks is in section 11.15 of the Trademarks Act.848
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) is the government body that
processes a request849 that a geographical indication be entered on Canada's list of
geographical indications.850 Tesh Dagne indicated in 2016 that
[i]n Canada, there [had] not been significant initiative to use GIs as
instruments of marketing regional identity in agricultural production. In
recent years, however, the province of Québec has become a leader in the
use of GIs after it launched the produits du terroir initiative.851
On the CIPO website, a current search of the Canadian Trademarks Database for the
category "geographical indications" retrieved 867 entries (data current as of 23 March
2022.) Geographical indications for wines and spirits and agricultural and food products
were amongst those retrieved. A few entries were found to have "removed" status
notifications and others were in the process of "advertising". The full list of Canadian
geographical indications on Canada’s list of recognized geographical indications has only
twenty-seven entries on it.852

848

Trademarks Act, supra note 22, ss 11.14, 11.15.

849

Process to register a geographical indication is found on the CIPO website:
<https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr04244.html>.
850

For the list of geographical indications see online: <https://www.ic.gc.ca/cipo/listgiws.nsf/gimenueng?readForm>.
851

Tesh W Dagne, "The Narrowing Transatlantic Divide: Geographical Indications in Canada's Trade
Agreements" (2016) 10 European Review of Intellectual Property Law 598 at 609.
This list is the full list of geographical indications recognized in Canada – with the option to select the
list of Canada's geographical indications, online: <https://www.ic.gc.ca/cipo/listgiws.nsf/gimenueng?readform&sort=region&order=CA>.
852
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(c) Geographical indications in Canadian case law
Considering that geographical indications entered the Canadian intellectual
property legal environment relatively recently (first only for wines and spirits (following
the 1995 TRIPS Agreement), and even more recently following the 2014 Canada-Korea
Free Trade Agreement and the 2017 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
between Canada and the European Union), it may be understandable that litigated
disputes involving geographical indications appear to be scarce. 853
To register a geographical indication requires a "responsible authority" to apply
for registration directly to the Canadian Intellectual Property Office, which then
rigorously examines the application. It is not known how many details contained in those
applications are evidence of "reputation," mainly because the definition in
the Trademarks Act reads "if a quality, reputation or other characteristic of the wine
or spirit or the agricultural product or food is essentially attributable to its geographical
origin" [emphasis added]. 854 Because the requirement for registration is not simply for
"reputation" but is for "reputation or other characteristic”, it is not possible to isolate

853

Nonetheless, Renata Watkin, writing in the Intellectual Property Journal in 2018, proffers an interesting
constitutional argument based on the concept of “reputation” that is inherent in the protection of
geographical indications:
These constitutional issues permeate the process of identification and establishment of GIs. The
assessment of the ‘‘essentially attributable characteristics” of origin-specific products seems to fall
under provincial jurisdiction. Assessing reputation would arguably involve concurrent or
overlapping federal-provincial jurisdiction as both federal trademark law and the common law tort
of passing off protect reputation. Where a product’s renown is linked to a production method, the
determination as to whether the method itself is distinctive is a matter of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction.
See Renata Watkin, "Placing Canadian Geographical Indications on the Map" (2018) 30:2 IPJ 271 at 284.
854

Trademarks Act, supra note 22, s 2, “geographical indication”
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those applications which dealt with reputation from those that dealt with other
characteristics.
There appears to be little litigation concerning the prohibitions for the use of
geographical indications legislated in the Trademarks Act (sections 11.14 and 11.15).
There are, however, cases in which Canadian courts have denied trademark
registration to an applicant because the applicant was attempting to register (as a
trademark, not a geographical indication), a mark that included a protected geographical
indication. The case regarding the use of the term Champagne, Institut national de
l’origine et de la qualité and Comité interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne v
Sugarfina, Inc.,855 mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, is such a case:
[22] The Opponent submits that the Mark is clearly descriptive, in
English, of the character and/or quality of the applied-for goods because it
clearly describes bear-shaped candies that contain Champagne wine. In
this respect, the Opponent essentially argues that:
• Champagne wine has a considerable, if not legendary,
reputation which extends to comestible products and so even
when the word CHAMPAGNE is used in the context of such
products including those covered by the application for the
Mark, Canadian consumers would be aware that it is indicative
of a specific wine, with specific features, from a specific
geographical area, produced according to specific standards;
• The word BEAR(S) is descriptive of a mammal with a specific
silhouette and when it is used in association with candies
(including gummy candies), the word
• The Applicant's goods used in association with the Mark are in
fact bear-shaped candies ("gummy bears") having Champagne
wine as one of their ingredients.
…
Conclusion as to non-registrability

855

Supra note 798.
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[33] The Opponent has filed evidence showing that Champagne is a
controlled designation of origin (AOC) and a recently registered
geographical indication covering “wine”. It has also provided some
evidence of the fame of the alcoholic beverage Champagne. Hearsay
and deficiencies aside, I am satisfied that a fair review of the whole of
the Opponent’s evidence establishes that the average Canadian
consumer would be familiar with the word “champagne” being used
in respect of wine and would likely associate it to a sparkling wine
from the wine-making region of Champagne in France.
[34] That said, I am far from convinced that whatever reputation the
Opponent has established for Champagne wine in any way extends to
food products. Similarly, I cannot subscribe to the Applicant’s
contention that the evidence properly establishes the “commonness of
the word ‘champagne’ on third party food products”. Besides,
depending on the context, the word “champagne” nevertheless is and
can be used descriptively in association with same. In fact, from the
limited instances where the context of the third party uses of this term
can be inferred from the evidence, I note that it mostly appears in a
clearly descriptive sense to identify a food product’s component,
rather than as some kind of color or laudatory reference. I will shortly
come back to this point. [emphasis added]856

C - Conclusions From This Chapter
This chapter has demonstrated that reputation is involved in the concept of
geographical indications. It also establishes, though the case law on geographical
indications in Canada is very limited, that the concept of reputation as it is used in
defamation cases (discussed earlier in Chapter 3) is not related to the concept of
reputation as it is involved in litigation about geographical indications.
Melissa Loucks has pointed out, in Trademarks and Geographical Indications:
Conflict or Co-existence?, that geographical indications and trademarks “do not engage
the interests of the same types of parties nor accomplish the same business goals.”857 This

856

Ibid at para 34 [emphasis added].

857

Loucks, Trademarks and Geographical Indications, supra note 27 at 119.

221
thesis confirms the strict connection that a geographical indication must have with a
specific locality, a connection which separates the concept of geographical indication
from the concept of trademark: a trademark is a symbol that can theoretically become
identified with any good or service a proprietor chooses. The goals sought to be achieved
by trademark protection and geographical indication protection also differ: a geographical
indication application is required to have evidence of reputation (for quality or other
characteristics) before a geographical indication can be registered whereas a trademark
can be first registered and then, afterward, acquire reputation.
The term ‘geographical indication’ has a statutory definition, in the definition
section of the Trademarks Act: this distinguishes geographical indications from both
moral rights (although the term ‘moral right’ appears in the definition section of the
Copyright Act, Chapter 4 shows that it is not actually a definition of moral rights rather a
reference to moral rights sections in the Act) and prohibited marks (of which, as
established in Chapter 5, there exists no statutory definition). The definition of
geographical indication in the Trademarks Act is particularly important to this research
because it establishes clearly, in its inclusion of the term "reputation", the importance of
reputation to geographical indications.
In Chapter 4, this research established that, though both authors and performers
are involved with moral rights and copyright, moral rights and copyright differ
completely in the goals sought to be achieved. It is the moral rights which protect
reputation (and are not alienable). Similarly, in Chapter 5, this research established that
prohibited marks and trademark differ completely in the types of parties involved and the
goals sought to be achieved. Prohibited marks are inalienable and statutorily protected
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from being used in connection with trademarks because of the reputations of the entities
involved, whereas trademarks (which, unlike prohibited marks, are alienable) are legally
protected precisely in order to allow them to develop commercial value from any
reputation in the marketplace they can develop in connection with goods and services. In
this chapter, Chapter 6, it has been established that reputation is a foundational aspect of
protecting geographical indications.
The reputation involved with moral rights must be proven when asserting the
moral rights in court. The reputation involved with prohibited marks has been protected
by Parliament through inclusion in s 9 of the current Trademarks Act (as a mark which
cannot be used as a trademark). The interest protected by geographical indication
protection, as described in this Chapter 6, is the ongoing reputation arising from
connection to a given geography (and can involve physical, historical and social aspects
of geography).
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
This thesis began by asking the following overall question:
•

Does the concept of ‘reputation’ form a unique link bringing the
concepts of moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical
indications uniquely together?

The answer to this question, established through this research, is ‘yes.’
From this overarching question, three specific questions emerged:
1.

Is the concept of reputation involved in each of the moral rights,
prohibited marks and geographical indications?

2.

Can the concept of reputation in defamation law contribute to an
understanding of the concept of reputation involved in moral rights,
prohibited marks and geographical indications?

3.

Does the concept of reputation distinguish the moral rights, prohibited
marks and geographical indications from the classic triad in
intellectual property (copyright, patent and trademark)?

With respect to the first specific question, this research has established that yes,
indeed, the concept of ‘reputation’ forms a unique link between the moral rights,
prohibited marks and geographical indications which, in turn, uniquely identifies this
group of devices as a set.

While it may have been thought that the moral rights, because of their association
with authors and performers, were associated with people (in the same way that
reputation in defamation can be associated with individuals), moral rights only arise in
connection with works and performances, not directly with individuals. This is most
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clearly evidenced from the fact that the moral rights can outlast the lifetimes of their
authors and performers.
From this perspective, the “reputation” protected in the moral rights is not
dissimilar to the reputation involved in the prohibited marks, where the reputation
accrues to institutions, organizations, and nations -- and to individuals, but only to
individuals by virtue of their positions (and where individuals are protected by prohibited
marks, in the cases of both moral rights and prohibited marks is the position that is
protected: when the current individual protected by a prohibited mark leaves the role, the
positions do not end and will be filled by other individuals, who will then be protected in
the role; an individual has the benefit of moral rights protection only in the role of author
or performer, not in a personal capacity).

The reputation earned by businesses seeking the protection of geographical
indications is, like the reputations involved in the moral rights and the prohibited marks,
also inevitably a direct result of the efforts of the people involved (sometimes over
generations) with the products seeking geographical indications status, but, as in the cases
of both the moral rights and the prohibited marks, it is not the people directly that gain
the protection of geographical indications: it is the symbols of the origin of the goods or
services that gain geographical indications protection -- and then the goods and services
draw upon reputation through the association of the goods or services with the
geographical indication.

It is the connection between reputation and identity (reputation and works in the
case of the moral rights; reputation for protected positions and institutions in the case of
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prohibited marks; and reputations for identified products and services in the case of the
geographical indications) that, this thesis establishes, links moral rights, prohibited marks
and geographical indications together.

This thesis demonstrates that the connection with reputation in each of the cases
of moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical indications occurred at a different
point in the life cycle of the device of moral right, a prohibited mark, and a geographical
indication (as described in Chapters 4, 5 and 6), reputation (as ‘esteem’) has been
demonstrated to be critical to all three (moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical
indications).
For prohibited marks Parliament recognizes the reputational interest involved and
legislates the protection of the mark. On the other hand, for geographical indications
Parliament has legislated categories of products which may claim geographical
indications protection, but a producer must apply through an administrative process to get
geographical indication protection for any particular product. By contrast with prohibited
marks and geographical indications Parliament has legislated reputation into the moral
rights protection for authors and performers under the Copyright Act. Every author and
performer is entitled to the protection of their reputation but should any difficulty arise, it
is up to the author or performer to take recourse through an infringement action.
Therefore, all three have shared interests in the concept of reputation, a person protected
under prohibited marks, a person seeking geographical indication and an author or
performer enjoying moral rights protection will become engaged with reputation at
different stages. Nonetheless, in all three cases the meaning of reputation is the same: a
question of the esteem in which the person protected by prohibited marks is held, the
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esteem in which the geographical indication is held and the esteem in which an author or
performer is held.
All of the people and institutions protected by Canada’s prohibited marks
legislation858 are protected going forward (after being included in the prohibited marks
section of the Trademarks Act) from having use of their identities occur as trademarks in
connection with commercial enterprises, thus protecting their reputations. It is not
surprising, then, that, in the relatively small number of decisions that have resulted in
Canada from litigation over prohibited marks, reputation has not been an issue:
reputation has been a given in the litigation since it is brought under the current section 9
of the Trademarks Act, which, as noted above, has predetermined that the protected
person or institution has a reputation worthy of protection.

As demonstrated in chapter 6, reputation is a core concept in geographical
indications: there is no registration of a geographical indication without evidence
proving reputation being presented to the registering authority. In Canada, in including
an indication on the list of protected geographical indications in Canada under section
11.12, the required statement of the Minister must include information including

(e) the quality, reputation or other characteristic of the wine or spirit or
the agricultural product or food that, in the Minister’s opinion,
qualifies that indication as a geographical indication [emphasis added].

858

There is no criminal provision in Canadian law that relates to protection of prohibited marks.
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As noted in Chapter 6, the current list of geographical indications in Canada is extensive,
859

of which, as reported in Chapter 6, twenty-seven are listed for use with Canadian

products.860

Even though, as noted in Chapter 6, there has not been much litigation involving
geographical indications in Canada, it is clear from the legislation that an applicant can
provide evidence of reputation sufficient to support the awarding of geographical
indication protection in order to satisfy the federal Minister during the application process
and thus get a geographical indication added to the list. As described in Chapter 6, what
litigation involving geographical indications has been reported in Canada demonstrates
that discussion of reputation in the judgments is common.

With respect to the second specific question, about defamation law, this thesis
has found that the concept of reputation in defamation law cannot make any contribution.
The theoretical writing on reputation in defamation (explored in Chapter 2) cannot be
related to the role of reputation revealed in this research in connection with moral rights,
prohibited marks or geographical indications protection. The exploration of Canadian
defamation jurisprudence (in Chapter 3) has demonstrated, first, that the presence of
juries in Canadian defamation trials – and their unique role with respect to making
findings about reputation in defamation cases – makes analysis of how reputation is
determined in Canadian defamation in jury cases impossible because jury deliberations
are required to remain strictly confidential to the jury in each case. The comments about
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<https://www.ic.gc.ca/cipo/listgiws.nsf/gimenu-eng?readForm>. Note that the website itself appears to
indicate that this current list has been static since June 14, 2019.
860

<https://www.ic.gc.ca/cipo/listgiws.nsf/gimenu-eng?readform&sort=region&order=CA>.
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reputation made by judges at any level where a jury has been involved at trial must and
(as is seen in the discussion in Chapter 3) do remain wholly speculative and general.
However, in addition to demonstrating that there can be no evidence of the effect of
reputation in defamation cases tried by juries, this research has also established that, even
where judges sit alone (the less common occurrence in Canadian defamation litigation),
judges are not explicit in their judgments about their own factual findings about
reputation. Judges sitting alone have spoken speculatively and in general about reputation
in their reasons, just as judges were found to do in cases where juries were involved and
the role of deciding questions of reputation did not lie with the judges.

Substantively, this research has confirmed that there is a considerable body of
theoretical writing associated with defamation law – and, indeed, theoretical exploration
of the concept of reputation in defamation. In particular, a theoretical construct about
reputation as involving notions of property, honour and dignity as aspects of reputation in
defamation has gained considerable currency: an exploration initiated by American
scholar Robert C. Post861. This theoretical “school” was explored in this thesis, in
Chapter 2, in terms of both its expression by Canadian authors and the extent to which it
has been applied in the Canadian context.

861

Post, supra note 165.
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In Chapter 2, the works of four authors connected to Canada were amongst those
explored: Bob Tarantino,862 Chris D.L. Hunt,863 Katie Duke864 and Megan Richardson.865
As discussed in Chapter 2, Megan Richardson’s piece contains no reference to Canadian
jurisprudence. The articles published by Hunt and Duke make almost no reference to
Canadian jurisprudence.866
Only Canadian Bob Tarantino, in the entire body of work discussing Post’s ideas,
cites much from Canadian civil defamation decisions.867 In his piece, Tarantino cited to
six of the ten Canadian judgments analyzed in Chapter 3 of this thesis: the civil cases
Vander Zalm v Times (1979), Simpson v WIC Radio (2004), Hill v Church of Scientology
(1992), Grant v Torstar (2008), and Quan v Casson (2007), and the criminal decision in
R v Lucas (1998).868 Tarantino comments, in discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hill v Scientology
The SCC framed its reasoning in Hill as a determination of whether the
common law of defamation had struck an appropriate balance between
862

Tarantino, supra note 236.

863

Hunt, supra note 246.

864

Katie Duke, supra note 248.

865

Megan Richardson, supra note 254. Megan Richardson is included in these comments because she
published this article in a Canadian journal: the Canadian Journal of Comparative and Contemporary Law
is published by the Faculty of Law of the University of Thompson Rivers. Richardson, herself, may not
have any other connection with Canada.
866

For instance, in his article Hunt, supra note 246, refers once to Hill v Church of Scientology (1995);
Katie Duke, supra note 248, refers once to Simpson v WIC Radio (2008), twice, at 76 and 77, to Hill v
Church of Scientology (1995), and once, at 75, to Grant v Torstar (2009).
867

In the latter portion of his article, Tarantino, supra note 236, embarks on a project to describe a
defamation tort for public figures (at 621-638) also citing to Canadian jurisprudence.
868

Tarantino, supra note 236, did not include in his discussion either the early case of Currie v Preston and
Wilson, [1928] or the relatively historic case of Lefolii et al. v Gouzenko, [1969] SCR 3. In addition,
because his article published in 2010 predates the Supreme Court of Canada judgment in the matter,
Tarantino did not discuss Crookes v Newton, 2011 SCC 47, [2011] 3 SCR 269. While Tarantino did discuss
the criminal case of R v Lucas (1998) nine times (at 596, 598, 599, 602, 603,611,614, 621), he did not
discuss the earlier criminal case R v Stevens (either at trial (1993, supra note 110), or on appeal (1995,
supra note 528).
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values of reputation and freedom of expression… For all that rhetorical
flight, what actually constitutes a reputation was left unexplained
[emphasis added], though there are indications that the SCC conceived of
reputation as an instrumental good – it serves the “fundamentally
important purpose of fostering our self-image and sense of self-worth,”
and it is the “fundamental foundation on which people are able to interact
with each other in social environments. [emphasis added]869
This finding of Tarantino’s -- that, in Hill v Scientology, “what actually constitutes a
reputation was left unexplained” --- echoes exactly this author’s analysis of the case in
Chapter 3.
In discussing Vander Zalm, and WIC Radio Tarantino notes “[i]n short the
reputation of an individual is what is protected by the tort [of defamation]”, 870 and
continues “however, as noted by the SCC in Hill, very little has been written by the
courts about that central concept and its constitutive elements.”871 This may explain why,
as discussed in Chapter 3 of this present study, none of these three cases (Vander Zalm,
WIC Radio or Hill) was found to deal directly with the concept of reputation in the
judgments.

The theoretical literature discussed in Chapter 2 (written by Canadians or others)
has not been cited in any of the Canadian decisions examined in this thesis.

One reason for the lack of connection found between theories of reputation in
defamation law and the jurisprudence of defamation in Canadian law may well be the
existence of juries in civil and criminal defamation matters in Canada. As has been
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Tarantino, supra note 236 at 600-601 [footnotes omitted].

870

Ibid at 612 [footnotes omitted].

871

Ibid at 612, giving no pinpoint reference to Hill.
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demonstrated in Chapter 3, civil defamation actions are, across Canada, amongst the very
few remaining civil causes of action that can be tried by a judge and jury, as opposed to
being tried by judge alone. The ability to be tried by judge and jury, rather than by judge
alone, as also explained in Chapter 3, also exists for cases of criminal libel. As has been
described in Chapter 3, where there is a jury, the jury decides all matters of fact – and
jury deliberations, across Canada, are, by law, confidential to the jury: not even the
presiding judge is privy to them. This means that no evidence of the interpretation of
reputation where a jury was involved was available to this researcher for examination –
and, of course, nor would it be available to scholars working on theories of reputation in
defamation.

Recall, from Chapter 3, that the extensive history of the Currie trial presented by
Robert Sharpe, included a quotation from the trial which detailed evidence of reputation
that was entered at trial – but, as it was a jury trial, no one can say whether the jury took
this evidence into account in finding for former General Currie or, if they did take it into
account, what weight they may have given to it:
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

872

Do you know General Currie?
I do, sir.
Do you know his reputation?
I do.
As a military man?
I do.
What is it?
Well, I should say that any man that could have a military reputation
such as General Currie would be envied. [emphasis added] 872

Sharpe, supra note 374 at 212-213 [emphasis added].
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There were trials involved in the review of Canadian defamation cases presented
in Chapter 3 of this thesis in which no juries were involved. Theoretically, it would have
been possible in these cases to find, in the trial judge’s judgment, findings made with
respect to the plaintiff’s reputation and to see, in them, connections made by the judge to
the evidence before him or her. As discussed in Chapter 3, in one of the two instances of
civil litigation examined in which a jury was not involved, Vander Zalm v Times
Publishers, the judgment of Justice Monroe at trial does not discuss the precise evidence
before him that led to his finding that the plaintiff had a protectable reputation.873 In the
other, Simpson v Mair and WIC Radio Ltd., Madam Justice Koeningsberg found (as set
out in Chapter 3) that the plaintiff Simpson
had a significant public profile before the alleged defamation … [and that]
… she had a public reputation as a leader of those opposed to schools
teaching acceptance of a gay lifestyle. Simpson's reputation was earned as
a result of her very public actions and words.874
Although reputation in defamation has been frequently pointed to as a touchstone
for interpretation of reputation generally, this thesis has established that reputation in
defamation could not serve that role in interpretation of reputation in the context of moral
rights, prohibited marks or geographical indications.

Finally, this thesis establishes that the concept of reputation, in the sense of
‘esteem’, not only distinguishes the moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical
indications from the classic triad in intellectual property (copyright, patent and
trademark), but also sets the moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical indications
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See Vander Zalm v Times Publishers, (1979), 96 DLR (3d) 172
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Simpson v Mair and WIC Radio Ltd., 2004 BCSC 754 at para 10
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uniquely apart as a group. While there are matters of reputation involved in trademark
law, the reputation involved in that area of classic intellectual property is reputation in a
sense different from the sense of reputation as esteem that unites the concepts of moral
rights, prohibited marks and geographical indications.

This thesis demonstrated that reputation in trademark law, as discussed in Chapter
1, can be distinguished in terms of both meaning and use from the concept of reputation
(as esteem) which uniquely unites the moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical
indications. The concept of reputation in trademark law is a concept of reputation in the
sense of being a communication of association (in the case of trademark, association of a
symbol with particular goods or services in the minds of the public). It is at least in part
because of the sense of ‘reputation’ as esteem present in the more modern devices of
moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical indications that, whether or not the
existence of moral rights, prohibited marks or geographical indications have any
economic impact, they remain, in all three cases, ‘inalienable.’875

The finding in this thesis that the role of reputation in moral rights, prohibited
marks and geographical indications, each associated with a classic form of intellectual
property (moral rights with copyright and prohibited marks and geographical indications
with trademark), is one unique to the device in question and yet not unlike the presence

875

It is not argued here that these three devices, moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical
indications, are unique in having an inalienable character amongst the devices grouped with classic
intellectual property: as Margaret Ann Wilkinson has demonstrated, the technological protections measures
(found in modern copyright enactments), the rights management provisions (also found in modern
copyright enactments), the data protection provisions (found enacted in modern times in patent enactments)
and confidential information law (protection of which, in Canada, remains at common law) all also possess
the characteristic of inalienability. See Wilkinson, “What is the Role…”, supra note 62.
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of reputation as a characteristic associated with the other two (and not with any other
intellectual property-related device), is not inconsistent with the work of Margaret Ann
Wilkinson who has written that “the shift from individual to corporate ownership of
patents, copyrights and trademarks [that occurred in the mid-nineteenth century] is the
key challenge to understanding the current contribution of intellectual property to societal
interests.”876 She explains that prior to the “modern legal separation of a corporation from
its owners …, inventors, authors and creators were exclusively individuals who, in turn,
could only engage in business with other individuals – a business’s goodwill [in the sense
of reputation] was only the goodwill of the individual or individuals operating it.”877
Wilkinson notes that “balance in intellectual property now has to be achieved in an
environment of a triad of interests (individual, corporate and societal) and not as in the
original intellectual property environment of dual interests (individual and societal).”878

The unique positions of moral rights, prohibited marks and geographical
indications, each with its own unique association with a particular aspect of reputation,
alongside the classic intellectual property devices of copyright and trademark, may be
seen to be adaptations made by governments, including the Canadian government, as
modern intellectual property is required to adapt to function in a more complex
environment and other rights must be created to represent interests other than those of the
classic intellectual property rights holders.

876

Ibid at 21.

877

Ibid at 9.

878

Ibid at 34.
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This thesis has demonstrated that moral rights, prohibited marks, and
geographical indications are one set of rights created to function in modern society
alongside of, but independent of, the classic intellectual property rights of copyright and
trademark. It is the concept of reputation, in the sense of 'esteem', that distinguishes moral
rights, prohibited marks and geographical indications from copyright and trademark and
creates, of them, a unique set of rights, none of which poses the classic characteristics of
intellectual property.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Statutory Provisions Relating to the Role of Judge and Jury in Civil
Defamation Proceedings Across Common Law Canada
[emphasis added throughout on concepts such as “jury”, “judge”, etc.]
Newfoundland and Labrador
Defamation Act, RSNL 1990, c D-3
General or special verdict
8. On the trial of an action for defamation before a jury
(a) the jury may give a general verdict upon the whole matter in issue in the action, and
shall not be required or directed to find for the plaintiff merely on proof of publication by
the defendant of the alleged defamation and of the sense ascribed to it in the action;
(b) the court shall, according to its discretion, give its opinion and directions to the jury
on the matter in issue as in other cases; and
(c) the jury may on the issue upon being directed to do so by the court find a special
verdict, if they think fit to do so, and the proceedings after verdict, whether general or
special, shall be the same as in other cases.

Nova Scotia
Defamation Act, RSNS 1989, c 122
Verdict of jury
8 On the trial of an action for defamation the jury may give a general verdict upon the
whole matter in issue in the action, and shall not be required or directed to find for the
plaintiff merely on proof of publication by the defendant of the alleged defamation and of
the sense ascribed to it in the action; but the court shall, according to its discretion, give
its opinion and directions to the jury on the matter in issue as in other cases; and the
jury may on such issue find a special verdict, if they think fit so to do and the
proceedings after verdict, whether general or special, shall be the same as in other cases.
Separate verdicts
12 (1) In a consolidated action under Section 11 the court or jury shall assess the whole
amount of the damages, if any, in one sum, but a separate verdict shall be given for or
against each defendant in the same way as if the actions consolidated had been tried
separately.
(2) If the court or jury gives a verdict against defendants in more than one of the actions
so consolidated it shall apportion the amount of the damages between and against those
defendants, and, if the plaintiff is awarded the costs of the action, the judge shall make
such order as he considers just for the apportionment of the costs between and against
those defendants.

Prince Edward Island
Defamation Act, RSPEI 1988, C D-5
Jurisdiction of jury and court in action

237
6 On the trial of an action for defamation the jury may give a general verdict upon the
whole matter in issue in the action, and shall not be required or directed to find for the
plaintiff merely on proof of publication by the defendant of the alleged defamation and of
the sense ascribed to it in the action; but the court shall, according to its discretion, give
its opinion and directions to the jury on the matter in issue as in other cases; and the jury
may on such issue find a special verdict, and the proceedings after verdict, whether
general or special, shall be the same as in other cases.
Consolidated actions, jurisdiction of jury
8(1) In a consolidated action under section 7 the jury shall assess the whole amount of
the damages, if any, in one sum, but a separate verdict shall be taken for or against each
defendant in the same way as if the actions consolidated had been tried separately.
Apportionment of damages between defendants
(2) If the jury finds a verdict against the defendants in more than one of the actions so
consolidated, they shall apportion the amount of the damages between and against these
defendants; and, if the plaintiff is awarded the costs of the action the judge shall make an
order for the apportionment of the costs between and against these defendants.
New Brunswick
Defamation Act, RSNB 2011, c 139
General or special verdict
6(1) On the trial of an action for defamation, the jury may give a general verdict on the
whole matter in issue in the action and shall not be required or directed to find for the
plaintiff merely on proof of publication by the defendant of the alleged defamation and of
the sense ascribed to it in the action
(2) According to its discretion, the court shall give its opinion and directions to the jury
on the matter in issue as in other cases.
(3) If they think fit to do so, the jury may find a special verdict on the matter in issue int
he action.
(4) The proceedings after verdict, whether general or special, shall be the same as in other
cases.
Damages in a consolidated action
8(1) In a consolidated action under section 7, the court or jury shall assess the whole
amount of the damages, if any, in one sum, but a separate verdict shall be given for or
against each defendant in the same way as if the actions consolidated had been tried
separately.
(2) If the court or jury gives a verdict against defendants in more than one of the
consolidated actions, it shall apportion the amount of the damages between and against
those defendants.
(3) If the plaintiff is awarded the costs of the action, the judge shall make the order that
the judge considers just for the apportionment of the costs between and against the
defendants.

Ontario
Libel and Slander Act, RSO 1990, c L-12
Assessment of damages and apportionment of damages and costs
11(2) In a consolidated action under this section, the jury shall assess the whole amount
of the damages, if any, in one sum, but a separate verdict shall be taken for or against
each defendant in the same way as if the actions consolidated had been tried separately,
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and, if the jury finds a verdict against the defendant or defendants in more than one of
the actions so consolidated, the jury shall apportion the amount of the damages between
and against the last-mentioned defendants, and the judge at the trial, in the event of the
plaintiff being awarded the costs of the action, shall thereupon make such order as he or
she considers just for the apportionment of the costs between and against such
defendants.
Verdicts
14 On the trial of an action for libel, the jury may give a general verdict upon the whole
matter in issue in the action and shall not be required or directed to find for the plaintiff
merely on proof of publication by the defendant of the alleged libel and of the sense
ascribed to it in the action, but the court shall, according to its discretion, give its opinion
and directions to the jury on the matter in issue as in other cases, and the jury may on
such issue find a special verdict, if they think fit so to do, and the proceedings after
verdict, whether general or special, shall be the same as in other cases.

Manitoba
The Defamation Act, CCSM 2002, c D20
General or special verdict
On the trial of an action for defamation
6(a) the jury may give a general verdict upon the whole matter in issue in the action, and
shall not be required or directed to find for the plaintiff merely on proof of publication by
the defendant of the alleged defamation and of the sense ascribed to it in the action;
(b) the court shall, according to its discretion, give its opinion and directions to the jury
on the matter in issue as in other cases; and
(c) the jury may on such issue find a special verdict if they think fit so to do; and the
proceedings after verdict, whether general or special, shall be the same as in other cases.
Assessment and apportionment of damages and costs
8(1) In a consolidated action under section 7 the court or jury shall assess the whole
amount of the damages, if any, in one sum; but a separate verdict shall be given for or
against each defendant in the same way as if the actions consolidated had been tried
separately.
Apportionment
(2) If the court or jury gives a verdict against defendants in more than one of the actions
so consolidated, it shall apportion the amount of the damages between and against those
defendants; and, if the plaintiff is awarded the costs of the action, the judge shall make
such order as he deems just for the apportionment of the costs between and against those
defendants.

Saskatchewan
Libel and Slander Act, RSS 1978, c L-14
Powers of judge or jury as to verdict
5 On the trial of an action for libel, the jury may give a general verdict upon the whole
matter in issue in the action and shall not be required or directed to find for the plaintiff
merely on proof of publication by the defendant of the alleged libel and of the sense
ascribed to it in the action, but the court shall, according to its discretion, give its opinion
and directions to the jury on the matter in issue as in other cases, and the jury may on the
issue find a special verdict if it thinks fit to do so, and the proceedings after verdict
whether general or special shall be same as in other cases.
Consolidation of different actions for same libel

239
6(1) The court or a judge upon an application by two or more defendants in any two or
more actions for the same or substantially the same libel, or for a libel or libels contained
in articles the same or substantially the same published in different newspapers, brought
by the same person, may make an order for the consolidation of the actions so that they
shall be tried together, and, after the order has been made and before the trial of the
actions, the defendants in any new actions instituted in respect of any such libel or libels
shall also be entitled to be joined in a common action upon a joint application being made
by the new defendants and the defendants in the actions already consolidated.
Damages and costs assessed thereon
(2) In a consolidated action under this section the jury shall assess the whole amount of
the damages, if any, in one sum, but a separate verdict shall be taken for or against each
defendant in the same way as if the actions consolidated had been tried separately, and, if
the jury finds a verdict against the defendant or defendants in more than one of the
actions so consolidated, it shall apportion the amount of the damages between and against
the last mentioned defendants, and the judge at the trial, if the plaintiff is awarded the
costs of the action, shall thereupon make such order as he deems just for the
apportionment of the costs between and against those defendants.

Alberta
Defamation Act, RSA 2000, c D-7
General and special verdicts
6(1) On the trial of an action for defamation, the jury
(a) may give a general verdict on the whole matter in issue in the action, and
(b) shall not be required or directed to find for the plaintiff merely on proof of
publication by the defendant of the alleged defamation and of the sense ascribed
to it in the action, but the court shall, according to its discretion, give its opinion
and directions to the jury on the matter in issue as in other cases, and the jury
may on the issue find a special verdict if it thinks fit to do so.
(2) The proceedings after verdict, whether general or special, shall be the same as in other
cases.
Damages in consolidated action
8(1) In a consolidated action under section 7, the court or jury shall assess the whole
amount of the damages, if any, in one sum, but a separate verdict shall be given for or
against each defendant in the same way as if the actions consolidated had been tried
separately.
(2) If the court or jury gives a verdict against defendants in more than one of the actions
so consolidated, it shall apportion the amount of the damages between and against those
defendants, and if the plaintiff is awarded the costs of the action the judge shall make an
order as the judge considers just for the apportionment of the costs between and against
those defendants.

British Columbia
Libel and Slander Act, RSBC 1996, c 263
Direction to jury and return of verdict
14 (1) On the trial of an action for making or publishing a libel, on the plea of not guilty
pleaded, the jury sworn to try the issue may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty
on the whole matter put in issue in the action.
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(2) The jury must not be required or directed by the court before which the action is tried
to find the defendant guilty merely on the proof of publication by the defendant of the
paper charged to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to it in the action.
(3) The court before which the trial is held must, in its discretion, give the opinion and
directions of the court to the jury on the matter in issue, as in other cases.
(4) The jury may on the issue find a special verdict, if they think fit to do so.
(5) The defendant, if found guilty, may move for a stay of judgment on the grounds and
in a manner he might have done before the coming into force of this Act.
Verdict, damages and costs in consolidated actions
16 (1) In a consolidated action under section 15, the court or jury must assess the whole
amount of the damages, if any, in one sum, but a separate verdict must be taken for or
against each defendant, in the same way as if the actions consolidated had been tried
separately.
(2) If the court or jury finds a verdict against the defendant or defendants in more than
one of the actions consolidated, they must proceed to apportion the amount of damages
that they have found between and against the defendants.
(3) If the court awards costs to the plaintiff, the court must make an order it thinks just
for the apportionment of costs between and against the defendants.

Northwest Territories
Defamation Act, RSNWT 1988, c D-1
General or special verdict
6. (1) Where an action for defamation is tried with a jury, the jury may give a general
verdict on the whole matter in issue in the action and shall not be required or directed to
find for the plaintiff merely on proof of
(a) publication by the defendant of the alleged defamation, and
(b) the sense ascribed to the defamation in the action, but the presiding judge shall,
according to his or her discretion, give his or her opinion and directions to the jury on the
matter in issue as in other cases and the jury may on that issue give a special verdict if
they think fit to do so.
Proceedings after verdict
(2) The proceedings after verdict by a jury, whether general or special, shall be the same
as in other cases.
General or special finding by judge
7 Where an action for defamation is tried by a judge without a jury, the judge may
make a finding of a general or special nature as the judge thinks fit.
Assessment of damages in consolidated action
9(1) In an action consolidated under section 8, the jury or judge, as the case may be,
shall assess the whole amount of the damages, if any, in one sum, but a separate verdict
or finding shall be given for or against each defendant in the same way as if the actions
had been tried separately.
Apportionment of damages and costs
(2) A jury or judge that makes a verdict or finding against the defendants in more than
one action consolidated under section 8 shall apportion the amount of the damages
between and against the defendants and where the plaintiff is awarded the costs of the
action, the judge shall make an order that the judge considers just apportioning the costs
between and against the defendants.

Nunavut
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The Northwest Territories Defamation Act applies
Definitions
"judge" means a judge of the Nunavut Court of Justice;

Yukon
Defamation Act, RSY 2002, c 52
General or special verdict at jury trial
6(1) If an action for defamation is tried with a jury, the jury may give a general verdict
on the whole matter in issue in the action, and shall not be required or directed to find for
the plaintiff merely on proof of publication by the defendant of the alleged defamation
and of the sense ascribed to it in the action; but the presiding judge shall, according to
discretion, give the judge’s opinion and directions to the jury on the matter in issue as in
other cases; and the jury may on that issue find a special verdict, if they think fit so to do,
and the proceedings after verdict, whether general or special, shall be the same as in other
cases.
(2) If an action for defamation is tried by a judge without jury, the judge may make
any finding of a general or special nature as the judge sees fit.
Damages and costs in consolidated actions
9(1) In a consolidated action under section 7, the jury or a judge, as the case may be,
shall assess the whole amount of the damages, if any, in one sum, but a separate verdict
or finding shall be taken for or against each defendant in the same way as if the actions
consolidated had been tried separately.
(2) If the jury or a judge, as the case may be, makes a verdict or finding against the
defendants in more than one of the actions so consolidated, the amount of the damages
shall be apportioned between and against the defendants; and, if the plaintiff is awarded
the costs of the action, the judge shall make any order considered just for the
apportionment of the costs between and against the defendants.
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Appendix B: Moral Rights in Canada's Copyright Act
Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42
Note: Headings are as in the Statute; emphasis added

PART I
Copyright and Moral Rights in Works

Definitions, s 2

moral rights means the rights described in subsections 14.1(1) and 17.1(1); (droits moraux)

Compilations
2.1 (1) A compilation containing two or more of the categories of literary, dramatic,
musical or artistic works shall be deemed to be a compilation of the category making up
the most substantial part of the compilation.
Idem
(2) The mere fact that a work is included in a compilation does not increase, decrease or
otherwise affect the protection conferred by this Act in respect of the copyright in the
work or the moral rights in respect of the work.

Moral rights
14.1 (1) The author of a work has, subject to section 28.2, the right to the integrity of the
work and, in connection with an act mentioned in section 3, the right, where reasonable in
the circumstances, to be associated with the work as its author by name or under a
pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous.

No assignment of moral rights
(2) Moral rights may not be assigned but may be waived in whole or in part.

No waiver by assignment
(3) An assignment of copyright in a work does not by that act alone constitute a waiver of
any moral rights.

Effect of waiver
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(4) Where a waiver of any moral right is made in favour of an owner or a licensee of
copyright, it may be invoked by any person authorized by the owner or licensee to use the
work, unless there is an indication to the contrary in the waiver.
Term
14.2 (1) Moral rights in respect of a work subsist for the same term as the copyright in
the work.

Succession
(2) The moral rights in respect of a work pass, on the death of its author, to
(a) the person to whom those rights are specifically bequeathed;
(b) where there is no specific bequest of those moral rights and the author dies testate in
respect of the copyright in the work, the person to whom that copyright is bequeathed; or
(c) where there is no person described in paragraph (a) or (b), the person entitled to any
other property in respect of which the author dies intestate.

Subsequent succession
(3) Subsection (2) applies, with such modifications as the circumstances require, on the
death of any person who holds moral rights.

Moral rights
17.1 (1) In the cases referred to in subsections 15(2.1) and (2.2), a performer of a live
aural performance or a performance fixed in a sound recording has, subject to subsection
28.2(1), the right to the integrity of the performance, and — in connection with an act
mentioned in subsection 15(1.1) or one for which the performer has a right to
remuneration under section 19 — the right, if it is reasonable in the circumstances, to be
associated with the performance as its performer by name or under a pseudonym and the
right to remain anonymous.

No assignment of moral rights
(2) Moral rights may not be assigned but may be waived in whole or in part.

No waiver by assignment
(3) An assignment of copyright in a performer’s performance does not by itself constitute
a waiver of any moral rights.
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Effect of waiver
(4) If a waiver of any moral right is made in favour of an owner or a licensee of a
copyright, it may be invoked by any person authorized by the owner or licensee to use the
performer’s performance, unless there is an indication to the contrary in the waiver.

Application and term
17.2 (1) Subsection 17.1(1) applies only in respect of a performer’s performance that
occurs after the coming into force of that subsection. The moral rights subsist for the
same term as the copyright in that performer’s performance.

Succession
(2) The moral rights in respect of a performer’s performance pass, on the performer’s
death, to
(a) the person to whom those rights are specifically bequeathed;
(b) if there is not a specific bequest of those moral rights and the performer dies testate
in respect of the copyright in the performer’s performance, the person to whom that
copyright is bequeathed; or
(c) if there is not a person as described in paragraph (a) or (b), the person entitled to any
other property in respect of which the performer dies intestate.
Subsequent succession
(3) Subsection (2) applies, with any modifications that the circumstances require, on the
death of any person who holds moral rights.

Moral Rights Infringement
Infringement generally
28.1 Any act or omission that is contrary to any of the moral rights of the author of a
work or of the performer of a performer’s performance is, in the absence of the author’s
or performer’s consent, an infringement of those rights.

Nature of right of integrity
28.2 (1) The author’s or performer’s right to the integrity of a work or performer’s performance is
infringed only if the work or the performance is, to the prejudice of its author’s or performer’s
honour or reputation,
(a) distorted, mutilated or otherwise modified; or
(b) used in association with a product, service, cause or institution.

Where prejudice deemed
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(2) In the case of a painting, sculpture or engraving, the prejudice referred to in
subsection (1) shall be deemed to have occurred as a result of any distortion, mutilation
or other modification of the work.

When work not distorted, etc.
(3) For the purposes of this section,
(a) a change in the location of a work, the physical means by which a work is exposed or
the physical structure containing a work, or
(b) steps taken in good faith to restore or preserve the Work shall not, by that act alone,
constitute a distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work.

246
Appendix C : Prohibited Marks - Section 9 of the Trademarks Act, RSC 1985 c T-13
Unfair Competition and Prohibited Signs
9 (1) No person shall adopt in connection with a business, as a trade-mark or otherwise, any mark
consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be likely to be mistaken for,
(a) the Royal Arms, Crest or Standard;
(b) the arms or crest of any member of the Royal Family;
(c) the standard, arms or crest of His Excellency the Governor General;
(d) any word or symbol likely to lead to the belief that the goods or services in
association with which it is used have received, or are produced, sold or performed under,
royal, vice-regal or governmental patronage, approval or authority;
(e) the arms, crest or flag adopted and used at any time by Canada or by any province or
municipal corporation in Canada in respect of which the Registrar has, at the request of
the Government of Canada or of the province or municipal corporation concerned, given
public notice of its adoption and use;
(f) the emblem of the Red Cross on a white ground, formed by reversing the federal
colours of Switzerland and retained by the Geneva Convention for the Protection of War
Victims of 1949 as the emblem and distinctive sign of the Medical Service of armed
forces and used by the Canadian Red Cross Society, or the expression “Red Cross” or
“Geneva Cross”;
(g) the emblem of the Red Crescent on a white ground adopted for the same purpose as
specified in paragraph (f);
(g.1) the third Protocol emblem — commonly known as the “Red Crystal” — referred to
in Article 2, paragraph 2 of Schedule VII to the Geneva Conventions Act and composed
of a red frame in the shape of a square on edge on a white ground, adopted for the same
purpose as specified in paragraph (f);
(h) the equivalent sign of the Red Lion and Sun used by Iran for the same purpose as
specified in paragraph (f);
(h.1) the international distinctive sign of civil defence (equilateral blue triangle on an
orange ground) referred to in Article 66, paragraph 4 of Schedule V to the Geneva
Conventions Act;
(i) any territorial or civic flag or any national, territorial or civic arms, crest or
emblem, of a country of the Union, if the flag, arms, crest or emblem is on a list
communicated under article 6ter of the Convention or pursuant to the obligations
under the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set
out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the
Registrar gives public notice of the communication;
(i.1) any official sign or hallmark indicating control or warranty adopted by a
country of the Union, if the sign or hallmark is on a list communicated under
article 6ter of the Convention or pursuant to the obligations under the Agreement
on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to
the WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the Registrar gives public
notice of the communication;
(i.2) any national flag of a country of the Union;
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(i.3) any armorial bearing, flag or other emblem, or the name or any abbreviation
of the name, of an international intergovernmental organization, if the armorial
bearing, flag, emblem, name or abbreviation is on a list communicated under
article 6ter of the Convention or pursuant to the obligations under the Agreement
on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to
the WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the Registrar gives public
notice of the communication;
(j) any scandalous, obscene or immoral word or device;
(k) any matter that may falsely suggest a connection with any living individual;
(l) the portrait or signature of any individual who is living or has died within the
preceding thirty years;
(m) the words “United Nations” or the official seal or emblem of the United Nations;
(n) any badge, crest, emblem or mark
(i) adopted or used by any of Her Majesty’s Forces as defined in the National
Defence Act,
(ii) of any university, or
(iii) adopted and used by any public authority, in Canada as an official mark for
goods or services, in respect of which the Registrar has, at the request of Her
Majesty or of the university or public authority, as the case may be, given public
notice of its adoption and use;
(n.1) any armorial bearings granted, recorded or approved for use by a recipient pursuant
to the prerogative powers of Her Majesty as exercised by the Governor General in respect
of the granting of armorial bearings, if the Registrar has, at the request of the Governor
General, given public notice of the grant, recording or approval; or
(o) the name “Royal Canadian Mounted Police” or “R.C.M.P.” or any other combination
of letters relating to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or any pictorial representation
of a uniformed member thereof.
Excepted uses
(2) Nothing in this section prevents the adoption, use or registration as a trade-mark or
otherwise, in connection with a business, of any mark
(a) described in subsection (1) with the consent of Her Majesty or such other
person, society, authority or organization as may be considered to have been
intended to be protected by this section; or
(b) consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be likely to be mistaken for
(i) an official sign or hallmark mentioned in paragraph (1)(i.1), except in
respect of goods that are the same or similar to the goods in respect of
which the official sign or hallmark has been adopted, or
(ii) an armorial bearing, flag, emblem or abbreviation mentioned in
paragraph (1)(i.3), unless the use of the mark is likely to mislead the
public as to a connection between the user and the organization.
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Appendix D : Comparison of “Prohibited Marks” in the Current Trademarks Act
and “Forbidden Marks” in the 1932 Unfair Competition Act.
Trademarks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13
(last amended on June 18, 2019)
9 (1) No person shall adopt in connection with a
business, as a trademark or otherwise, any mark
consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be likely to
be mistaken for

1932 An Act respecting Unfair
Competition in Trade and Commerce

(a) the Royal Arms, Crest or Standard;

(a) the Royal Arms, Crest or Standard;

(b) the arms or crest of any member of the Royal
Family;

(b) the arms or crest of any member of
the Royal Family;

14. (1) No person shall be entitled to
adopt for use in connection with his
business, as a trade mark or otherwise,
any symbol consisting of, or so nearly
resembling as to be likely to be mistaken
for,

(c) the national flag in any of its forms;

(c) the standard, arms or crest of His Excellency the
Governor General;
(d) any word or symbol likely to lead to the belief that
the goods or services in association with which it is used
have received, or are produced, sold or performed under,
royal, vice-regal or governmental patronage, approval or
authority;
(e) the arms, crest or flag adopted and used at any time
by Canada or by any province or municipal corporation
in Canada in respect of which the Registrar has, at the
request of the Government of Canada or of the province
or municipal corporation concerned, given public notice
of its adoption and use;
(f) the emblem of the Red Cross on a white ground
formed by reversing the federal colours of Switzerland
and retained by the Geneva Convention for the
Protection of War Victims of 1949 as the emblem and
distinctive sign of the Medical Service of armed forces
and used by the Canadian Red Cross Society, or the
expression “Red Cross” or “Geneva Cross”;
(g) the emblem of the Red Crescent on a white ground
adopted for the same purpose as specified in paragraph
(f);
(g.1) the third Protocol emblem — commonly known as
the “Red Crystal” — referred to in Article 2, paragraph
2 of Schedule VII to the Geneva Conventions Act and
composed of a red frame in the shape of a square on
edge on a white ground, adopted for the same purpose as
specified in paragraph (f);
(h) the equivalent sign of the Red Lion and Sun used by
Iran for the same purpose as specified in paragraph (f);

(d) the standard, arms or crest of His
Excellency the Governor-General;

(e) the arms or crest adopted and
used at any time by Canada or by
any province or municipal
corporation in Canada;
(g) the emblem of the Red Cross Society,
consisting of a red cross on a white
ground or the expression “Red Cross” or
“Geneva Cross;”
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(i) the emblem of any fraternal society,
the legal existence of which is
recognized under any law in force in
Canada;

(h.1) the international distinctive sign of civil defence
(equilateral blue triangle on an orange ground) referred
to in Article 66, paragraph 4 of Schedule V to
the Geneva Conventions Act;
(i) any territorial or civic flag or any national, territorial
or civic arms, crest or emblem, of a country of the
Union, if the flag, arms, crest or emblem is on a list
communicated under article 6ter of the Convention or
pursuant to the obligations under the Agreement on
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set
out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement stemming from
that article, and the Registrar gives public notice of the
communication;
(i.1) any official sign or hallmark indicating control or
warranty adopted by a country of the Union, if the sign
or hallmark is on a list communicated under article
6ter of the Convention or pursuant to the obligations
under Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the
WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the
Registrar gives public notice of the communication;
(i.2) any national flag of a country of the Union;

(h) any national, territorial or civic flag,
arms, crest, or emblem of the prohibition
of which as a commercial device notice
has been received and publicly given by
the Registrar pursuant to the provisions
of the Convention more than two months
before the adoption of the symbol;

(i.3) any armorial bearing, flag or other emblem, or the
name or any abbreviation of the name, of an
international intergovernmental organization, if the
armorial bearing, flag, emblem, name or abbreviation is
on a list communicated under article 6ter of the
Convention or pursuant to the obligations under the
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the WTO
Agreement stemming from that article, and the Registrar
gives public notice of the communication;
(j) any scandalous, obscene or immoral word or device;

(h)

(h)

(f) any national flag, arms, crest or
emblem commonly used as such by any
foreign state;

(k) any matter that may falsely suggest a connection
with any living individual;
(l) the portrait or signature of any individual who is
living or has died within the preceding thirty years;
(m) the words “United Nations” or the official seal or
emblem of the United Nations;

(k) the portrait or signature of any
person who is living or has died
within thirty years.
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(n) any badge, crest, emblem or mark
(i) adopted or used by any of Her Majesty’s
Forces as defined in the National Defence Act,
(ii) of any university, or
(iii) adopted and used by any public authority,
in Canada as an official mark for goods or
services, in respect of which the Registrar has,
at the request of Her Majesty or of the university
or public authority, as the case may be, given
public notice of its adoption and use;

(n.1) any armorial bearings granted, recorded or
approved for use by a recipient pursuant to the
prerogative powers of Her Majesty as exercised by the
Governor General in respect of the granting of armorial
bearings, if the Registrar has, at the request of the
Governor General, given public notice of the grant,
recording or approval; or
(o) the name “Royal Canadian Mounted Police” or
“R.C.M.P.” or any other combination of letters relating
to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or any pictorial
representation of a uniformed member thereof.
9 (2) Nothing in this section prevents the adoption, use
or registration as a trademark or otherwise, in
connection with a business, of any mark

(a) described in subsection (1) with the consent of Her
Majesty or such other person, society, authority or
organization as may be considered to have been intended
to be protected by this section; or
(b) consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be likely
to be mistaken for
(i) an official sign or hallmark mentioned in
paragraph (1)(i.1), except in respect to goods
that are the same or similar to the goods in
respect of which the official sign or hallmark
has been adopted, or
(ii) an armorial bearing, flag, emblem, name or
abbreviation mentioned in paragraph (1)(i.3),
unless the use of the mark is likely to mislead
the public as to a connection between the user
and the organization

(j) any symbol adopted and used
by any public authority in Canada
as an official mark on similar
wares;

14 (2) Nothing in this section shall
prevent the use as a trade mark, or
otherwise in connection with a business,
of any such symbol as aforesaid with the
consent and approval of His Majesty or
such other person as may be deemed to
have been intended to be protected by the
provisions hereof.
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Appendix E: Article 6ter of the Paris Convention in 1925, 1934, 1958 and 1967
1925
Hague Revision
Article 6ter.
[1] The contracting countries agree to refuse or to invalidate the registration, and to
prohibit by appropriate measures the use, without authorization by the competent
authorities, either as trademarks or as elements of trademarks, of armorial bearings, flags
and other State emblems of the contracting countries, official signs and hallmarks
indicating control and warranty adopted by them and all imitations thereof from a
heraldic point of view.
[2] The prohibition of the use of official signs and hallmarks indicating control and
warranty shall apply solely in cases where the marks which contain them are intended to
be used on goods of the same or a similar kind.
[3] For the application of these provisions the contracting countries agree to communicate
reciprocally, through the International Bureau at Berne, the list of State emblems and
official signs and hallmarks indicating control and warranty which they desire, or may
hereafter desire, to place wholly or within certain limits under the protection of the
present Article and all subsequent modifications of this list. Each contracting country
shall in due course make available to the public the lists so communicated.
[4] Each contracting country may, within a period of twelve months from the receipt of
the communication, transmit through the International Bureau of Berne its objections, if
any, to the country concerned.
[5] In the case of well-known State emblems, the measures prescribed by paragraph [1]
shall apply solely to marks registered after the signature of the present Act.
[6] In the case of State emblems which are not well known, and in the case of official
signs and hallmarks, these provisions shall be applicable only to marks registered more
than two months after the receipt of the communication provided for in paragraph [3].
[7] Incases of bad faith the countries shall have the right to cancel the registration of
marks that contain State emblems, signs or hallmarks even though registered before the
signature of the present Act.
[8] Nationals of each country who are authorized to make use of State emblems, signs or
hallmarks of their country, may use them even though they are similar to those of another
country.
[9] The contracting countries undertake to prohibit the unauthorized use in trade of the
State armorial bearings of the other contracting countries, when the use is of such a
nature as to be misleading as to the origin of the goods.
[10] The above provisions shall not prevent the countries from exercising the power
given in paragraph [2] (No. 3) of Article 6, to refuse or to cancel the registration of marks
containing, without authorization, the armorial bearings, flags, decorations, and other
State emblems or official signs or hallmarks adopted by a country of the Union.
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1934
London revision
Article 6ter.
(1) The countries of the Union agree to refuse or to invalidate the registration, and to
prohibit by appropriate measures the use, without authorization by the competent
authorities, either as trademarks or as elements of trademarks, of armorial bearings, flags
and other State emblems of the countries of the Union, official signs and hallmarks
indicating control and warranty adopted by them and all imitations thereof from an
heraldic point of view.
(2) The prohibition of the use of official signs and hallmarks indicating control and
warranty shall apply solely in cases where the marks which contain them are intended to
be used on goods of the same or a similar kind.
(3) For the application of these provisions the countries of the Union agree to
communicate reciprocally, through the International Bureau, the list of State emblems
and official signs and hallmarks indicating control and warranty which they desire, or
may thereafter desire, to place wholly or within certain limits under the protection of the
present Article and all subsequent modifications of this list. Each country of the Union
shall in due course make available to the public the lists so communicated.
(4) Any country of the Union may, within a period of twelve months from the receipt of
the communication, transmit through the International Bureau its objections, if any, to the
country concerned.
(5) In the case of well-known State emblems, the measures prescribed by paragraph (1)
shall apply solely to marks registered after 6th November, 1925.
(6) In the case of State emblems which are not well known, and in the case of olficial
signs and hallmarks, these provisions shall be applicable only to marks registered more
than two months after the receipt of the communication provided for in paragraph (3).
(7) In cases of bad faith the countries shall have the right to cancel the registration of
marks that contain State emblems, signs or hallmarks even though registered before 6th
November, 1925.
(8) Nationals of each country who are authorized to make use of State emblems, signs or
hallmarks of their country, may use them even though they are similar to those of another
country.
(9) The countries of the Union undertake to prohibit the unauthorized use in trade of the
State armorial bearings of the other countries of the Union, when the use is of such a
nature as to be misleading as to the origin of the goods.
(10) The above provisions shall not prevent the countries from exercising the power
given in paragraph (l)(No. 3) of Article 6B, to refuse or to cancel the registration of
marks containing, without authorization, the armorial bearings, flags, decorations and
other State emblems or official signs or hallmarks adopted by a country of the Union.
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1958
Lisbon revision
Article 6ter.
(I)(a) The countries of the Union agree to refuse or to invalidate the registration, and to
prohibit by appropriate measures the use, without authorization by the competent
authorities, either as trademarks or as elements of trademarks, of armorial bearings, flags
and other State emblems of the countries of the Union, official signs and hallmarks
indicating control and warranty adopted by them and all imitations thereof from a
heraldic point of view, (b) The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) above apply equally to
armorial bearings, flags and other emblems, abbreviations or titles of international
intergovernmental organizations of which one or more countries of the Union are
members, with the exception of armorial bearings, flags and other emblems,
abbreviations or titles that are already the subject of existing international agreements
intended to ensure their protection,
(c) No country of the Union shall be required to apply the provisions of sub-paragraph (b)
above to the prejudice of the owners of rights acquired in good faith before the entry into
force, in that country, of the present Convention. The countries of the Union shall not be
required to apply the said provisions when the use or registration covered by subparagraph (a) above is not of such a nature as to suggest to the public that a connection
exists between the organization concerned and the armorial bearings, flags, emblems,
abbreviations or titles, or if such use or registration is clearly not of a nature to mislead
the public as to the existence of a connection between the user and the organization.
(2) The prohibition of the use of official signs and hallmarks indicating control and
warranty shall apply solely in cases where the marks which contain them are intended to
be used on goods of the same or a similar kind.
(3)(a)[l] For the application of these provisions the countries of the Union agree to
communicate reciprocally, through the International Bureau, the list of State emblems
and official signs and hallmarks indicating control and warranty which they desire, or
may thereafter desire, to place wholly or within certain limits under the protection of the
present Article and all subsequent modifications of this fist. Each country of the Union
shall in due course make available to the public the lists so communicated. [2]
Nevertheless, this communication is not obligatory so far as the flags of States are
concerned, (b) The provisions of subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1) of this Article shall
only apply to armorial bearings, flags and other emblems, abbreviations or titles of
international intergovernmental organizations that the latter have communicated to the
countries of the Union through the International Bureau.
(4) Any country of the Union may, within a period of twelve months from the receipt of
the communication, transmit through the International Bureau its objections, if any, to the
country or international intergovernmental organization concerned.
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(5) In the case of State flags, the measures prescribed by paragraph (1) above shall apply
solely to marks registered after 6th November,1925. (6) In the case of State emblems
other than flags, and of official signs and hallmarks of the countries of the Union and in
the case of armorial bearings, flags and other emblems, abbreviations or titles of
international intergovernmental organizations, these provisions shall be applicable only to
marks registered more than two months after the receipt of the communication provided
for in paragraph (3) above.
(7) In cases of bad faith the countries shall have the right to cancel the registration of
marks that contain State emblems, signs or hallmarks even though registered before 6th
November, 1925.
(8) Nationals of each country who are authorized to make use of State emblems, signs or
hallmarks of their country, may use them even though they are similar to those of another
country.
(9) The countries of the Union undertake to prohibit the unauthorized use in trade of the
State armorial bearings of the other countries of the Union, when the use is of such a
nature as to be misleading as to the origin of the goods.
(10) The above provisions shall not prevent the countries from exercising the power
given in paragraph (3) of Article bquinquies B, to refuse or to cancel the registration of
marks containing, without authorization, the armorial bearings, flags and other State
emblems or official signs or hallmarks adopted by a country of the Union as well as the
distinctive signs of international intergovernmental organizations mentioned in paragraph
(1) of this Article.
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Appendix F: The Changes Made in 1953 to the 1932 Legislation for Prohibited
Marks
Trade-Marks Act, 1952-53, c 49
9. (1) No person shall adopt in connection with
a business, as a trade mark or otherwise, any
mark consisting of, or so nearly resembling as
to be likely to be mistaken for
(a) the Royal Arms, Crest or Standard;
(b) the arms or crest of any member of the
Royal Family
(c) the standard, arms or crest of His
Excellency the Governor General;
NEW (d) any word or symbol likely to lead
to the belief that the wares or services in
association with which it is used have
received, or are produced, sold or
performed under royal, vice- regal or
governmental patronage, approval or
authority;
(e) the arms, crest or flag adopted and used at
any time by Canada or by any province or
municipal corporation in Canada in respect of
which the Registrar has at the request of the
Government of Canada or of the province or
municipal corporation concerned, given public
notice of its adoption and use;

(f) the heraldic emblem of the Red Cross on a
white ground, formed by reversing the federal
colours of Switzerland and retained by the
Geneva Convention for the Protection of War
Victims of 1949, as the emblem and distinctive
sign of the Medical Service of armed forces
and used by the Canadian Red Cross Society;
or the expression "Red Cross "or" Geneva
Cross";
NEW (g) the heraldic emblem of the Red
Crescent on a white ground adopted for the
same purpose as specified in paragraph (f)
by a number of Moslem countries;
NEW (h) the equivalent sign of the Red
Lion and Sun used by Iran for the same
purpose as specified in paragraph (f);

1932 An Act respecting Unfair Competition in
Trade and Commerce
14. (1) No person shall be entitled to adopt for
use in connection with his business, as a trade
mark or otherwise, any symbol consisting of, or
so nearly resembling as to be likely to be
mistaken for,
(a) the Royal Arms, Crest or Standard;
(b) the arms or crest of any member of the Royal
Family;
(c) the national flag in any of its forms;
(d) the standard, arms or crest of His Excellency
the Governor-General;

(e) the arms or crest adopted and used at any
time by Canada or by any province or municipal
corporation in Canada;

(f) any national flag, arms, crest or emblem
commonly used as such by any foreign state;
(g) the emblem of the Red Cross Society,
consisting of a red cross on a white ground or
the expression “Red Cross” or “Geneva Cross;”
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SUBSECTION (i) FROM 1932 DOES NOT
APPEAR IN THE STATUTE IN 1953
(i) any national, territorial or civic flag, arms,
crest or emblem, or official control and
guarantee sign or stamp, notice of the
objection to the use of which as a commercial
device has been received pursuant to the
provisions of the Convention and publicly
given by the Registrar;
NEW (j) any scandalous, obscene or
immoral word or device;
NEW (k) any matter that may falsely
suggest a connection with any living
individual;
(l) the portrait or signature of any individual
who is living or has died within the preceding
thirty years;
NEW (m) the words "United Nations" or
the official seal or emblem of the United
Nations;
(n) any badge, crest, emblem or mark
(i) adopted or used by any of Her Majesty's
naval, army or air forces,
(ii) of any university, or
(iii) adopted and used by any public authority
in Canada as an official mark for wares or
services, in respect of which the Registrar has
at the request of Her Majesty or of the
university or public authority as the case may
be, given public notice of its adoption and use,
or
NEW (o) the name "Royal Canadian
Mounted Police" or "R.C.M.P." or any
other combination of letters relating to the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or any
pictorial representation of a uniformed
member thereof.
9 (2) Nothing in this section prevents the use
as a trade mark or otherwise, in connection
with a business, of any mark described in
subsection (1) with the consent of Her Majesty
or such other person, society, authority or
organization as may be considered to have
been intended to be protected by this section.

(i) the emblem of any fraternal society, the legal
existence of which is recognized under any law
in force in Canada;
(h) any national, territorial or civic flag, arms,
crest, or emblem of the prohibition of which as a
commercial device notice has been received and
publicly given by the Registrar pursuant to the
provisions of the Convention more than two
months before the adoption of the symbol;

(k) the portrait or signature of any person who is
living or has died within thirty years.

(j) any symbol adopted and used by any public
authority in Canada as an official mark on
similar wares;

14 (2) Nothing in this section shall prevent the
use as a trade mark, or otherwise in connection
with a business, of any such symbol as aforesaid
with the consent and approval of His Majesty or
such other person as may be deemed to have
been intended to be protected by the provisions
hereof.
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Appendix G: The Changes Made in 2019 to 1953 Legislation for Prohibited Marks
Trademarks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13 (last amended on
June 18, 2019)
9 (1) No person shall adopt in connection with a
business, as a trademark or otherwise, any mark
consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be likely to
be mistaken for

(a) the Royal Arms, Crest or Standard;
(b) the arms or crest of any member of the Royal
Family;
(c) the standard, arms or crest of His Excellency the
Governor General;
(d) any word or symbol likely to lead to the belief that
the goods or services in association with which it is used
have received, or are produced, sold or performed under,
royal, vice-regal or governmental patronage, approval or
authority;

Trade Marks Act, 1952-53, c 4, s 1
9. (1) No person shall adopt in
connection with a business, as a trade
mark or otherwise, any mark
consisting of, or so nearly resembling
as to be likely to be mistaken for
(a) the Royal Arms, Crest or Standard;

(b) the arms or crest of any member of
the Royal Family;
(c) the standard, arms or crest of His
Excellency the Governor General;
(d) any word or symbol likely to lead
to the belief that the wares or services
in association with which it is used
have received or are produced, sold or
performed under royal, vice-regal or
governmental patronage, approval or
authority;
(e) the arms, crest or flag adopted and used at any time
(e) the arms, crest or flag adopted and
by Canada or by any province or municipal corporation
used at any time by Canada or by any
in Canada in respect of which the Registrar has, at the
province or municipal corporation in
request of the Government of Canada or of the province Canada in respect of which the
or municipal corporation concerned, given public notice Registrar has at the request of the
of its adoption and use;
Government of Canada or of the
province or municipal corporation
concerned, given public notice of its
adoption and use;
(f) the emblem of the Red Cross on a white ground,
(f) the heraldic emblem of the Red
formed by reversing the federal colours of Switzerland
Cross on a white ground, formed by
and retained by the Geneva Convention for the
reversing the federal colours of
Protection of War Victims of 1949 as the emblem and
Switzerland and retained by the
distinctive sign of the Medical Service of armed forces
Geneva Convention for the Protection
and used by the Canadian Red Cross Society, or the
of War Victims of 1949, as the
expression “Red Cross”or “Geneva Cross”;
emblem and distinctive sign of the
Medical Service of armed forces and
used by the Canadian Red Cross
Society; or the expression "Red Cross
"or" Geneva Cross";
(g) the emblem of the Red Crescent on a white ground (g) the heraldic emblem of the Red
Adopted for the same purpose as specified in paragraph Crescent on a white ground adopted
(f);
for the same purpose as specified in
paragraph (f) by a number of Moslem
countries;
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(g.1) the third Protocol emblem — commonly known as
the “Red Crystal” — referred to in Article 2, paragraph
2 of Schedule VII to the Geneva Conventions Act and
composed of a red frame in the shape of a square on
edge on a white ground, adopted for the same purpose as
specified in paragraph (f);
(h) the equivalent sign of the Red Lion and Sun used by
Iran for the same purpose as specified in paragraph (f);

(h) the equivalent sign of the Red Lion
and Sun used by Iran for the same
purpose as specified in paragraph (f);

(h.1) the international distinctive sign of civil defence
(equilateral blue triangle on an orange ground) referred
to in Article 66, paragraph 4 of Schedule V to
the Geneva Conventions Act;
(i) any territorial or civic flag or any national, territorial
or civic arms, crest or emblem, of a country of the
Union, if the flag, arms, crest or emblem is on a list
communicated under article 6ter of the Convention or
pursuant to the obligations under the Agreement on
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights set
out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement stemming from
that article, and the Registrar gives public notice of the
communication;
(i.1) any official sign or hallmark indicating control or
Warranty adopted by a country of the Union, if the sign
or hallmark is on a list communicated under article
6ter of the Convention or pursuant to the obligations
under the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the
WTO Agreement stemming from that article, and the
Registrar gives public notice of the communication;
(i.2) any national flag of a country of the Union;
(i.3) any armorial bearing, flag or other emblem, or the
name or any abbreviation of the name, of an
international intergovernmental organization, if the
armorial bearing, flag, emblem, name or abbreviation is
on a list communicated under article 6ter of the
Convention or pursuant to the obligations under the
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the WTO
Agreement stemming from that article, and the Registrar
gives public notice of the communication;
(j) any scandalous, obscene or immoral word or device;
(k) any matter that may falsely suggest a connection
with any living individual;

(i) any national, territorial or civic flag,
arms, crest or emblem, or official
control and guarantee sign or stamp,
notice of the objection to the use of
which as a commercial device has been
received pursuant to the provisions of
the Convention and publicly given by
the Registrar;

(j) any scandalous, obscene or immoral
word or device;
(k) any matter that may falsely suggest
a connection with any living
Individual;
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(l) the portrait or signature of any individual who is
living or has died within the preceding thirty years;

(l) the portrait or signature of any
individual who is living or has died
within the preceding thirty years;
(m) the words “United Nations” or the official seal or
(m) the words "United Nations" or the
emblem of the United Nations;
official seal or emblem of the United
Nations;
(n) any badge, crest, emblem or mark
(n) any badge, crest, emblem or mark
(i) adopted or used by any of Her Majesty’s
(i) adopted or used by any of
Forces as defined in the National Defence Act,
Her Majesty's naval, army or
(ii) of any university, or
air forces,
(iii) adopted and used by any public authority,
(ii) of any university, or
in Canada as an official mark for goods or
(iii) adopted and used by any
services, in respect of which the Registrar has, at
public authority in Canada as
the request of Her Majesty or of the university
an official mark for wares or
or public authority, as the case may be, given
services, in respect of which
public notice of its adoption and use;
the Registrar has, at the
request of Her Majesty or of
the university or public
authority as the case may be,
given public notice of its
adoption and use; or
(n.1) any armorial bearings granted, recorded or
approved for use by a recipient pursuant to the
prerogative powers of Her Majesty as exercised by the
Governor General in respect of the granting of armorial
bearings, if the Registrar has, at the request of the
Governor General, given public notice of the grant,
recording or approval; or
(o) the name “Royal Canadian Mounted Police” or
“R.C.M.P.” or any other combination of letters relating
to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or any pictorial
representation of a uniformed member thereof.

9 (2) Nothing in this section prevents the adoption, use
or registration as a trademark or otherwise, in
connection with a business, of any mark

(a) described in subsection (1) with the consent of Her
Majesty or such other person, society, authority or
organization as may be considered to have been intended
to be protected by this section; or

(o) the name "Royal Canadian
Mounted Police" or "R.C.M.P." or any
other combination of letters relating to
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
or any pictorial representation of a
uniformed member thereof.
9 (2) Nothing in this section prevents
the use as a trade mark or otherwise, in
connection with a business, of any
mark described in subsection (1) with
the consent of Her Majesty or such
other person, society, authority or
organization as may be considered to
have been intended to be protected by
this section.
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(b) consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be likely
to be mistaken for
(i) an official sign or hallmark mentioned in
paragraph (1)(i.1), except in respect to goods
that are the same or similar to the goods in
respect of which the official sign or hallmark
has been adopted, or
(ii) an armorial bearing, flag, emblem, name or
abbreviation mentioned in paragraph (1)(i.3),
unless the use of the mark is likely to mislead
the public as to a connection between the user
and the organization
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